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ABSTRACT  
The 2008 financial crisis that led to the collapse of companies and economic recession 
in most countries has also increased the concern for transparency, accountability and 
regulatory oversight and once more put corporate governance and board effectiveness on the 
front burner of big business issues all over the world. The board is seen as a key player in 
governance of companies and there is need for a better understanding of how this body 
works. Majority of the research work in these areas has been in developed economies and not 
much work has been done in the area of board effectiveness in the emerging markets of 
Africa. 
This thesis examines the relationship between key board characteristics and board 
effectiveness. It also explored the impact of certain mediators on this relationship. Unlike 
most studies on board which focus on firm performance and mostly in developed markets, 
this study was conducted in an emerging market and the focus was on board effectiveness. 
Based on the work done by other researchers in developed economies the researcher 
developed a theoretical framework and a set of hypotheses to examine the relationship 
between board characteristics and board effectiveness and the impact of certain mediators on 
this relationship. Board characteristics considered in this research include board size, CEO 
duality, board independence, and board diversity. In addition, the impact of board human 
capital on board effectiveness was also considered. Additionally, the researcher examined if 
the relationships between board characteristics and board effectiveness will be affected by 
organization type, ownership, age and size.  
The empirical examination of the hypotheses developed from the theoretical 
framework presented in this study show that board characteristics, apart from professional 
human capital, do not have any significant impact on board effectiveness. Board professional 
human capital was found to have a positive relationship with board operations and board 
cohesiveness and also with board effectiveness. 
 The results show that in Nigeria, board diversity and human capital are the most 
important board structural factors that impact board effectiveness. They also show that board 
processes of operations, cohesiveness and decision making have significant impact on board 
effectiveness. Finally the results show that board process factors are more important than 
board structural factors in determining board effectiveness.  The study shows that these 
relationships were not significantly affected by organization type, ownership, age or size.  
The study contributes to understanding of board effectiveness in an emerging market 
where board roles and processes are still developing; by examining both traditional variables 
such as board size, CEO duality, board independence and other organizational attributes such 
as board job related diversity and board professional human capital variables. In addition, this 
is the first study to examine board effectiveness in publicly quoted companies in Nigeria. The 
study will also contribute to better governance practices in Nigeria, where lack of good 
governance has been blamed for the slow economic development and growth. 
The theoretical framework and the findings of this thesis are expected to stimulate 
scholars for further research into identifying the characteristics that boards must possess if 
they are to be active and effective. They should also stimulate practitioners and scholars of 
strategy, organizational behaviour and corporate governance to examine boards and their 
activities from many perspectives, particularly from the process side. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1   Overview 
 
In today‘s globalized world, the market place has become particularly challenging 
where good players must be firms who operate on rule-based systems rather than on 
relationship-based
1
 ones.  This brings to fore, the importance of corporate governance, which 
applies to both private and public institutions in a country.  Both formal and informal 
institutions together govern the relationship between the people who manage corporations 
(management) and all others who invest resources in corporations in a country.  These 
institutions include the country‘s corporate laws, securities laws, accounting rules, generally 
accepted business practices and prevailing business ethics (Oman, C., Fries, S., and Buiter, 
W., 2003).  Thus, the institutions of corporate governance serve as a platform for regulating 
appropriate behaviour in any given economy. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737) define 
corporate governance as ―the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment‖. John and Senbet (1998, p. 372) propose 
the more comprehensive definition that ―corporate governance deals with mechanisms by 
which stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over corporate insiders and management 
such that their interests are protected‖.  
Since the mid 1980s, the issue of corporate governance has attracted a very significant 
level of attention both in academic research and in practice. The scandals at big global 
businesses such as Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, Lehman Brothers and International News 
Corporation, in the last 10 years, have placed the corporate governance systems of modern 
corporations under close scrutiny. Each round of corporate scandals over the years sets off a 
fresh round of debate and corporate governance enhancements. The Asian financial crisis in 
the late 1990s led to the focus on insider trading. The Enron and WorldCom scandals led to 
the focus on the roles of audit committees and external auditors and board independence. The 
global financial crisis that erupted after the collapse of Lehman Brothers led to the focus on 
executive remuneration. At the heart of these corporate governance reforms and 
enhancements is a common interest in the effectiveness of boards of directors. 
                                                          
1 Relationship-based systems are prone to conflict of interests and possible abuse, particularly in emerging 
markets, such as Nigeria. 
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The 2008 financial meltdown that led to the collapse of companies and economic 
recession in most countries has also increased the concern for transparency, accountability 
and regulatory oversight and once more put corporate governance and board effectiveness on 
the front burner of big business issues all over the world.  
In the wake of corporate failures, numerous suggestions have been made about how to 
improve the governance of companies in order to rebuild trust. These corporate governance 
reforms focus primarily on the makeup and the working of the board (Van den Berghe and  
Levrau, 2004). The board is seen as a key player in governance of companies and as such 
there is the need for a better understanding of how this body works. Most of the research 
work in these areas has been in developed economies and not much work has been done in 
the areas of corporate governance and board effectiveness in the emerging markets of Africa. 
Prior research on corporate governance in an African context include board 
characteristics and the financial performance of Nigerian quoted firms ( Ujunwa, 2012), 
studies of SMEs (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006; Abor and Adjasi, 2007), the impact 
of board attributes on capital structure and financial decisions (Abor and Biekpe, 2007), 
governance standards (Okike, 2007), perceptions of governance (Wanyama et al., 2009), 
board characteristics and involvement in strategic decision making – the Nigerian 
perspectives (Ogbechie et al., 2009), corporate governance practices of publicly quoted 
companies in Nigeria (Ogbechie and Koufopoulos, 2007), financial distress (Muranda, 2006), 
effects on capital markets (Kibuthu, 2005), overviews of corporate governance in Africa 
(Nganga et al., 2003), and studies of governance in the Nigerian context (Oyejide and Soyibo, 
2001; Sademola and Soyibo, 2001). 
There is a need for further research to understand better, document and operationalize 
board variables and board effectiveness especially in African markets like Nigeria. This 
thesis seeks to identify and examine the key factors that lead to effective boards of directors, 
which in turn impacts firm performance. 
 
1.2   Importance of Boards 
A lot of work and discussions on corporate governance involve boards of directors 
and highlight their importance to the success of the organizations they govern. Governance 
issues arise whenever ownership of an entity is separated from its management. Adam Smith 
in his ‗Wealth of Nations‘ demonstrated that the concept of corporate governance was known 
as early as the eighteenth century, even though the phrase was not in use. According to him, 
3 
 
the directors of companies, being managers of other people‘s money, are not expected to 
watch over it with the same vigilance as they will over their own. This is the basis of agency 
theory proposed almost eighty years ago by Berle and Means (1932). Berle and Means (1932) 
in their influential treatise on the separation of shareholders‘ ownership and management‘s 
control in a corporation stated that agency problems arise when the principal (shareholders) 
lacks the necessary power or information to monitor and control the agent (managers). 
Agency problems still exist in the business world because the interests of firms‘ owners and 
managers (agents) are usually divergent (Dalton et al., 2007: 1) and hence potential for 
―managerial mischief‖.  
According to Burlaka (2006), there are three types of problems that shareholders 
encounter when they seek to exercise their control over managers. First, small shareholders 
frequently lack the expertise and funds to monitor and assess the work of managers who have 
enormous information at their discretion. Second, large shareholders may have a conflict of 
interest, which can undermine their incentive to maximize firm value. Third, large 
shareholders may themselves be part of organizations that face governance problems. 
Agency theory has been very popular in explaining the role of boards in mitigating the 
costs resulting from sub-optimal performance by agents, termed as agency costs (Berle and  
Means, 1932; Jensen and  Meckling, 1976; Fama and  Jensen, 1983; Dalton et al., 2007). 
Other theoretical perspectives on corporate governance such as stewardship, resource 
dependency and stakeholder theories also enhance the understanding of the role of boards 
(Hillman and  Dalziel, 2003; Hendry and  Kiel, 2004; Freeman, Wicks and  Parmar, 2004). 
Stewardship theory views agents (managers) as stewards who manage their firm 
responsibly to improve the performance of the firm (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998). Resource dependency theory considers agents (management as well as the 
board) as a resource since they would provide social and business networks and influence the 
environment in favour of their firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pearce and Zahra 1992; 
Johnson, Daily and  Ellstrand, 1996; Carpenter and  Westphal, 2001). While Stakeholder 
theory expects boards to take into consideration the needs of an increasing number of 
different stakeholder groups, including interest groups linked to social, environmental and 
ethical considerations (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman et al., 2004). 
A good understanding of the different theoretical perspectives will give better insights into 
the contribution of boards to firm governance and performance. 
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The importance of role of the board in ensuring good corporate governance has been 
recognised in all the codes of corporate governance and laws that have been enacted in 
different parts of the world. After the Enron saga, the US government enacted The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, which puts pressure on the board to ensure adherence to regulations and 
standards leading to transparency and integrity. The penalties for non-compliance are aimed 
at improving oversight function of the board (Moeller, 2004). 
In the UK, the Cadbury report on the financial aspects of corporate governance 
(1992), Greenbury report on directors‘ remuneration (1995), Hampel report on corporate 
governance (1998), Turnbull report on guidance of directors (1999), Higgs report on role and 
effectiveness of non-executive directors (2003), Combined Code on corporate governance 
(2003, 2008, 2010) and Walker report (2009) on financial institutions highlighted the role of 
the boards in good governance. South Africa released its first code of corporate governance, 
King Report I, in 1994, which coincided with the re-integration of South Africa with the rest 
of the world (Naidoo, 2002). A revised edition of the code was issued in 2002, King Report 
II, to keep in line with emerging trends in other parts of the world (Naidoo, 2002). A further 
revised edition, King Report III, was released in 2009 after the global financial crisis kicked 
off and these reports also stressed the role of boards in good governance.  
In Nigeria the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) released a code of 
corporate governance (2003) for publicly quoted companies, which highlighted the role of 
boards in good governance. The Nigerian code was revised in 2010 to have more bite and 
bring it in line with global best practices. The new code applies to all publicly quoted 
companies in Nigeria and all other companies seeking to raise funds from the capital market 
through the issuance of securities or seeking listing by introduction. The code is not 
mandatory as companies are expected to comply or explain if they do not. It recommends a 
formal and rigorous annual evaluation of the board, the committees, and each individual 
director. 
International organizations such as Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) have also 
developed guidelines for corporate governance with focus on the role of boards. The OECD 
first released its guidelines ―Principles of Corporate Governance‖ in 1998 and revised it in 
2004. The ICGN has provided a forum to facilitate international dialogue for major 
institutional investors, investor companies, financial intermediaries, academics and other 
parties interested in the development of global corporate governance practices (ICGN, 1999). 
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These principles have given rise to best practices that are being endorsed by G-7 countries, 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, International Finance Corporation, the United 
Nations and other international organisations (ICGN, 1999). The common denominator of all 
these codes and practices is their emphasis on the importance of an independent and 
competent board (Carlson, 2001). 
A good board can play a significant role in ensuring good firm performance. Boards 
can provide link between the firm and its environment, secure critical resources (Williamson, 
1996; Hillman et al., 2000). The board has an important role to play in helping management 
make strategic decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983, Davies, 1999; Kemp, 2006). Another 
important role of boards is to act as a mechanism of internal governance and monitoring of 
management (Barnhart, Marr and Rosenstein, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). By 
performing these roles, an effective board is likely to help the firm achieve superior 
performance (Hawkins, 1997; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). It is therefore important to 
study and understand what makes boards of directors effective.  
 
1.3   Renewed interest in Boards   
Recent corporate governance scandals in various parts of the world have again put the 
spotlight on board of directors. These scandals which include Enron, WorldCom, Tyco 
International in the United States, HIH insurance in Australia, Parmalat in Italy, Saytem in 
India and Air New Zealand‘s disastrous experience with Ansett Australia highlighted the 
inadequate role played by the boards and failure of corporate governance processes (France 
and Carney, 2002; Weekend Herald, 2003, Economist, 2003; Lockhart, 2004). The public 
uproar after the Enron collapse led to enactment of ‗The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002‘ in the US 
(Moeller, 2004) and similar regulations or corporate governance codes in many other 
countries. The pressure is now on boards to live up to their responsibilities and reduce or 
eliminate corporate governance abuses. 
In the last few years there has been more pressure on boards to show how they govern 
and add value to their companies. How to enhance board effectiveness has become a focus of 
attention and debate amongst corporate governance experts and researchers. 
There has been renewal of interest in understanding the roles of boards and top 
management and how they could be made more effective. First, there has been a deep sense 
of dissatisfaction amongst shareholders regarding the poor performance of corporations, 
raising questions about the competency of boards, corporate greed and falling shareholder 
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value (Sherman and Chaganti, 1998; Vint, Gould and Recaldin, 1998). Second, there has 
been a phenomenal growth in the number of institutional investors such as pension funds, 
mutual funds, banks, and insurance companies, who have the necessary resources and 
expertise to perform their fiduciary duty of ensuring good governance and returns by 
monitoring the board decisions (Hawkins, 1997; Sherman and Chaganti, 1998; Becht, Bolton, 
and Roell, 2003). Third, there has been an increasing realisation on the part of corporations 
that a good board is a source of strength in several ways such as attracting investment capital, 
improving valuations and share price performance, and providing better long-term 
shareholder returns (Vint et al., 1998; Lee, 2001; Carlsson, 2001). Good governance practices 
are now recognised to serve as sources of economic growth in many countries (Healy, 2003). 
The performance of a company generally reflects the quality of its directors and the 
effectiveness of its board. According to Nicholson and Kiel (2004) an effective board and an 
effective management team should produce positive performance. In a similar fashion, poor 
board effectiveness and poor management effectiveness will lead to poor corporate 
performance.  Sufficient insight into the complex web of criteria which enables boards of 
directors to be effective in conducting their roles and ultimately creating shareholder wealth 
has not been fully explored. In this respect, Zahra and Pearce (1989) argued that there is ―a 
growing awareness of the need to understand better how boards can improve their 
effectiveness‖. Since then several governance literatures have rekindled interest in 
understanding the effectiveness of boards. The impact of these studies is reflected in 
recommendations put forward in the Codes of Good Governance published in most 
developed and emerging countries. Recommendations such as reducing board size, including 
outsider board members and independent directors, encouraging committees on the board and 
proactive meetings, or separating the positions of chairman and CEO, have been put forward. 
So far, concise models of how boards should function have not yet been found (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003). More recent research studies have tried to seek optimal solutions to the 
problem of governance by modelling board behaviour (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; 
Drymiotes, 2007; Gillete et al., 2007; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 
2008). 
. 
1.4   Past studies on Board Effectiveness 
Empirical studies on boards of directors have to a large extent been driven by the 
question of how much the board can influence firm performance.  Various researchers have 
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examined the direct impact of different board attributes on firm performance. Using financial 
performance as a proxy, they have explored boards‘ effectiveness in protecting shareholders‘ 
interests, but have mostly shown inconclusive results (Coles, et.al. 2001).  
Another group of research work has investigated the influence of board attributes on 
the performance of board roles, suggesting an indirect causal relationship between boards of 
directors and company performance (Deutch, 2005). A common feature of all these studies 
however, is the focus on a limited number of characteristics related to board composition, 
such as outsiders‘ representation, board size and CEO duality. There are other studies which 
try to examine the impact of board committees (Kesner, 1988), director characteristics (van 
der Walt and Ingley, 2003) and board processes (Cornforth 2001). Insight into how boards of 
directors operate effectively in creating shareholder wealth is still of interest for further 
exploration. Nicholson and Kiel (2004) developed a framework for diagnosing board 
effectiveness but has not been tested empirically. Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) have 
also developed a process-oriented model for determining board effectiveness. This model, 
which is yet to be tested empirically, strongly relies on the input-process-output approach 
used in research frameworks for studying organizational teams. 
 
1.5   Board Research in Emerging Markets 
Emerging markets play an increasingly important role in the global economy, given 
their high economic growth prospects and their improving physical and legal infrastructures. 
For some investors, emerging markets offer an attractive opportunity, but they also involve 
multifaceted risks at the country and company levels. These risks require investors to have a 
much better understanding of the firm-level governance factors in different markets. 
Corporate governance is the most researched aspect of boards in the emerging market. 
For the past three years, approximately 1,000–1,200 papers are published each year on the 
Social Sciences Research Network with the term ―corporate governance‖ appearing as a key 
word in the abstract. Most of these researches have concentrated in the developed economies 
while less than 1 per cent focus on emerging markets.  These numbers indicate a relatively 
limited scholarly focus on emerging markets, possibly due to data limitations. Equally 
noteworthy is that much of the work done so far has focused on board structures, for which 
data are relatively more available. Work on board processes, performance and effectiveness 
have been quite scanty, especially in the specific case of Nigeria, which is the second largest 
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economy in Africa and an important potential economic power in emerging markets. This 
research is aimed at gaining further insights into the concept of board effectiveness. This is 
informed by the belief that board effectiveness is determined by a large and interrelated set of 
variables which have to be better understood through further board research. The focus is on 
understanding the key determinants of effective board of directors employing evidence from 
publicly quoted companies in Nigeria. The motivating question is how do boards of publicly 
quoted companies in Nigeria operate and what factors determine their effectiveness?. Also 
explored are the interrelationships between those/ determinants, board characteristics and 
board effectiveness. 
The fact that different companies operating in Nigeria, in the same industry/sector and 
market environment and under the same regulatory arrangements generate different outcomes 
can be explained in terms of differences in the way they are run. How these companies are 
run is usually determined by their boards and this has generated interest in understanding how 
these boards operate or function. 
 
1.6   Research Problem 
1.6.1 Corporate Governance Challenges and Board Effectiveness 
The various global corporate governance failures in the last 10 years and the global 
financial crisis of the last 4 years have put pressure on boards to live up to their 
responsibilities.  Most countries in the world, including emerging markets, had to take stock 
of how they fared. Walker (2009) reviewed corporate governance in UK banks and came up 
with recommendations which included improving the quality of boards, their functions, 
performance evaluation, remuneration and risk management capabilities. In South Africa, the 
King III code emerged and in Nigeria, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) code 
was revised. Whilst these changes were aimed at making corporate boards more effective, 
there are still challenges as to how these boards are constituted and structured, how they 
operate in terms of processes and how they perform their various roles. 
1.6.2 Research Questions 
Using Nigeria as the contextual setting for emerging markets, the development of 
effective boards could be achieved through the provision of the following research questions: 
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RQ1. What are the effects of board characteristics on board cohesiveness, board decision-
making, and board operations? 
RQ2. What are the effects of board human capital on board cohesiveness, board decision-
making, and board operations? 
RQ3. What are the effects of board cohesiveness, decision-making and operations on board 
effectiveness (board control, service, and strategic roles)? 
1.6.3 Research Objectives 
Controlling for various covariate factors such as industry and sector similarities and 
market and environmental sameness, we argue that disparities in outcomes can be explained 
in terms of differential board characteristics.  How companies perform is seen as a function of 
the way they are run given the type of boards and their effectiveness in performing their 
roles.  
The most discussed issues regarding boards of directors are how to organize them and 
what characteristics they need to posses if they are to function effectively. With regard to the 
factors that influence board effectiveness, Carter and Lorsch (2003, p. 8) explain that 
‗‗structure, composition, and processes are the explicit design choices every board must 
make.‖ 
This dissertation therefore seeks to identify and examine the key factors that lead to effective 
boards of directors, which eventually contribute towards firm performance. In the process of 
conceptualising board effectiveness and operationalizing board performance in an emerging 
market, this study aims to achieve the following objectives: 
 Develop a conceptual framework of board effectiveness and test it empirically. 
This will assist in gaining a more profound insight into the concept of board 
effectiveness. This is based on the belief that board effectiveness is determined by 
a large and interrelated set of variables which have not been fully explored in 
mainstream board research.  
 Determine the factors that influence board effectiveness. This study is focused on 
understanding the key determinants of effective boards of directors and the drivers 
of these determinants, using data from publicly quoted companies in Nigeria.  
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1.7   Motivation for the Research 
Corporate governance becomes particularly important in developing and emerging-
markets, like Nigeria, because of the prevalence of relationship-based institutions in both the 
economic and political spheres, since the various legal institutions tend to be weak.  This 
scenario has given rise to countless abuse of corporate privileges by corporate insiders and 
their allies, which has resulted in the expropriation problem
2
.  
In the last ten years, corporate governance has become one of the most debated 
business issues in Nigeria. In 2003 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of 
Nigeria came up with a code of Best Practices for Public Companies in Nigeria, SEC (2003)
3
 
and this was reviewed in 2010. In 2006, the Central Bank of Nigeria
4
 came up with corporate 
governance code for banks operating in Nigeria arising from the consolidation exercise in the 
industry. Furthermore, recent developments
5
 in the Nigerian banking industry, which forced 
the Central Bank of Nigeria to intervene in 8 banks, have added more interest to the 
discussion on corporate governance and board effectiveness in Nigeria. 
Weak legal institutions in Nigeria have further reinforced the need for strong and 
effective boards to ameliorate these weaknesses. The effectiveness of boards in Nigeria will 
therefore have a significant impact on the state of corporate governance at firm level and also 
in the country. The need to understand the issues that make these boards more effective in 
performing their roles is therefore a pressing one. 
Prior to an academic career, the researcher had worked as the marketing director of a big 
multinational company in Nigeria and currently sits on several boards that include public and 
private companies. The researcher has over twenty five years of board experience and has 
encountered several governance challenges on these boards and these have led him to see 
how best to put some theoretical perspective into the practical experiences that have been 
encountered on these boards. This is a critical motivation for this study and thesis  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 That is corporate insider use of their effective control over resources to exploit other investors and generate 
corporate control rents to their advantage 
3 See www.sec.ng 
4 See www.cbn.org 
5 Many banks in Nigeria had liquidity problems arising from toxic assets in margin trading and downstream 
petroleum business. 
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1.8   Theoretical Framework 
The research is based on the theoretical framework below (figure 1), which is adopted 
from the work by Nicholson and Kiel (2004) and Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007). 
 
Figure 1.1: Theoretical Framework 
 
 The framework is based on the premise that board characteristics and board human 
capital have impact on board processes, which in turn have impact on board effectiveness. 
Board human capital is the individual knowledge, skills and abilities possessed by directors 
(Nicholson & Kiel, 2004). Board effectiveness is determined by how well board control 
(monitoring), board service and board strategic roles are carried out. The board characteristics 
in the framework are board size, board leadership, board independence, and board diversity. 
The board processes considered are board decision-making, board cohesiveness and board 
(administrative) operations. The study investigates the impact of various board characteristics 
on board decision-making process, cohesiveness and the operations undertaken by the board 
to serve the firm. It also considers  the impact of these  board characteristics, board decision 
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making, cohesiveness and operations on board effectiveness. The framework does not include 
firm performance. However, it is assumed that board effectiveness will lead to good firm 
performance. 
 
1.9   Research Methodology 
The vast majority of studies on boards of directors have relied upon quantitative data 
gathering techniques (Daily et. al.2003). These techniques include mainly large archival data; 
while a subset of board studies have also used questionnaires. Levrau and Van den Berghe 
(2006), in their study of Belgium boards used a mixed method design (Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2003). They opted for a sequential exploratory design (Creswell et. al., 2003), 
which is a two phase approach whereby the collection and analysis of qualitative data in an 
initial phase is followed by a phase of quantitative data collection and analysis. 
In this study the quantitative approach was adopted because of the difficulty of 
engaging top executives in interviews as a result of their busy schedules. The quantitative 
research instrument was developed from the materials that other researchers had developed. 
Structured questionnaires, accompanied by a personalized letter, were mailed to the 
chairpersons and directors of all publicly quoted companies in Nigeria. Follow up phone calls 
and reminder mail waves were used to ensure good response rate.   
Principal component analysis (PCA) was used to extract the relevant factors that were 
employed in a simple least squares regression methodology to analyse the data.  
 
1.10   Contribution of the Study 
This study has developed a framework that is more applicable to an emerging market 
and has gone beyond theoretical framework to testing the framework empirically, which is a 
step beyond what most researchers in this area have done. This thesis therefore, fills an 
empirical gap in the literature. It contributes to the body of knowledge on board of directors‘ 
performance and effectiveness, particularly in emerging markets. It also contributes to a 
better understanding of board dynamics and gives salient insights into key considerations for 
appointing directors in emerging markets such as Nigeria.  
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1.11   Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter one gives an overview of the study and 
explains the importance of the study. It also discusses the motivations for undertaking the 
study and the contribution it makes to the body of knowledge. 
Chapter two gives a comprehensive description of Nigeria as a means of having a 
good understanding of the context of the study. 
Chapter three provides detailed review of relevant literature. It first discusses the 
various models of boards and corporate governance in general. Then the chapter looks at 
different theoretical perspectives relating to boards and their effectiveness. The chapter 
further reviews the literature related to board characteristics and effectiveness.  
Chapter four presents the theoretical framework and hypotheses for explaining the 
relationships between board characteristics, board human capital, board processes and board 
roles/tasks. 
Chapter five gives the methodology adopted for this research, along with the research 
design. It describes the sample, data sources, data collection, variables and the statistical tools 
used for data analyses. The last section of this chapter discusses the context of the study 
(Nigeria) and peculiar problems associated with data collection in Nigeria.  
Chapter six focuses on the descriptive statistics employed in analysing the data 
collected. Chapter seven presents the results of factor analysis of the data and narrowing 
down on the new dependent, independent and mediator constructs and variables. 
Chapter eight presents the results of the correlation and regression analyses of the data 
and implications of the results for theory development, board formation, professionals and 
policy makers.  
Chapter nine concludes the thesis by summarising the main findings and the 
contributions for practitioners and academia. This chapter also identifies the limitations of the 
current study and concludes with a set of recommendations for future research. 
 
1.12   Summary 
 This introductory chapter presents a synopsis of the entire thesis. Starting with a 
background overview of corporate governance and board performance, it then explores the 
importance of boards and the renewed interest in boards arising from the governance scandals 
in various parts of the world. The overview of past studies in board effectiveness sets the 
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stage for the introduction of the research problem and objectives. The research methodology 
and the contribution of the study are then introduced followed by the thesis outline. 
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CHAPTER 2: NIGERIA – CONTEXT OF THE THESIS 
2.1   Introduction 
This chapter discusses the context of the thesis research, which is Nigeria. First 
section looks at the geography and socio-economic issues of the country. Corporate 
governance development in the country is discussed in the second section. The third section 
reviews board in Nigeria and the fourth section reviews the structure of the Nigerian stock 
market. 
2.2 Overview of Nigeria 
 The research for this thesis was carried out in Nigeria and so it is important to have a 
good understanding of the country in terms of political, economic, social and cultural factors.  
Nigeria is a country in West Africa with land area of 923,773 square metres and an estimated 
population of 163 million
6.
 The country, which is a former British colony, is an assemblage 
of people of different tribes, cultures, languages and religions, necessitated by the colonial 
interests of the then British government to ease the governance of the country. The 
predominant ethnic groups and languages in Nigeria are the Hausas in the north, Yorubas in 
the west and Ibos in the east. The country's government and politics have been conditioned 
and be-deviled by the problems of accommodating several diversities: ethnic, linguistic (there 
are between 250 and 400 distinct languages), geopolitical, religious (there is a deepening 
cleavage between Christians and Muslims), and class. English is however the official 
language and medium of communication in schools and in business. 
The Nigerian economy is largely dependent on its oil sector, which supplies about 
95% of its foreign exchange earnings. Despite its rich natural resources, Nigeria has a per 
capita income of around US$1460 per annum and life expectancy of 48.4 years (UNDP 
Human Development Report 20107).  
Nigeria is a leading power on the continent of Africa given its sheer size and resource 
base. The country is a large supplier of oil to the US, although the growing exploitation of 
                                                          
6 See http://www.doingbusiness.org 
7 http://hdr.undp.org 
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unconventional oil and gas supplies in North America will mean that Nigeria will need to 
look for alternative markets over the longer term. 
Over the last few years the Nigerian government had operated with significant deficit 
budget every year and this deficit had been around the 3 - 5% of GDP level. Deficits of this 
level are considered sustainable, provided that the efficiency of expenditure is steadily 
increased and translate into higher longer-term economic growth. The deficit had been 
financed largely by domestic borrowing but in 2010 the government indicated its intention to 
borrow a greater share of the debt from external sources. This was to allay fears locally that 
government borrowing was crowding out the private sector. A debut US$500m Eurobond 
was launched successfully in January 2011 and based on that success the government might 
return to international capital markets in the future. 
Going forward, the government is targeting more prudent fiscal policy, and the 
generally favourable oil price environment will make this possible via strong revenue. 
However, expenditure control will prove more difficult. Economic expansion will be buoyed 
by robust performance in the non-oil sector and real GDP growth is expected to average 
above 7% in the near future. Tighter monetary and fiscal policy should help control inflation 
but stronger growth and higher commodity prices could see it increase.  
 However, the public sector is very weak and, on top of this, corruption threatens to 
crumble the country. As such, compared with the Western standard, there is a near collapse of 
governance in Nigeria. Corruption has increased the cost of doing business in the country. 
The 2012 Transparency International Corruption Report8 ranked Nigeria 139 out of 174 
countries in its corruption index. 
In sum, businesses wishing to operate in Nigeria face many constraints, including 
poor infrastructure, particularly poor and inadequate road networks and electricity supply; 
inadequate physical security; corruption; weak enforcement of contracts, and the high cost of 
finance. These factors have deterred foreign entrepreneurs from investing in Nigeria and 
induced many Nigerians to take their money and skills abroad (NEEDS 2005: xv). The World 
Bank Report ―Doing Business 20129‖, rates Nigeria 131 out of 185 countries (125 in 2010) in 
terms of ease of doing business. The World Bank, in an investment assessment in that report, 
showed that 80 per cent of businesses in Nigeria offer bribes to government officials. It also 
                                                          
8 http://cpi.transparency.org 
9 http://www.doingbusiness.org 
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added that the country remains the most attractive investment destination in Africa despite 
the high rate of corruption. 
2.3 History and Development of Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
 Present Nigerian firms as institutions of socioeconomic production and exchange 
originated within the context of colonial imperialism and have therefore evolved in the 
context of modernisation and contact with the Western world. Nigeria gained independence 
from Britain in 1960. Before the contact with the West the mode of production was largely 
agrarian and peasantry in nature. The first generation of Nigerian firms evolved towards the 
end of the slave trade. The United Africa Company (UAC), founded by George Goldie in 
1879, was one of the earliest modern firms that operated in the area that later became Nigeria. 
The first company law in Nigeria was the Companies Ordinance of 1912, which was a 
local enactment of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 of England; even the current 
company law of Nigeria (now known as the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990, 
CAMA) is largely modelled on the UK Company Act 1948 (Guobadia, 2000).  As a result, 
issues relating to the conduct and governance of Nigerian corporations have their roots in the 
country‘s colonial past (Okike, 2007). Nigeria thus inherited the British corporate governance 
system. 
At the assumption of independence, expatriates dominated the investment 
opportunities and sources of capital accumulation in Nigeria. This inhibited the accumulation 
and reinvestment of capital by Nigerian investors who were not economically strong to 
compete with the foreign investors and multinational corporations. These inabilities to 
compete made the Nigerian investors to become mere intermediaries between the foreign 
entrepreneurs and the Nigerian state, or, were finally made to turn to the state as a source of 
capital. This resulted in an increased intervention of the state in investment and 
entrepreneurship, which in turn arrogated to the state and the members of the political class a 
huge advantage of monopoly over economic investments and highly profitable government 
contracts. Politics has also become one of the primary sources of capital accumulation by 
Nigerians. All these have fuelled corruption in the country with rulers dipping their hands in 
the treasury of the country with a high level of impunity.  
The post-independence (after 1960) Nigerian economy was public sector-driven with 
government at both Federal and state levels investing in most sectors. In the 1970s the 
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government embarked on a massive indigenization program which aimed at achieving some 
level of economic independence by getting more Nigerians involved in the private sector at 
the expense of foreign investors in all sectors of the economy. The 1980 and 90s was the era 
of privatization, with government divesting from businesses and moving the economy to 
become private sector-driven. This did not result in dispersion of ownership but rather created 
companies with core and dominant investors. These dominant investors determined the 
composition of the boards of the companies they own. 
  In Nigeria, most businesses in the formal sector are not publicly listed and only about 
213 companies are listed in the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). All the others, over 
500,000, are operating outside the legislation governing the capital market. These companies 
are mainly small and family owned. In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon world, where corporate 
ownership is typically dispersed among many shareholders, a high percentage of listed 
companies in emerging markets such as Nigeria have dominant shareholders (Barton and 
Wong, 2006). This ownership structure has significant effect on corporate governance 
practice as the dominant shareholders tend to have control over top management and board 
appointments. 
The basic law that guides the operations of companies in Nigeria is the Companies 
and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990. It clearly specifies the duties and responsibilities of 
directors and recognises the board of directors as the most important body that can ensure 
good corporate governance practices in a firm.  The CAMA 1990 requires every private 
company registered in Nigeria to have at least two directors on its Board (one-tier model). 
The directors have a statutory duty to act at all times in what they believe to be the best 
interests of the company as a whole so as to preserve its assets, further its business and 
promote the purposes for which the company is formed. They must prepare financial 
statements, which reflect a ―true and fair‖ view of the company‘s affairs during the financial 
year and must be presented to shareholders for their approval at the annual general meeting 
(AGM). 
The directors must also prepare a Directors‘ Report providing an overview of the 
company‘s development, its principal activities during the year and any significant changes in 
those activities. These provisions are aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of boards and their 
accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders. 
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An interesting thing about boards in Nigeria is the degree of diversity arising from the 
need to reflect a national character. In Nigeria the agitation for even and fair distribution of 
national resources amongst the various ethnic groups transformed into the entrenchment in 
the constitution of the country the Federal Character concept. The concept implies that 
appointments in government organizations and institutions should reflect the diversity of the 
country as all sections should be represented. Federal character and quota system in Nigeria 
is similar to the affirmative action policy in America. 
The letter and spirit of Federal Character imply the composition of the government of 
the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such 
a manner as to reflect the Federal Character of Nigeria and the need to promote national 
unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no 
predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in 
that government or in any of its agencies. This should also be extended to the states of the 
country. This concept has also filtered into the private sector even though the constitution 
does not demand it. 
The importance of true and effective implementation of federal character in public 
appointments to reflect the multi-variables of a multi-cultural, multilingual, multi-religious 
Nigeria‘s national development cannot be over emphasised. It is important, particularly, in a 
plural society such as Nigeria, that all citizens feel a sense of equal voice, equal 
representation and equal participation. No citizen or group of citizens should feel 
marginalized. The sectional polarization has in recent times manifested itself in what is now 
known as ―ethnic militias‖ that have led to several social unrests in the country. These groups 
emerged to protect their collective ethnic or regional interests. 
The adverse effect of Federal Character is the promotion of mediocrity or neglect of 
merit in appointments. This is because professionals and experienced individuals could be 
over-looked due to the fact that they are more in one part of the country than the order. In 
addition Ethnicity and Religion are two issues that have also played dominant roles in the 
way of life and governance in Nigeria and Africa in general. The corporate governance 
implications of Federal Character in board appointments include having directors that are not 
competent and knowledgeable, and allegiance to shareholders that are responsible for their 
appointment.   
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2.3.1 The Code of Corporate Governance Best Practices for Public Companies in 
Nigeria  
The global concern for good corporate governance has also been extended to Nigeria 
as a result of various corporate governance problems that have arisen in some publicly quoted 
companies over the past ten years. This has made corporate governance one of the most 
debated business issues in Nigeria and has prompted a number of regulatory organizations to 
set up corporate governance structures. In 2001 the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) of Nigeria set up a committee that came up with a code of Best Practices for Public 
Companies in Nigeria (―the Code‖) that became operational in 2003. The review of the code 
began in 2010 and finally became operational in March 2011. 
In 2005 the Institute of Directors of Nigeria set up a Center for Corporate Governance 
to champion the cause of good corporate governance amongst its members. Furthermore in 
March 2006, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) issued corporate governance guidelines for 
banks operating in Nigeria. 
The Nigerian code of Corporate Governance is primarily aimed at ensuring that 
managers and investors of companies carry out their duties within a framework of 
accountability and transparency.  This should ensure that the interests of all stakeholders are 
recognized and protected as much as possible.  
The code of Best Practices for Public Companies in Nigeria (―the code‖) is voluntary 
even though it is recommended that all Nigerian public companies comply with the code and 
are required to state reasons for non-compliance should they at any time fail to comply with 
it. The code has as its main target the boards of Directors of all public Companies operating 
in Nigeria, but the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of Nigeria who put together 
the code is encouraging as many Companies as possible to adopt the code. 
The code outlines the main duties and responsibilities of the board to include 
balancing the interests of the stakeholders, ensuring that the Company performs to high 
business and ethical standards and providing sound advice to management. 
The code recommends that the Board of Directors shall be composed of Executive 
and non-Executive Directors under the leadership of a Chairman, so as not to exceed 
15(fifteen) persons or be less than 5(five) persons in total. The code recommends that the 
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roles of the chairman and the CEO should be separate and where the Chairman is also the 
Chief Executive, it is important to have a ‖strong independent element‖ on the board. It also 
recommends that the number of non-executive directors should be more than the number of 
executive directors and the appointment of at least one independent director to ensure further 
independence of the board. However, many governance experts are of the opinion that one 
independent director is too minimal for this purpose. 
The code recommends that members of the Board should be individuals with, upright 
personal characteristics, relevant core competences and entrepreneurial spirit. They should 
have a record of tangible achievement and should of knowledgeable in Board matters. 
Members should possess a sense of accountability and integrity and be committed to the task 
of good corporate governance. 
Another interesting recommendation of the code is that directors should not be 
members of Boards of companies in the same industry to avoid conflict of interest, breach of 
confidentiality and misappropriation of corporate opportunity. 
The code recommends the establishment of the following board committees the Audit 
Committee, Governance/Remuneration Committee and Risk Management Committee and 
such other committees as the Board may deem appropriate depending on the size, needs or 
industry requirements of the company. 
The code recommends that the Board should establish a system to undertake a formal 
and rigorous annual evaluation of its own performance, that of its committees, the Chairman 
and individual directors. The evaluation system should include the criteria and key 
performance indicators and targets for the Board, its committees, the Chairman and each 
individual committee member  
  
2.3.2 Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria 
At the end of the consolidation exercise in the Nigerian banking industry, the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN), in March 2006, released the Code of Corporate Governance for 
Banks in Nigeria, to complement and enhance the effectiveness of the SEC code, which was 
implemented at the end of 2006. The three major governance issues that attracted the 
attention of the regulators are directors‘ dealings, conflict of interest and creative accounting. 
The main objective was to restore public confidence through the enthronement of good 
governance. 
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The CBN code is mandatory and all banks are expected to compile and CBN 
inspectors are expected to enforce the compliance. The code recommends a board size of 5 to 
20 directors, the separation of the positions of the CEO and chairperson, majority non-
executive directors, and the appointment of 2 independent directors. The code also 
recommends tenor limit for CEO (10 years) and directors (12 years), a recommendation that 
is not in the SEC code.  
The code also recommends annual performance evaluation of the board and 
individual directors and the evaluation report presented to the shareholders at the annual 
general meeting and a copy sent to the CBN. The establishment of the following committees 
are recommended by the code, Audit, Credit, Risk Management, and Governance.  
The Central Bank of Nigeria code is also being reviewed as a result of corporate 
governance failures that led to the near collapse of ten of the twenty four banks operating in 
Nigeria in 2009. 
2.3.3 Corporate Governance Mechanism 
Corporate governance mechanisms are the processes and formal systems by which a 
country‘s corporate laws, regulations and corporate governance codes are enforced. The most 
important aspect of a country‘s corporate governance mechanism is the monitoring process – 
the inbuilt surveillance system that ensures that the corporations are complying with the law 
(Reed, 2002).  The effectiveness of any corporate governance mechanism depends largely on 
the country's regulatory frameworks and public governance systems (Wilson, 2006). Nigeria 
is one country where public accountability is seriously hampered by the political elite 
(Kifordu 2010) and the country‘s corporate governance mechanism are driven more by 
political considerations. The extent to which the laws are enforced is largely dependent on the 
disposition of the political party in power.  
When a country‘s corporate laws and governance codes are enforced by regulatory 
agencies independent of political influences, the professional bodies will readily collaborate 
with government institutions and the capital market regulators or vice versa (Reed, 2002; 
Wilson 2006). The fact that Nigeria has many corporate governance codes raises question 
about the effectiveness of its corporate governance mechanisms. A situation where a bank 
owns a stock brokerage firm and an Insurance agency and a mortgage company raises a 
question on which corporate governance code is most applicable since all these industries 
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have their own corporate governance codes. The confusion arising from which code 
supersedes the other also makes enforcement almost impossible. 
The significant levels of corruption, corporate misdemeanours and insider abuses of 
corporate privileges in Nigeria are indications of weak corporate governance environment. 
The mechanisms for ensuring good corporate governance exist in Nigeria but the major 
challenge lies in the weakened, inefficient and inadequate regulatory agencies responsible for 
ensuring enforcement and monitoring compliance (Amaeshi et al 2006, Okike, 2007). In 
Nigeria, the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) is the prime government agency that is 
saddled with the responsibility of regulating, controlling and supervising all companies‘ 
related matters but this agency is deliberately weakened by government negligence and is 
perfunctory in performing its duties (Okike 2007). Legal Compliance can only be ensured by 
a virile and well-funded agency. 
It has been widely acknowledged that good corporate governance helps most 
developing countries and emerging markets to attract domestic and foreign direct 
investments, build their markets competitiveness, restore investors‘ confidence, promote 
economic growth and boost national development (Armstrong, 2003; Koufopoulous, 2006). 
However, there are still many major challenges to good corporate governance in these 
developing countries (Li and Flier, 2007; Wilson, 2006) especially when the corporations are 
caught in the dilemma of surviving or being ethical, which is the case in Nigeria. The 
decision to stay alive and remain viable no matter what it takes is making most businesses in 
Nigeria to close their eyes to governance, ethical, social and environmental issues. 
That the boards of directors of eight Nigerian banks were dismissed in 2009 for bad 
corporate governance, insider abuse and mismanagement of shareholders and depositors 
funds, just three years after the introduction of the CBN‘s mandatory code, showed the 
difficulties of enforcement in Nigeria. Although these banks, which are listed companies, 
were reporting incredible economic performances and receiving accolades and awards locally 
and internationally, the CBN could not ensure that the integrity of the figures that the banks 
were reporting to the public.  
Nigeria is a country where the government has persistently reneged on its many 
promises to provide infrastructures and ensure rapid economic development. The citizens of 
Nigeria do not rely on the government for the most basic of amenities such as potable water, 
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electricity, schools and security. Everyone tries to cut corners and provide the amenities at 
very high personal cost. It is the same with corporations as they are more inclined to breaking 
the laws and disrespecting the people's rights so that they can survive the harsh business 
environment.  It is therefore easy for firms to operate unethically, exploiting the natural 
resources, polluting the environment and refusing to pay taxes as part of the survival 
processes in Nigeria 
2.4 Key Issues on Board Development in Nigeria 
Shareholder vigilance in Nigeria is rather weak and external pressure on corporate 
management is also weak. Boards are therefore required to be major drivers of good 
corporate governance in Nigeria. The general roles played by boards, including those in 
Nigeria, can be classified into three broad categories. First, directors are expected to monitor 
senior executives, select and dismiss them, evaluate their performance and design their 
compensation package. Second, directors should be part of defining, selecting and 
implementing corporate strategy. Third, directors should perform ceremonial functions that 
enhanced the company‘s legitimacy (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Stiles And Taylor, 2001). 
In the last few years there has been more pressure on boards to show how they add 
value to their companies. How to enhance board effectiveness has become a focus of 
attention and debate amongst corporate governance experts and researchers. In Nigeria the 
debate is even stronger, following the Cadbury Nigeria recent scandal
10
. The Cadbury Nigeria 
scandal has exposed the limited knowledge of boards in Nigeria and has brought to question 
the effectiveness of the board and individual directors. 
In Nigeria, like most developing countries, good corporate and public governance are 
critical to economic survival and growth. It is therefore important to understand the role of 
boards in ensuring good governance practices.  Recent and current developments in Nigeria‘s 
financial services industry have added more pep to the discussion on board effectiveness and 
                                                          
10 Cadbury Nigeria deliberately overstated its financial position over a number of years (2004-2006) to the tune 
of between N13 and N15 billion ($1 = N120). Over this number of years, Cadbury Nigeria had assigned itself an 
ambitious growth target. To achieve these targets, several systems abuses occurred and the overstatements were 
directly traceable to these systems abuses. 
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good corporate governance. A number of financial failures, frauds and questionable business 
practices had adversely affected investors‘ confidence and customers‘ trust in the industry.  
Most of the research activities on boards in Nigeria have focused on board 
characteristics and firm performance (Ujunwa, 2012; Ogbechie and Koufopoulos, 2007; 
Okike, 2007; Sanda, Mikailu and Garba, 2005). No significant work has been done in 
understanding the way Nigerian boards operate and how effective they are. 
In Nigeria, the institutions that help guard against corporate malfeasance – Securities 
Exchange Commission, Nigeria Stock Exchange, the Judiciary, Institutional Investors, 
Professional Associations, and a probing Media – are still relatively weak or lack critical 
mass. Boards may therefore be the most reliable line of defence for good corporate 
governance.  It is therefore important to understand how boards function and how best to 
make them effective and add value to the firm. 
Many companies in Nigeria, particularly quoted companies, are responding to 
pressure from regulators for higher standards of corporate governance. Boards now appoint 
truly independent directors; have board committees such as audit, risk management, 
nomination (governance) and remuneration committee (Ogbechie and Koufopoulos, 2007).  
2.5 Research Population and Frame 
 Although it would have been desirable to study the entire population of boards of 
businesses (quoted, private, and family) in Nigeria, it will be impossible because of the 
closed nature of most family and private companies. The researcher therefore decided to 
restrict the study to only publicly quoted companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange as they 
have formal boards and provide information of their operations in the public domain. As at 
May 1, 2010 there were 213 quoted companies in the Nigerian Stock exchange with 199 in 
the first (1
st
) tier and 14 in the second (2
nd
) tier market. The 2
nd
 tier securities market, which 
is now known as alternative securities market are for indigenous (local Nigerian) companies; 
while the 1
st
 tier securities market is for both indigenous and foreign companies. Table 2.1 
shows the characteristics of both markets. 
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  1st Tier 
 
2
nd
 Tier 
1 Company must be registered as a Public 
Limited Liability Company under the 
provision of Companies and Allied Matter Act 
1990. 
 
Company must be registered as a Public 
Limited under the federal Inland Revenues 
Service. 
2 Must submit its financial statements / business 
records of past 5 years to the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange on registration. 
 
Must submit its financial statements / business 
records of past 3 year to the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange on registration.  
3 Date of last audited accounts must not be 
more than 9 months. 
Date of last audited accounts must not be more 
than 9 Months. 
 
4 Amount of money that can be raised in the 
market is unlimited. 
Amount of money that can be raised may not 
exceed N100 million.  
 
5 Annual quotation fee is based on the Market 
Capitalization of the company. 
Annual quotation fee is a flat rate of N30,000. 
 
6 At least 25% of share capital must be offered 
to the public. 
At least 15% of share capital must be offered 
to the public. 
 
7 Number of shareholders must not be less than 
300. 
Number of shareholders must not be less than 
100. 
 
8 After listing, company must submit 
quarterly, half-yearly and annual accounts 
to SEC. 
 
After listing, company must submit half-yearly 
and annual accounts to SEC.  
9 Securities must be fully paid up at the time of 
allotment. 
  
Securities must be fully paid up at the time of 
allotment. 
10 Un-allotted Securities must be sold on NSE 
trading floors. 
Un-allotted Securities must be sold on NSE 
trading floors 
Source: Nigerian Stock Exchange – Monthly Stock Market Review, July 2010 Edition 
Table 2.1: Differences between the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 tier Securities Market in Nigeria 
The companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange are classified as follows: 
1. Aviation and road transportation 
2. Commercial services 
3. Construction and real estate 
4. Financial services 
5. Healthcare 
6. Hotel and tourism 
7. Information and Communication Technology 
8. Media, Printing and Publishing 
9. Petroleum Marketing 
10. Manufacturing 
27 
 
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1   Introduction 
This chapter reviews literature relating to corporate boards, the various models and 
their effectiveness. The literature review has been organised in the following sections. First 
section discusses the various models of boards and the corporate governance implications, 
then a review previous studies that have been undertaken on boards of directors in the second 
section. The third section reviews and summarises perspectives of popular theories relating to 
board performance and effectiveness.  
 
3.2   Models of Board of Directors – Governance Structure 
There are three leading approaches to the organization of corporate boards and hence 
corporate governance systems: the Anglo-US one-tier board model, the continental European 
two-tier board model, and the Japanese model. The Anglo-Saxon model is used in the US, the 
UK and Canada, while the continental European model is used in European countries such as 
Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Finland and Netherland. The Japanese model is used mainly 
in Japan and some other Asian countries such as Korea. Each model has implications on the 
number and size as well as the composition of the monitoring boards. Ownership structure 
and business structure, which are part of corporate governance, are different for each of the 
systems. The differences in legal and political institutions of these corporate governance 
systems will affect managerial behaviour. 
 
3.2.1 Anglo-US Model 
The Anglo-US model is an outsider model of governance system (Gugler, Muller and 
Yurtoglu, 2004), in which ownership is dispersed and owners exercise indirect control on 
management by electing representatives to the board that monitors management. 
The Anglo-US model is characterised by share ownership of individual and 
institutional investors not affiliated with the corporation (known as outside shareholders). 
Equity financing is the common method of raising capital for corporations in the UK and the 
US. The three major players in the Anglo-US model are management, directors and 
shareholders and they form the ―corporate governance model (figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1: The Corporate Governance Triangle 
 
The Anglo-US system, from which many elements of governance are taken and 
imitated by others (Witt, 2004), emphasizes the primacy of shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997) and presumes that top executives‘ primary responsibility is to maximize 
shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This Anglo-American model focuses on a 
number of governance mechanisms including the separation of ownership from control, 
financing through the stock market, and the use of independent directors (Dalton et al., 1998).  
In this system, the board of directors‘ main tasks are to appoint and dismiss the 
managers, approve payments and acquisitions and decide on important strategies. Executive 
directors (who are members of management) and non-executive directors (who are outsiders) 
operate together in one organizational layer that constitutes the board. Boards are elected by 
the shareholders at their annual general meetings. As a result of the various corporate 
governance regulations in these countries, the non-executive directors constitute the majority 
on the board. However, many of the companies still have boards that operate with a board 
leadership structure that combines the roles of the CEO and the chairman (called CEO-
duality). While most companies in the UK have board leadership structure that separates both 
positions, there still a few boards in the US that practice CEO-duality. One-tier boards also 
make use of board committees such as audit, remuneration and nomination committees. In 
MANAGEMENT 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
SHAREHOLDERS 
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addition the board of directors is in charge of both decision management and decision 
control. 
This system of corporate governance is also referred to as ―stock market capitalism‖ 
and it relies on external monitoring mechanisms. However, the Enron-type scandals have 
shown that these external monitoring mechanisms are not sufficient for controlling the 
discretionary power of top executives (Gomez, 2004). Managers tend to be disciplined by 
market-based rewards and punishments through capital markets in this system. 
 
3.2.2 Continental European Model 
The Continental European model of corporate governance, also referred to as the 
German model, differs significantly from the Anglo-US model. This model is based on a two-
tier principle that distinguishes a management board and a supervisory board with no 
overlapping membership between them. The management board (a more collegial version of 
the CEO and senior management of the Anglo-American firm) consists of executives who 
manage the company, and the supervisory board is responsible for appointing and supervising 
the management board. Seats on the supervisory board are held in varying proportions by 
representatives of shareholders and employees. For example in companies with between 500 
and 2000 employees, one third of the supervisory board members are employee 
representatives, while in companies with more than 2000 employees the law stipulates that 
labour should take half the seats on the board. 
 An additional organizational layer has been included in this model to separate the 
executive function of the board from its monitoring function, to form a two-tier board. The 
supervisory board, which is the upper layer, is entirely composed of non-executive 
supervisory directors who are usually representatives of labour, government and/or 
institutional investors. The management board, which is the lower layer, is usually made up 
of executive directors. The CEO has no seat on the supervisory board and this ensures some 
degree of independence. In this model, the supervisory board is in charge of decision control, 
while the management board is in charge of decision management. This form of corporate 
governance is also referred to as ―welfare capitalism‖ (Buck & Shahrim, 2005). The 
supervisory board plays the role of outside directors of U.S. and UK companies and it has a 
limited range of rights. It can only control managers of the corporation in extreme 
circumstances by not renewing their contract or blocking proposed mergers. 
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In countries that practice this model, bank financing is traditionally preferred to equity 
financing, and so banks and corporations are the dominant shareholders. The major players in 
this model are banks, corporate players and labour unions. In Germany the banks have strong 
influence within firms as they carry out lending activities and sometimes act as agents for 
other shareholders (Vitols, 2004). According to Vitols (2005), German banks therefore play 
an important monitoring role in corporate governance, at least when compared with the UK 
or the US. This prominent role by banks is attributable to their importance in corporate 
financing, particularly for capital-intensive manufacturing, significant direct share ownership 
in nonfinancial firms, proxy voting on behalf of their customers, and to the nomination of 
bank managers as directors to the supervisory boards of nonfinancial firms. However, such a 
role may not be in the interest of shareholders as the bank‘s main interest is not likely to be 
maximisation of shareholder value. 
This form of corporate governance model embraces a wider conception of corporate 
governance that refers to the means by which stakeholders (creditors, employees, 
government, etc.) may impose control over firms, decisions (Chizema, 2010). 
 
3.2.3 One-tier versus Two-tier Board Models 
 In recent literature, the question of whether a one-tier or two-tier board system is 
superior has been the subject of considerable debate. One of the key concerns is whether 
board members are more likely to be under the influence of management, undermining their 
ability to monitor, under one system or the other. On the one hand, non-executive directors in 
the one-tier model are often closer to management and hence less likely to be objective when 
it comes to corrective actions (Becht, Bolton, and Roell, 2003). On the other hand, Almazan 
and Suarez (2003) argue that under certain circumstances, weak (one-tier) boards may 
actually be optimal. Graziano and Luponini (2005), in contrast, argue that in the presence of 
large shareholders (more concentrated ownership), as is the case in many European countries, 
the two-tier board system may be optimal because it can limit the interference of a large 
shareholder, encouraging managers to exert effort. Adams and Ferreira (2007) develop a 
model of boards in which they are able to analyze differences between one-tier and two-tier 
board structures. In their model, under certain conditions shareholders would prefer a two-tier 
board structure, which entails a separation between the advisory role (management board) 
and the monitoring role (supervisory board). They find that board independence is 
particularly valuable for a supervisory board in the two-tier board structure, but it may not be 
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valuable in the one-tier system due to the conflicting advisory and monitoring roles. In their 
model, which board structure is optimal depends on the level of managerial control benefits: 
under high benefits, the two-tier structure is better. Adams and Ferreira conclude that the 
choice of board structure should depend on shareholder preferences. 
The one-tier and two-tier board models can therefore be seen as alternative 
organizational approaches to support the role of boards of directors to align the diverging 
interests of managers, shareholders and other stakeholders. 
The Anglo-US model of board structure is the model being used in Nigeria, and the board of 
directors is expected to be responsible for the direction and supervision of the affairs of the 
company. 
 
3.2.4 Japanese Model 
           Corporate ownership in Asia is typically concentrated, with controlling owners (La 
Porta et al., 1999) who usually have voting rights in excess of cash flow rights. These 
controlling owners have the power and incentive to influence strategic decisions by 
participating in or personally monitoring management (Grossman and Hart, 1988). In Japan, 
which is a typical Asian country, the corporate governance model (Japanese model) is 
characterised by a single large board of directors that is dominated by managers (insiders) 
and it is not as widely spread as the other two models earlier discussed. 
In Japan, conglomerates, called Keiretsu, are important and the companies that make 
up a conglomerate are linked together through interlocking directors. These companies are 
supported by cross-holdings of one another‘s shares. Financial institutions and/or banks 
belong to the conglomerates that hold shares in those companies. Furthermore, the main bank 
and some other financial institutions are represented on the conglomerate‘s supervisory 
board. An important aspect is the multi-directional control, where each company belonging to 
the „Keiretsu‟ is able to exercise some control over the companies that control it (Rychlewski, 
2010). Additionally, there is a single board of directors that is dominated by managers; over 
three quarters of a board‘s members are managers.  
In this model, the four major players are: main bank (a major inside shareholder), 
affiliated company (a major inside shareholder), management and the government. The 
conglomerate‘s (keiretsu‟s) main bank will become important when a company of this 
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conglomerate has a problem, with cash infusion, restructuring plan, or engineering 
management change (Gugler et al., 2004, p. 140).  
The same model is also found in South Korea, where the business groups are 
characterised by controlling owners known as chaebols, which are legally independent sets of 
firms that are bound together by a constellation of formal and informal ties (Ma et al., 2006). 
The global performance of big Korean companies such as Samsung, LG, etc. has generated 
more interest in the Korean model. 
Gugler et al. (2004, p.132) describe the Korean model as being “a hybrid between the 
German corporate pyramid and the Japanese keiretsu”. The top position of the structure is 
filled by the founding family, who can perpetuate their empires through cross-shareholdings 
among the member companies that result in an imbalance between control and ownership 
rights. Furthermore, the founding families can maintain their power, thus control by the fact, 
that banks and other financial institutions do not play a monitoring role in the company. In 
such firms the controlling owners tend to exploit minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008) 
and this constitutes a serious governance problem. Claessens and his colleagues (2000) found 
that in over 80 per cent of large Korean firms, the largest and controlling shareholder or 
family members were also represented among top executives. Controlling shareholders also 
selected most of the directors on the board (Young et al., 2008), thereby rendering the 
internal governance system ineffective. The selected directors are not likely to oppose the 
views of the controlling shareholders.  
Before the Asian financial crisis of 1997, neither the chaebol ownership structure nor 
Korean legal institutions encouraged effective corporate governance. In 1996, the controlling 
shareholders of the large chaebol owned an average of 23% of the outstanding shares, but 
effectively controlled 68% of the votes through various forms of cross- and circular-holdings 
in subsidiaries and related firms (Kim and Kim, 2008). Such disproportionate control gave 
the chaebol owners the power to appoint the top managements and boards of their affiliated 
firms. This meant that minority shareholders could not be protected and insider trading was 
more likely to take place. 
After the Asian crisis, governance reforms sought to improve transparency, the 
disclosure of financial and corporate information and the financial health of chaebols (Joh, 
2003). One of the conditions that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggested when it 
lent emergency funds to the Korean government was to carry out corporate board reform 
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(Joh, 2003), including the appointment of outside directors. Before the introduction of outside 
directors in 1998, the board of directors in the Korean company was generally composed of 
insider executives who were effectively neutralized by the controlling shareholder. Reforms 
were also aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of the board system, the main thrust of the 
governance shake-up in Korean companies. The best governance practices in Korea could be 
seen mainly in three kinds of corporations: (1) newly privatized companies; (2) large 
corporations run by professional management; and (3) banks with substantial equity 
ownership in the hands of foreign investors. The governance practices of many of these 
companies meet the global standard (Kim and Kim, 2008). 
Chizema and Kim (2010) found that Korean firms, which are known for adopting the 
Japanese board-model, now appoint outside directors to the boards. . They also found that 
larger firms that are under stricter control by the government have higher representation of 
outside directors on the board. This is an example of corporate governance convergence on 
the Anglo-American model, where higher levels of outside director representation on the 
board are the norm. 
The concept of outside directors has been highly contested in Korea, with some 
questioning its effectiveness (Kim, 2007), others arguing that ‗independent‘ directors help to 
monitor owner-managers and to minimize agency problems (Cho and Kim, 2007) of the 
principal–principal form (Young et al., 2008). Opponents of this innovation have argued that 
because Korea has a different institutional environment to the USA and/or UK, outside 
directors would be ineffective in Korea (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). 
3.3   Research on Board of Directors 
The global financial crisis that began in 2008 brought into question the effectiveness 
of the governance mechanisms in many large companies. Less than ten years after Enron 
scandal, the world was faced again with the fallout of bad corporate governance, particularly 
in the financial services industry. The consequences of poor governance practices in the 
financial services industry had harmful effect on many other industries. This was not a 
surprising outcome as the financial industry is a cornerstone of the economy of most 
countries (Merton and Bodie, 2005). These corporate failures have often been blamed on the 
board of directors and many governments and investors have put the board on their search 
light.  
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The board of directors is at the apex of the organization and plays an important role in 
the affairs of a company. According to Nicholson and Kiel (2004) the board of directors is 
the organ of a company vested with the complex task and power over overseeing a 
company‘s strategy and leadership, monitoring its financial results and ensuring compliance 
with regulations. The board of directors is undoubtedly one of the main mechanisms for 
controlling a company. It has all the powers necessary for managing, directing and 
supervising the management of the business and affairs of the company. How boards interpret 
their roles and how they operate are key to their effectiveness (Ashburner, 1997 and Carter 
and Lorsch, 2004). 
Corporate governance codes, governance experts, institutional investors, and activists 
have long advocated changes in the board structure (Monks and Minow, 2001) that will 
enable them be more effective as governance agents. The changes include, among others, the 
appointment of independent directors, having board committees that could check conflicts of 
interest, and a separation of the roles of CEO and chairman of the board (Van den Berghe and 
De Ridder, 1999; Weil, Gotshal and Manges, 2002). These structural measures are assumed 
to be important ways of enhancing the power of the board, protect shareholders‘ interest and 
hence increase shareholder wealth (Westphal, 1998; and Becht et al., 2003). 
Boards of directors are of interest to scholars, the investment communities, the 
business world, regulators and society at large. According to Cadbury (1999) this attention is 
understandable, given the fact that boards of directors serve as a bridge between the 
shareholders, who provide capital, and management in charge of running the company. At the 
heart of the corporate governance debate is the view that the board of directors is the guardian 
of shareholders‘ interest (Dalton et.al., 1998). However, over the years, boards are being 
criticized for failing to meet their governance responsibilities. Major institutional investors 
put pressure on directors they perceive to be incompetent and have long advocated changes in 
the board structure that will ensure better performance (Monks and Minow, 2001). Their call 
has been strengthened by many corporate governance reforms resulting from major corporate 
failures. These reforms put great emphasis on formal issues such as board independence, 
board leadership structure, board size and committees (Van den Berghe and De Ridder, 1999; 
Weil, Gotshal and Manges, 2002). These structural measures are assumed to be important 
means to enhance the power of the board, protect shareholders‘ interest and hence increase 
shareholder wealth (Westphal, 1998; Becht et.al., 2003). The executive remuneration 
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scandals that emerged from the 2008/09 global economic/financial crisis were to some extent 
blamed on the ineffectiveness of boards. 
Over the years the performance of boards of directors has been studied extensively 
from an agency theory perspective (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Dalton et al., 2007) and also 
from resource-dependency perspective (Zaid, 1967; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). However, some empirical researches are available on the governing performance of 
boards and most of them measure board performance by the company‘s financial 
performance (Vance, 1964; Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma, 
1985). It is therefore not likely that a company‘s financial performance is dependent solely on 
board performance as there are numerous endogenous and exogenous factors that influence a 
company‘s financial performance.  
The interest of the investment and business community, and regulators in the 
effectiveness of corporate boards has stimulated academic research in this area. Empirical 
studies on boards of directors are to a large extent driven by the need to find out whether the 
board of directors can influence a firm‘s performance. These however, have met with mixed 
results (Kang and Sorensen, 1999; Daily, Dalton, and Cannella, 2003).  Early research on US 
boards concluded that boards of directors were rather passive and dominated by management 
and as such had minimal impact (Mace, 1971; Drucker, 1974; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). 
Some researchers have examined the direct impact of board attributes on firm performance 
by using a firm‘s financial performance as a proxy. However, many of these studies have 
shown inconclusive results (see the reviews by Dalton et.al., 1998 and Coles et.al., 2001). 
Another group of researchers has investigated the influence of board attributes on the 
performance of board roles, suggesting an indirect causal relationship between boards of 
directors and company performance (see the reviews by Johnson et.al. 1996 and Deutch, 
2005; Finegold et al., 2007). A common feature of all these studies is the focus on a number 
of characteristics related to board composition namely outside directors, board size, board 
diversity and CEO duality. There are other studies which try to examine the impact of board 
committees (Kesner, 1988), director characteristics (Vance, 1978, van der Walt and Ingley, 
2003) and board processes (Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000; Cornforth 2001). More of the 
researches focus on structural factors and only a few on process factors. 
There seems to be some agreement in literature, over the years, that progress in the 
field will largely depend on a better understanding of the inner workings of a board of 
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directors (Pettigrew, 1992; and Hermalin and Weisbach, 2000). Already a small number of 
empirical studies have attempted to understand actual board conduct by exploring the 
dynamics of power and influence as well as the behavior of board members and their 
relationship with management (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Huse and Schoning, 2004; 
Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; and Roberts et al., 2005). Some other scholars have also attempted 
to model the dynamics of boards theoretically (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Sundaramurthy 
and Lewis, 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004a; and Huse, 2005).  
Efforts are still being made by researchers to gain sufficient insight into the complex 
web of criteria which enables boards of directors to be effective in performing their roles and 
ultimately ensuring positive firm performance thereby creating shareholder wealth. In this 
respect, Zahra and Pearce (1989) argued that there is ―a growing awareness of the need to 
understand better how boards can improve their effectiveness as instruments of corporate 
governance‖. There is the need for more research that entails extensive field work to 
understand better, document and operationalize board variables.  
A review of the various theories that attempt to explain the operations of boards could 
provide good insight into how to tackle the research questions. 
3.4   Theoretical Perspectives 
Several theories have been developed by researchers over the years to explain to some 
extent the roles of boards, their performance and the behaviour of directors. The theories 
include managerial hegemony, agency, stewardship, stakeholders, and resource dependency. 
3.4.1 Theory of Managerial Hegemony and Board Effectiveness  
The theory of managerial hegemony describes the board as a legal fiction: a co-opted 
appendage institution that, despite its formal governing power over management, is in fact 
dominated by corporate management and, hence, ineffective in alleviating conflicts of 
interest between management and shareholders (Galbraith, 1967; Mace, 1971; Herman, 1981; 
Vance, 1983; Wolfson, 1984). As a result, the board‘s role in corporate governance is seen as 
a passive and compliant ―rubber stamp‖ for management‘s proposals and decisions (Herman, 
1981). This view of corporate boards is consistent with the traditional managerialist theory of 
corporate control, which emphasizes managements‘ growing control of corporate affairs as 
corporate ownership becomes more dispersed among many small shareholders (Berle and 
Means, 1932; Williamson, 1964; Winter, 1964). 
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According to the managerial hegemony theory, the board‘s lack of detachment is a 
result of management‘s control over the selection of outside board members (Mace, 1971; 
Williams, 1979), which leads to directors that are loyal to management and are expected to 
rubber-stamp their polices (Herman, 1981; Wolfson, 1984). The directors‘ passive board 
behaviour is further attributed to their relative lack of knowledge about the company‘s affairs 
(Estes, 1980), their dependence on information and insights that are provided by the 
company‘s top management (Bacon and Brown, 1975; Wolfson, 1984). In situations where 
management influence the appointment of directors, these directors are expected to refrain 
from overt criticism of management‘s behaviour in order not to jeopardize their board seat 
and its associated benefits, such as compensation and the prestige and status that are 
associated with board memberships. This will have an adverse effect on the board‘s 
monitoring and control function. 
For effective corporate governance it is therefore important to have a board that is 
dominated by independent outside directors who have not been appointed by management or 
have social links with them. This is to ensure that the directors are not controlled by 
management and this will help militate against the managerial hegemony theory. 
In an emerging market like Nigeria, this theory implies that for a board to be effective 
in its oversight function and control of management, the board must be made up of directors 
that are independent and beyond the control of management.   
3.4.2   Agency Theory and Board Effectiveness  
The advent of Modern Corporation created a separation between ownership and 
control of wealth (Berle and Means, 1932). This is because as firms grow beyond the means 
of a single owner, who may be incapable of meeting the rapidly increasing obligations of the 
firm, there is the tendency that the ownership structure of the business will grow also with the 
attraction of new investors. As the firm continues to grow, the owners of the enterprise 
employ some professional executives to help them run the enterprise efficiently on a day to 
day basis. This arrangement creates a relationship in which the owners of the business 
become the principals and the executives, whom they contracted to help manage their firms, 
the agents. This relationship between the business owners (principal) and their managers 
(agents) has been described as ―Pure Agency Relationship‖ because it is associated with 
separation of ownership from control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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Organizational theories and business policies have been strongly influenced by 
agency theory, which depicts top managers in large modern corporations as agents whose 
interests may diverge from those of their principals, the shareholders, (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
Agency theory argues that as firms grow in size the shareholders (principals) lose 
effective control, leaving professional managers (agents) with specialized knowledge to 
manage the affairs of the business, and in so doing, these agents over time gradually gain 
effective control over the business (Mizruchi, 1983). Often times, this transfer of firm‘s 
control from principals to agents over time leaves the agents free to pursue their own selfish 
aims to the detriment of the principals. This situation provides potential for ―managerial 
mischief‖ (Dalton et al., 2007).  
In modern corporations, agents and principal are motivated by opportunities that 
advance their own personal gains. While principals invest their wealth in companies and 
design governance systems in ways that maximize their utility, agents accept the 
responsibility of managing the principal‘s investment (wealth) because they perceive the 
possibility of gaining more utility with this opportunity than by accepting other opportunities 
(James Davis et al, 1997). When the interests and utility functions of the self-serving agents 
coincide with those of the principals, agency problem will not exist. However, when there is 
divergence, agency costs are incurred by the principals because the agents will want to 
maximize their own utility at the expense of the principals‘. 
The objective of agency theory is then to reduce the agency costs incurred by the 
principals by imposing internal control measures to keep these self-serving agents in check 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To this end, agency theorists have suggested some internal and 
external control mechanisms that will help check the excesses of the agents. Having a board 
of directors, who are independent of management in place, will provide the necessary internal 
control. For board effectiveness according to Fama and Jensen (1983), it is suggested that 
decision management (initiation and implementation of decisions) be separated from decision 
control (ratification and monitoring decisions). Decision management is the role of the 
manager (agents) while decision control is a board‘s role. The board helps control the 
corporate agency problem by governing management‘s decisions and assessing their impact 
on shareholders‘ wealth (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Fama and Jensen, 1983).   Another 
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internal control mechanism that has gained substantial literary attention is the executive 
compensation scheme (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Financial 
incentive schemes provide rewards and punishments that are aimed at aligning principal-
agent interest. If the managers receive rewards or incentives that are subject to successful 
completion of shareholders‘ interests or objectives (e.g. long-term rewards tied to firm‘s 
performance), they will be motivated to behave in manner that is consistent with 
shareholders‘ interest. If however, these suggested internal control mechanisms fail, some 
expensive external measures like acquisitions, divestitures, and ownership amendments are 
suggested to control the self-serving managers (Walsh and Seaward, 1990). Nevertheless, 
internal control mechanisms are generally preferred to the external measures because of the 
costs associated with the external measures (Walsh and Seaward, 1990). The application of 
these control mechanisms does not imply that all managers‘ decisions will result in increased 
wealth for the principal rather it implies that the managers will strive to attain outcome that 
are favourable to the principals.  
Agency theory, which has historically dominated research on corporate boards, 
emphasises monitoring and control of management. The monitoring function of the board is 
vital and can be better performed by having a board chair that is independent of the CEO, 
number of outside directors being more than inside directors and using incentives to bind 
CEO and top management team interests to those of shareholders. 
The board‘s effectiveness in monitoring management is critical for the survival of all 
corporations that are characterized by the separation of ownership and decision making 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). The effectiveness of the board will depend on how well they carry 
out their oversight functions and their understanding of shareholders‘ interests.   
In a recent review, Dalton et al. (2007) summarized the three principal means of 
minimizing agency problems as: firstly board independence, which entails ensuring that the 
board has more outside directors than inside directors and also that the chairperson and CEO 
is not the same person. This will help in better control and monitoring of management. 
Secondly, external control could be achieved through merger and acquisition, as this could 
discipline mischievous managers and they stand the risk of losing their jobs. Thirdly, agent 
equity ownership, which ensures that managers who share ownership of their firm work 
towards protecting shareholder interests and creating value for them. 
40 
 
Agency theory defines the monitoring effectiveness of the board in terms of size and 
independence. Agency theory proponents argue that a substantial increase of the board size 
could result in a slowdown in decision making and an increase in costs (Callen, Klein and 
Tinkelman, 2003; O‘Regan and Oster, 2005; Yermack, 1996).  The directors‘ independence 
assures their objectivity when monitoring the management team, thus reducing the managers‘ 
opportunistic behaviour and increasing the organizations‘ efficiency (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990; O‘Regan and Oster, 2005). 
However, exclusive reliance on agency theory is undesirable because the complexities 
of organizational life are ignored. This according to Doucouliagos (1994) calls for additional 
theory to explain this agent-principal relationship based on other non-economic assumptions. 
This call has given rise to other theories like stewardship and stakeholders‘ theories.  
3.4.3   Stewardship Theory and Board Effectiveness 
Stewardship theory was introduced as a means of defining the manager-agent 
relationships based upon other behavioural premises (Donaldson and Davis, 1989). The 
theory defines situations in which managers are not motivated by individual goals but rather 
see themselves as stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of the principals, 
owners of the business.  
Stewardship theory, which has its roots in psychology and sociology, was designed 
for researchers to examine the situations in which executives, as stewards, are motivated to 
work in the best interest of their principals, the shareholders (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). In 
stewardship theory, the steward seeks to attain the objectives of the organization which will 
in turn benefit all the other stakeholders in the business. This is because the steward believes 
that his interests are aligned with those of his principals, thus he maximizes his personal 
interests by ensuring that he protects and maximizes the shareholders‘ wealth through 
excellent performance. This creates the perception that utility gained from collective and pro-
organizational behaviours of managers is higher than the utility that can be gained from 
individualistic and self-serving behaviours.  
While agency theory advocates independent board leadership that discourages duality 
role of the chief executive officer (CEO), (Gillan, 2006; Rhoades et al., 2001 and Weir and 
Laing, 2001), stewardship leadership favours duality role for the CEO in which the steward‘s 
executive also chairs the board (Ju and Zhao, 2009; Peng, Zhang, and Li 2007; Adams, 
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Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005; Shen, 2003; Tian and Lau 2001; Finkelstein and D‘Aveni, 1994 
and Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The theory posits that the delegation of corporate control 
by owners to professional managers may be a positive development towards managing the 
complexity of modern corporations. Having control empowers managers to maximize 
corporate goals. Stewardship theory is therefore not favoured in modern corporate 
governance practices where CEO duality is frowned upon. 
3.4.4   Stakeholder Theory and Board Effectiveness 
  The emergence of stakeholder theory, according to Gay (2002) was prompted by the 
growing recognition by boards of the need to take account of the wider interest of the society. 
He lists the essential premises upon which the stakeholder theory rests, citing Jones and 
Wicks (1999) as being: that the corporation has relationships with many constituent groups 
(stakeholders) that affect, and are affected by its decisions; that the theory is concerned with 
the nature of these relationships in terms of both processes and outcomes and focuses on 
managerial decision making ; that the interest of all legitimate stakeholders have intrinsic 
value and no set of intrinsic value is assumed to dominate the other. The ―stakeholder 
approach‖ according to Hutton (1995), holds that a range of corporate constituencies – 
customers, employees, suppliers, creditors, communities – should have a say in the running 
of the firm. A stakeholder, according to this point of view, is one who has an interest in the 
enterprise and is at risk it if fails. An employee who may find it difficult to secure another 
employment if the enterprise closes; a creditor whose claims will not be met in full if the 
company enters insolvency; suppliers with close ties to a particular producer; and a 
community which has come to depend upon a large local employer, are all in a position 
where they have a stake in the enterprise‘s sustainability. The corporate enterprise cannot be 
maintained without the inputs of a series of constituencies; investors, lenders, suppliers, 
managers, workers, unions, communities. Thus corporate governance is an exercise in ―team 
production‖, in which the issue is how voluntary cooperation between the different 
stakeholder groups is to be achieved (Blair and Stout, 1999). 
This theory maintains that the objectives of the firm should be derived by balancing 
the conflicting aims of the various stakeholders in the firm:  managers, workers, stockholders, 
suppliers, vendors. This theory implies that a board will be mainly interested in performance 
of the company in terms of meeting the expectations of stakeholders. Such a board should be 
made up of directors with the right background and experience for effectiveness of their 
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service function. Board human and social capitals become important with the stakeholders‘ 
theory approach to corporate governance. 
A few authors have criticized the stakeholders‘ theory on certain grounds. For instance, Giles 
Slinger (1998) posited in his work that: ‗Stakeholder theory discards the objective basis for 
evaluating business action…. it provides no guidance at all as to how competing interests, are 
to be ranked or reconciled. And it consequently provides no effective standard against which 
business can be judged‘. 
3.4.5   Resource Dependency Theory and Board Effectiveness 
In resource dependency theory, organizations attempt to exert control over their 
environment by co-opting resources needed to survive. This implies appointing directors that 
can bring their social capital and competences to the firm, as this is one of the most valuable 
attributes that a director can bring to a board (D‘Aveni, 1990; Hillman, 2005; Stevenson and 
Radin, 2009). 
Social capital refers to a person‘s socially valuable personal attributes and network 
connections (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Lester et al., 2008). These attributes and 
connections benefit the firm (Haunschild, 1993; Lester et al., 2008; Payne et al., 2009).  For 
instance, directors who are famous and prestigious in their professions and communities can 
be a source of timely information for business executives. They therefore become actively 
involved in helping the organization by influencing their constituencies on behalf of the focal 
organization (Price, 1963). According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), ‗when an organization 
appoints an individual to the board, it expects the individual to support the organization with 
his business contacts and expertise.  This assistance will hopefully improve the organization‘s 
performance and in turn increase returns to shareholders. 
Proponents of resource dependence theory argue that organizational survival is dependent 
on the ability to access critical resources from the environment (Casciaro and Piskorski, 
2005; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Firms actively manage their resource environments by 
maintaining external linkages to organizations on which they depend for critical resources 
(Hillman, 2005; Westphal et al., 2006). Boards also react in the same way, for example by 
adding a representative of a critical resource to the board constitutes a way of managing this 
dependence and benefiting the firm. After the global financial crisis of 2008, most banks 
needed to include directors with risk management expertise on their boards. Once appointed 
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to a board, the directors will support, identify with, and work to assist the firm (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). Researchers argue that directors with high social capital can bring information 
about the external environment, other firms‘ strategies, and prospective managerial talent to 
the firm (Certo, 2003; Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993). 
 Ultimately, these ties can impact on the performance of the board and hence of the firm 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Modern boards are therefore composed on the basis of the 
resources the directors will bring to the board, and that is why diversity has become an 
important board characteristic. 
Another aspect of the resource dependency theory is the level and use of human 
capital on the board. The level of human capital on the board is also a resource that is 
available to the firm. Boards use their human capital to perform their roles of monitoring and 
resource provision. The resource provision role includes a variety of activities such as 
providing advice to management on major strategic actions 
Resources dependency also takes a broader view of organizational resources focusing 
on the firm‘s competencies and capabilities of coordinating productive resources that are not 
transaction specific (McWilliams and Gray, 1995; Poppo and Zenger, 1998). Resource 
dependency theory implies that the skills and knowledge of directors are resources that could 
be used to help the firm perform better. They therefore have some impact on the effectiveness 
of the board.  
Resource dependency theory implies that for effectiveness a board should be 
composed of directors with the right background and experience, have the right social capital 
and are on other boards. 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) propose a model that integrates agency and resource 
dependence perspectives. They argue that greater levels of ―board capital‖ (a combination of 
directors‘ human capital and social capital) not only should enable boards to secure more 
resources and provide superior advice (as has been shown in prior research, e.g., Boyd, 1990; 
Westphal, 1999), but also enable boards to be more effective monitors of company 
performance (firm performance may best be ascertained through multi-variable measures). 
However, they contend that the extent to which boards exercise these capacities will depend 
upon the incentives given to directors, with greater pay in stock and more board 
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independence predicted to generate greater attention to both monitoring and providing 
resources to the firm. 
3.4.6   Summary of different theories 
 Each of the theories gives credence to a particular aspect of the board‘s activity or 
role. Table 3.1 presents a summary of the five theories discussed above. 
 Managerial 
Hegemony 
Agency Stewardship  Stakeholder  Resource 
Dependence 
Board Role Board 
 ‗a legal 
fiction‘ 
Ensure match 
between 
managers and 
shareholders‘ 
managerial 
control 
Ensure 
stewardship of 
corporate 
assets 
 
Managerial 
empowerment 
Inclusive 
pursuit of 
all 
stakeholder 
interests 
Reduce 
uncertainty; 
boundary 
spanning 
 
Co-optation 
Representative 
Studies 
Mace (1971) 
 
Lorsch and  
Maclver 
(1989) 
 
Stiles (2001) 
Jensen and 
Meckling 
(1976)  
 
Fama and 
Jensen (1985) 
 
Kosnik 
(1987) 
 
Ang et al. 
(2000) 
 
Fosberg and  
Rosenberg 
(2003) 
 
Levrau and  
Van den 
Berghe 
(2007) 
 
Donaldson and  
Davis (1991) 
 
Donaldson and  
Davis (1994) 
 
Davis, et al. 
(1997) 
 
Huse (2007, p. 
55) 
 
Levrau and  
Van den 
Berghe (2007) 
 
Kim, et al. 
(2009) 
 
Lan and  
Heracleous 
(2010) 
RSA (1995) 
 
Blair (1995) 
 
Babic 
(2010) 
Pfeffer 
(1972) 
 
Pfeffer and  
Salancik 
(1978) 
 
Hilman and  
Dalziel 
(2003) 
 
Davis and  
Cobb 
(2010) 
 
Pugliese, et 
al. (2009) 
 
Nicholson 
and  
Newton 
(2010) 
 
Table 3.1: Theoretical Perspective 
(Derived from Philip Stiles, 1997) 
 
Agency theory contends that a key activity of the board is monitoring management on 
behalf of shareholders and that effective monitoring can improve firm performance by 
reducing agency costs. Resource dependence theory sees the board as a provider of resources, 
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such as advice and counsel and links to other organizations, to management and the firm, for 
better performance. Stewardship theory views managers as stewards who will work towards 
the success of the firm and encourages the empowerment of management by the board. 
Stakeholder theory explores the dilemma regarding the interest of different groups of 
stakeholders and it encourages the board to take account of the wider society. Managerial 
hegemony theory sees the board as being dominated by corporate management and 
ineffective in alleviating interest between management and shareholders. 
Among various theories discussed, the agency theory is the most popular and has 
received so much attention from academics (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1983) as well as practitioners. It provided the basis for governance standards, codes and 
principles developed by many institutions (OECD, 1999, 2004; ICGN, 1999, 2005). Boards 
are appointed by the shareholders to monitor and control managerial decision making to 
protect the shareholders‘ interest. In particular, this monitoring role is expected to be 
effectively performed through independent non-executive directors and that the positions of 
Chairman and CEO should be held by different persons (Cadbury, 1992; OECD, 1999; 
ICGN, 1999, Combined Code, 2006). However, other theories such as stewardship theory, 
resource dependency theory and stakeholder theory have become prominent over the recent 
times. Other scholars (e.g. Boyd, 1995; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) have taken a different 
approach and have not limited themselves to a particular distinctive perspective. Boyd (1995) 
argues that the seemingly opposing perspectives of both agency and stewardship theories can 
be correct, but under different environmental conditions, by using a contingency approach. 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) integrated the agency and resource dependency perspectives and 
argued that each board has board capital and it affects both board monitoring (agency 
perspective) and the provision of resources (resources dependency perspective) and that 
board incentives moderate these relationships. Hendry and Kiel (2004) explain that the choice 
of a particular theoretical perspective depends on ‗contextual factors‘ such as board power, 
environmental uncertainty and information asymmetry. Though there are different 
perspectives regarding the firm, ―many of these theoretical perspectives are intended as 
complements to, not substitutes for, agency theory‖ (Daily et al., 2003, p. 372). Review of 
different perspectives clarifies that there is need to take an integrated approach rather than a 
single perspective to understand the effect of corporate governance on board effectiveness. 
While agency theory places primary emphasis on shareholders‘ interests, stakeholder theory 
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places emphasis on taking care of interests of all stakeholders, and not just the shareholders. 
To gain a greater understanding of board process and dynamics, as discussed on this section, 
there is need to integrate different theories rather than consider any single theory. Such an 
approach was supported by Stiles (2001) who calls for multiple theoretical perspectives and 
Roberts et al. (2005) who suggests theoretical pluralism. The next section utilizes the above 
four theoretical perspectives to identify specific board characteristics and their influence on 
board effectiveness.  
3.5   Board Characteristics  
Researchers over the years have established that the performance of a board is 
influenced by the characteristics of the board. These characteristics include board size, CEO 
duality (leadership), board composition (independence), board committees and diversity.  
3.5.1   Board Size   
Board size refers to the total number of directors on the board of any corporate 
organization. Determining the ideal board size for organizations is very important because the 
number and quality of directors in a firm determines and influences the board functioning and 
hence corporate performance.  
The association between board size and corporate performance is still ambiguous as 
conflicting results have been found by various researchers (Yermack, 1996; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006). While Yermack (1996); Anderson et al. (2004); Coles, et al. (2008); Guest 
(2008) found a positive relationship between board size and a firm‘s market value, Randoy 
and Jenssen (2004) and Zahra and Stanton (1988), found that board size was not significantly 
associated with financial performance. Singh and Davidson III (2003) found out that larger 
boards are inversely related to firm‘s performance. Table 3.2 below shows a compilation of 
studies on board size and firm performance.  
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Study  Country  
Time 
period 
No. of 
firms Results 
Ibrahim and 
Samad, 2011 Malaysia 99-05 474 
Find a strong relationship between firms with 
smaller boards and firm value 
Yasser et al, 
2011 Pakistan 08-09 30 
Positive relationship between it and return on 
equity  
Jackling and 
Johl, 2009 India 05-06 180 
Larger board size has a positive impact on 
performance 
Coles, et al., 
2008  US 92-01 
Not 
reported 
Positive relationship between board size and a 
firm‘s market value 
Guest, 2008  UK 81-02 2,746 
Positive relationship between board size and a 
firm‘s market value 
Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006 Malaysia 96-00 347 
Positive correlation with accounting performance. 
And, a negative correlation with the market 
performance 
Bozec, 2005  Canada 76-00 25 
Finds that board size has a significantly negative 
effect on sales margin but not profitability 
Sanda et al., 
2005 Nigeria 96–99 93 
Firm value is positively correlated with small, as 
opposed to large boards 
Beiner et al., 
2004  Switzerland 01 165 
Find no negative impact between board size and 
firm performance 
Lasfer , 2004 UK 
90-91/ 
96-97 1,424 
Finds that board size has a significantly negative 
effect firm value 
Randoy and 
Jenssen, 2004 Sweden 96–98 120 
Board size was not significantly associated with 
financial performance 
Postma et al., 
2003 Holland 97 94 
Find that board size has a significantly negative 
effect firm value and profitablity 
Singh and 
Davidson III, 
2003  US 92-94  118 Firm performance is increased by smaller boards 
Vafeas , 1999 US 90-94 307 
Positive relationship between board size and a 
firm‘s market value 
Yermack, 1996 US 84-91 452 
Positive relationship between board size and a 
firm‘s market value 
Zahra and 
Stanton, 1988  US 80-81 100 
Board size was not significantly associated with 
financial performance 
Table 3.2: The Effect of Board Size on Firm Performance – Summary of Previous 
Studies 
 
The proponents of large board size believe it provides an increased pool of expertise 
because larger boards are likely to have more knowledge and skills at their disposal. They are 
also capable of reducing the dominance of an overbearing CEO (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
The board‘s monitoring and supervising capacity is increased as more and more directors join 
the board (Jensen, 1993). These proponents also find support from stakeholder theory which 
suggests a positive association between larger boards and effective decision making, 
furthermore, a larger board may enhance the quality of advice given to corporate 
management (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Cohen et al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
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 However, there are authors who believe that large board size adversely affects the 
performance and well-being of any firm. Larger boards are difficult to coordinate, and are 
very prone to fractionalization and coalitions that will delay strategic decision making 
processes (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). The proponents of small board size have support  
among agency theorists who argue that as board size increases, control and monitoring 
functions are impaired (Yermack, 1996), cohesion and coordination deteriorates (Jensen, 
1993; Forbes and Milliken, 1999), decision making suffers (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992), and 
discussions of managerial performance become less candid (Vafeas, 1999). In a Nigerian 
study, Sanda et al. (2005) reported that firm value is positively correlated with small, as 
opposed to large boards. The argument is that large boards are less effective and are easier for 
a CEO to control. The cost of coordination and processing problems is high in large boards 
and this makes decision making difficult. 
A board should be large enough to include a diversity of the competencies it needs to 
exercise its responsibilities but small enough to engage in active strategic discussion, make 
timely strategic decisions that will move the organization forward and bond together as a 
team. In the light of this, Hilb (2004) however, recommended a small, legally accountable, 
and well-diversified board comprising a maximum of seven members (including an 
independent chairman, independent members and the CEO) as the ideal board size for 
publicly quoted firms. 
3.5.2    Board Composition (Board Independence)  
Board composition refers to the distinction between inside and outside directors, and 
this is traditionally measured as the percentage of outside directors on the board (Goergen 
and Renneboog, 2000). For Baysinger and Butler (1985), composition may be easily 
differentiated into inside directors, affiliated directors and outside directors. This distinction 
is derived from the extent of their participation in firm management. Inside directors are 
those directors that are also managers and/or current officers in the firm while outside 
directors are non-manager directors. Among the outside directors (also known as external or 
non-executive directors), there are directors who are affiliated, and others that are 
independent. Affiliated directors are non-employee directors with personal or business 
relationship with the company while independent directors are those that have neither 
personal nor business relationships with the company. Although inside and outside directors 
have their respective merits and demerits, most authors favour boards that are dominated by 
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outside directors (Andres et al, 2005). It is argued that outside directors provide superior 
performance benefits to the firm as a result of their independence from firm‘s management 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985). They can bring to the board a wealth of knowledge and 
experience, which the company‘s own management may not possess. They can increase the 
element of independence and objectivity in board‘s strategic decision-making, and also help 
in providing independent supervision of the company‘s management (Department of Trade, 
1977; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Table 3.3 below shows a compilation of studies on the effect 
of board independence on firm performance. 
 
Study  Country  
Time 
period 
No. of 
firms Results 
Khan and 
Awan, 2012 Pakistan 10 91 
Find that having independent directors in board composition 
ensures greater ROA and ROE (firm performance).  
Dey and Liu, 
2011 US 97 -06 200 
Find that firms with directors on the board and audit 
committee who have social and professional connections to 
the CEO are associated with lower operating performance, 
lower value relevance, lower accruals quality and higher 
probability of restatements 
Pathan et al, 
2011 US 97-04 212 
Find negative relation between board independence and 
performance 
Bermig and  
Frick, 2010 Germany 98-07 294 
Find that board composition have no pronounced effect on 
firm valuation and performance 
Rashid et al, 
2010 Bangladesh 05-09 90 
Find no significant relationship between board composition 
in the form of representation of  
outside independent directors and firm performance 
Bhabra and 
Li, 2009 China 01-03 929 
Find positive relationship board independence between firm 
performance for both SOE and non-SOE 
 Jagg et al, 
2009  
Hong 
Kong 98-00 
391-
399 
Find that firms with a higher proportion of independent 
directors on corporate boards are associated lower earnings 
management 
Hashim 
and Devi, 
2008 Malaysia 04 200 
Find a positive significant result of board independence 
when firms undershoot target earnings 
Kajola, 2008 Nigeria 00-06 20 
Finds no significant relationship between ROE and board 
composition (independence) 
Sarkar et al, 
2008 India 03 500 
Find that board independence has a significant influence on 
opportunistic earnings management 
Boone et al , 
2007 US 88-92 1,019 
Find that board independence is 
negatively related to the manager's influence and positively 
related to constraints on such influence. 
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Garg, 2007 India 97-03 200 
Finds mixed evidence that independent directors add value 
and improve the performance of the firm 
Kam, 2007 
Hong 
Kong 00-02 869 
Finds no significant association between the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors on the board and 
earnings management. 
Arslan et al, 
2006  Turkey 97 -05. 999 
Find that board independence has no effect on accounting 
performance, But the stock market perceives board 
independence positively 
Randoy and 
Jenssen, 
2004 Sweden 96–98 120 
Find that board independence is not associated with firm 
performance based on accounting measures 
Ryan and 
Wiggins, 
2004  US 97 1,018 
Find that when a CEO‘s bargaining power increases over 
the board, compensation provides weaker incentives to 
monitor. 
Erickson et 
al, 2003  Canada 93-97 66 
Find that board independence had has a negative influence 
on firm value 
 Gompers 
and Baker, 
2003 US 78 -87. 1,116 
Find that longer-serving CEOs have more power to control 
board composition 
Klein, 2002 US 91-93 400 
Finds that board and audit committee independence are both 
negatively correlated with earnings management. 
Vafeas, 200  US 90-94 307 
Finds that board composition is not significantly associated 
with firm performance. 
Postma et al, 
1999  Holland 1996 94 
Find a negative relationship between the size and 
composition (number of outsiders) of the 
supervisory board and firm performance. 
Table 3.3: The Effect of Board independence on Firm Performance – Summary of 
Previous Studies  
 
Proponents of inside directors have posited that a board that is dominated by inside 
directors has a number of advantages, which include having access to important and relevant 
information about the operational activities of the company and industry environments in 
which the firm operates. In addition, their vast industry experience can help improve firm‘s 
performance (Bhagat and Black, 1998). 
While independence of the board is considered a key criterion in the governance of 
firms, there is no robust evidence that board independence improves firm performance 
(Adams et al., 2010). Vafeas (2000), Dalton, Daily and Ellstrand (1998) and Zahra and 
Stanton (1988) each found that board composition is not significantly associated with firm 
performance. Randoy and Jenssen (2004) found that board independence (board 
compositions) is not associated with firm performance based on accounting measures. 
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However, in a difference-in-differences estimation, Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) 
find that increases in director independence improve performance in those firms in which the 
costs of obtaining information are low, while performance worsens in firms in which 
information costs are high. 
An important issue that is highlighted in recent research on board independence is that 
increased independence also comes at a cost – the possibility of breakdowns in 
communication between the CEOs and directors (Adams and Ferreira (2009).  
A few recent papers also challenge the notion of independence, and document that 
boards that are independent on paper can be ineffective monitors when the directors are 
socially or professionally connected to the CEO (Hwang and Kim (2010); Dey and Liu 
(2010).   
Prior research finds evidence consistent with the influence of CEO bargaining power 
over board independence: Baker and Gompers (2003), Boone et al. (2007) and Ryan and 
Wiggins (2004) find that successful CEOs are able to bargain for less independent boards. 
A reliable and meaningful measure of board independence is difficult to obtain. Some 
previous studies consider the proportion of outside directors on the board as only a proxy for 
independence. 
3.5.3 CEO Duality (Board Leadership) 
CEO duality exists when a firm‘s CEO also serves as the chairman of the board of 
directors. Holding the highly symbolic position of board chair would provide the CEO with a 
wider power base and locus of control (Boyd, 1994). A couple of decades ago, organizations 
across the globe usually combine the position and functionality of the chairman and CEO of 
the board of directors. In the UK for instance, it was commonplace for leading firms to have a 
chairman of the board who also doubles as the CEO until recently. While some 
organizational scholars advocate the combination of both positions (Anderson and Anthony, 
1986; Harrison et al, 1988), others propose the separation of both positions (Lorsch and 
Mclver, 1989; Kesner and Johnson, 1990). The proponents of this duality role believe that 
allowing just one person to function as the chairperson and CEO of the board will provide a 
beneficial platform that is not potentially detrimental (Anderson and Anthony, 1986). For 
example, the greater levels of information and knowledge possessed by a joint 
CEO/Chairperson will enable him or her to better manage and direct the board‘s discussions 
and agenda (Lorsch and Mclver, 1989). Studies have found out that such strong and 
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unambiguous leadership can help a firm to easily adapt to changes in environmental demands 
(Chandler, 1962; Mintzberg and Waters, 1982). Others have suggested that this duality role is 
more efficient and therefore, more sensible form of governance (Williamson, 1985). 
Because of the recent corporate scandals, regulators and reformers are increasingly 
demanding that the role of the CEO be separated from that of the Chair (Wilson 2008, Lorsch 
and Zelleke 2005). This demand had been on for over 20 years, for moves aimed at 
separating the roles and functioning of these two positions had received considerable 
attention (Lorsch and Mclver, 1989; Dobrzynski, 1992) in the UK, US and Australia. In the 
UK, the Cadbury Committee report of 1992 recommended that there should be a clear 
division of responsibilities at the head of the company, implying that the roles of chair and 
CEO should not be combined. As Jensen (1993) noted, for board to be effective, it is very 
important to separate roles, as it avoids CEO entrenchment. It establishes independence 
(autonomy) between the board and corporate management. Without an independent chair, a 
board will not be able to perform its monitoring role effectively (Finkelstein and D‘Aveni, 
1994; Wilson 2008). 
Advocates claim that CEOs become more effective leaders when the two positions are 
separated because it allows them to concentrate on the firm‘s operations while empowering 
the board (Wilson 2008). Kajola (2008) also argued that concentration of decision 
management and decision control in one individual hinders boards‘ effectiveness in 
monitoring top management. 
Stakeholder theory holds that duality seriously impedes the overall stakeholder 
orientation of Board members (Sonnenfeld, 1981). Separating the functions of CEO and 
Chair of the Board may enhance the Board of Directors‘ monitoring and control ability, and 
improve Directors‘ information processing capacities (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). 
CEO duality may reduce the effectiveness of the board and may create a conflict 
between management and the board (Solomon, 2007) and hence reduce the board‘s ability to 
exercise its governance function. Balsam and Upadhyay (2009) found that firms separating 
the positions of chief executive officer (CEO) and board chair perform better and are more 
highly valued by the market. 
It is likely the benefits, if any, of having a separate board chair depends on the 
characteristics of the firm. For example, Palmon and Wald (2002) find ―small firms benefit 
from the clarity and decisiveness of decision-making under a single executive, while large 
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firms benefit more from the checks and balances of having two executives‖. Table 3.4 below 
shows a compilation of studies on the impact of CEO duality on firm performance. 
It could therefore be argued that the combination of the role of the Chairman and the 
Chief Executive is a considerable concentration of power that could endanger the 
effectiveness of the Chairman and whole board, with the potential adverse effects on the 
interests of the other stakeholders. In this regard, many codes of corporate governance, 
including the Nigerian code, recommend that the two roles should be separate, and where the 
Chairman is also the Chief Executive, it is important to have a ―strong independent element‖ 
on the board. 
 
Study  Year   Positive  Negative  
Insignificant /No 
Relationship  
Mahmood and Abbas 2011   Yes   
Mathur and Gill  2011 Yes      
Rashid  2010     Yes 
Belkhir 2009 Yes      
Chen et al 2008     Yes 
Kaymak and Bektas 2008   Yes   
Ponnu 2008     Yes 
Elsayed 2007     Yes 
Peng et al 2007 Yes      
Dahya  2005     Yes 
Sanda et al. 2005   Yes   
Abdullah 2004     Yes 
Bai et al. 2004   Yes   
Kiel and Nicholson 2003 Yes      
Dalton et al 1998     Yes 
Brickley et al  1997     Yes 
Baliga et al  1996     Yes 
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Pi and Timme 1993   Yes   
Rechner and Dalton 1991   Yes   
Anderson and Anthony 1986 Yes     
Fama and Jensen 1983   Yes   
Table 3.4: The Impact of CEO Duality on Firm Performance – Summary of Previous 
Studies 
 3.5.4    Board Committees  
The effectiveness of boards will also depend on the quality of board committees that 
are operational. Corporate governance best practices suggest that at least the following board 
committees should be in existence in a firm: Audit Committee, Corporate Governance or 
Nomination Committee, and Remuneration or Compensation Committee.  In addition any 
business exposed to high risk that could quickly destroy it can make a case for a specialist 
board committee to focus on that risk. 
 3.5.4.1 Audit Committees 
In the USA, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) first suggested in 1940 
that all public companies should have audit committees (SEC, 1940). In 1972, the SEC 
endorsed the establishment of audit committees in all public companies (SEC, 1972), and in 
1978 the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) recommended that its member firms establish 
audit committees made up of outside (non-executive) directors. This was reinforced in 1987 
by the Treadway Commission (NCFFR, 1987) which recommended that all public companies 
should be required by SEC rules to establish audit committees consisting of just non-
executive directors. 
An audit committee has been defined in terms of a subcommittee of largely non-
executive directors whose work encompasses matters relating to audit, financial reporting and 
internal control (Spira, 1998). The audit committee‘s role is perceived as undertaking detailed 
review on behalf of the main board of directors, both to free up main board time and to 
enable the particular expertise of non-executive directors to be usefully employed. 
During the last two decades audit committees have become a common mechanism of 
corporate governance internationally. The audit committee has been looked upon as the body 
that can check the excesses of top management and also ensure accurate financial reporting. 
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According to Reinstein and Weirich (1996), many large firms use audit committees as 
protection against fraud, mis-management and financial liability. 
Major international institutions such as the OECD and SEC, have advocated for the 
setting up of audit committees comprised mainly of non-executive directors in public 
corporations (Hermes, 1999; IGCN, 1999). Nevertheless, the various financial frauds and 
corporate governance scandals across the globe, in the last 10 years, imply that the audit 
committees were either under-performing or better still inefficient in discharging their 
responsibilities (Sommer, 1992; Levitt, 1999). This indeed, necessitated the various 
amendments that have been released by regulatory bodies and institutions across the world. 
The amendments were aimed at making the audit committees more effective and efficient in 
the discharge of their responsibilities, devoid of any manipulation by dominant Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs). 
Two monitoring advantages can be gained from having audit committees, namely, 
independence and board efficiency. Independence is achieved by having both the external 
and internal auditors report to the audit committee. This reporting relationship will ensure 
that management will not have undue influence on the internal and external auditors and so 
are likely to be more objective in discharging their duties. The efficiency of the board of 
directors can be improved by assisting the board in monitoring management performance. 
The spate of financial-reporting scandals in the US in the early 2000s led to the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a sweeping federal law with broad corporate governance 
implications (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002). Similar efforts to improve corporate governance 
and audit committee performance have occurred in numerous other countries (e.g. Bosch 
Report, 1995; Business Sector Advisory Group on Corporate Governance, 1998; Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accounts, 1997; Hampel Report, 1997; Peters Report, 1997). 
3.5.4.2   Remuneration Committee  
Remuneration committee is one of the powerful monitoring mechanisms for 
controlling the excesses of dominant CEOs and fostering good corporate governance (SEC, 
2002). Its absence throws up an avenue or opportunity for senior executives to award 
themselves pay raises that are not congruent with shareholders‘ interest. The absence of this 
committee according to Williamson (1985) is akin to the chief executive writing his 
employment contract with one hand, and then signing it with the other. The role of 
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remuneration committee is basically, to determine the appropriate design of reward structures 
for management and aligning management and shareholders‘ interests. (Main and 
Johnson,1993; Fisher 1986).  
In order to protect shareholders from managerial self-interest, the members of the 
remuneration committee should be independent directors who are not managers of the firm 
(Kesner, 1988; Kesner, 1994). These non-management committee members are expected to 
act as objective decision makers who will ensure that the CEO and the other directors‘ 
compensation are set at appropriate levels (Bowen, 1994; Mangel and Singh, 1993; Singh and 
Harianto, 1989). Indeed, the argument by many analysts that the remuneration committee 
should be composed largely of outside directors is consistent with Agency Theory, which 
advocates the separation of management from control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). On the 
contrary however, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) posited that the number of outside 
directors in the remuneration committee has no bearing with the structuring of pay package 
for the top executive officers in an organization. To them, chief executive‘s compensation is 
not related to the percentage of outside directors on the remuneration committee or even the 
board as a whole.  
Many authors and analysts have however posited that the effectiveness of the 
remuneration committee could still be undermined even if it is largely composed of non-
executive directors. For instance, Singh and Harianto, (1989) noted that the CEOs might offer 
non-executive directors attractive contracts and consulting agreements so as to build personal 
relationships with stronger sense of obligation with these directors. Elson (1993) opined that 
remuneration committee‘s objectivity might be undermined when the component directors 
feel as if they owe their board seats to executive privileges, as may be the case with 
independent directors. Elson clearly asserted that non-executive directors feel some sense of 
loyalty to CEOs because they feel that these CEOs largely influence their nomination to the 
board. Indeed, some CEOs are actually taking advantage of their position to influence boards 
to award excessive salaries (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; O‘Reilly and Wade, 1995). 
Such an action is likely to have an adverse effect on the oversight function of the board. 
 
3.5.4.3   Succession Committee  
Succession planning is believed to help organizational governance structures prepare 
for executive turnover in an orderly and thoughtful manner, evaluate internal resource needs, 
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and train qualified candidates for appointments to executive positions (Bruce et al, 2005). For 
Kesner and Sebora (1994), having a succession committee and plan in place is critical for 
organizational success. Early identification of heir-apparent not only smoothens the routine 
CEO succession process, but also provides insurance should anything unexpected happen to 
the incumbent (Vancil, 1987; Lorsch and Maclver, 1989). Succession process usually is a 
complex one. Although there are often identifiable internal candidates, high executive 
sensibilities, as very few CEOs who are willing to relinquish power in a timely manner 
(Cannella and Shen, 2001), can complicate the process even further. Succession planning is 
quite often characterized by severe internal political manipulations and power struggles 
(Pfeffer, 1981), largely determined by distribution of power among the parties involved 
(Boeker and Goodstein, 1993; Zajac and Westphal, 1996). 
One of the major roles of the board is to ensure continuity of the firm. One way of 
achieving this is to have an effective succession planning process that will ensure the right 
leadership pipeline. 
3.5.4.4   Nominating Committees  
Having the right calibre of directors in terms of skills, knowledge, experience, and 
social capital is important for the effectiveness of the board in adding value to the firm. The 
nominating committee is the body that can make this happen. The nominating committee, 
through its selection of directors, will also provide checks and balances and avoid any 
illogical and self-fulfilling CEO-led selection process. This will inject a greater degree of 
independence in the board itself. The process of nominating and selecting directors is one of 
the critical factors in determining how effectively a corporation is governed. If the process is 
handled well, a strong board will be built, and the organization‘s long-term interest will be 
well served. But if the process is poorly handled, as it too often is, the organization ends up 
with a weak, insulated and self-perpetuating board that leaves the organization vulnerable to 
catastrophic decisions and losing strategies (Leighton and Thain, 1993).  
The independence of the nominating committee is the key to this process and in recent 
times, some US State laws have come up with provisions that allow shareholders to affect 
board‘s composition of the nominating committee by conducting an election contest, upon 
which a candidate is recommended to the nominating committee or nominated at the Annual  
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 General Meeting (SEC, 2003). The composition, mandate and operation of the nominating 
committee should, at all times, be subject to clear and open terms of reference. This is 
because the nominating committee is a key board committee and also a key to sound 
corporate governance. 
Study  Country  
Study 
period 
No. of 
firms Results 
Lary and Taylor (2012) Australia 04 - 09 180 
Results reveal that stronger AC 
independence and competence, but 
not diligence, is significantly related 
to a lower incidence and severity of 
financial restatements (i.e. to a higher 
integrity of financial statements) 
 
Heenetigala and Armstrong (2011) Sri Lanka  03 - 07 37 
Reported a significant relationship 
between board committees and firm 
performance 
Boyle and Xu (2011) 
New 
Zealand 95-10 86 
Found that audit committees have 
also become increasingly dominated 
by independent directors 
Horstmeyer (2011) US 05-09 1500 
Documents that high demand and 
strong performing directors have a 
greater likelihood of serving on the 
nominating committee 
Baxter (2010) Australia 01 200 
 Found that in the  time period absent 
of audit committee regulation, there 
was strong support for the influence 
of the board of directors on the 
composition and activity of the audit 
committee 
 
Kang et al (2010) Australia 08 288 
Found a significant association  
between audit committee 
independence, expertise and activity 
and lower earnings management 
Waweru, Kamau ( 2008) Kenya 04 29 
audit committees had greatly 
enhanced the independence of the 
internal audit function by ensuring 
that internal audit recommendations 
were implemented 
Joshi and Wakil (2004) 
 Bahrain 03 30 
 Found that audit committees appear 
to be used more in larger firms and 
where there are a higher proportion of 
non-executive directors in it 
Weir and Laing (2001) UK 94 - 96 311 
Found that remuneration committees 
had no effect on firm performance. 
Klein (1999) US 92–93 472 
Found evidence that the presence of 
remuneration committees were 
positively associated with firm 
performance 
Reinstein and Weirich (1996) US 
Not 
Stated 247 
Found that many large firms use audit 
committees as protection against 
fraud, mis-management and financial 
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Table 3.5: Summary of Previous Studies on Board Committees 
3.5.5   Board Diversity  
The diversity literature suggests that diversity adversely impacts group dynamics, but 
improves group decision-making. Diversity can either be observable, such as gender, age, 
race and ethnicity, or non-observable such as knowledge, education, values, perception, 
affection and personality. Most research on diversity and its effects on board performance 
focus on observable or demographic diversity.  
Diversity is a factor that is considered in the evaluation of board performance and 
effectiveness. Board diversity implies that the directors have different skills, knowledge and 
experience. They are also from different age groups and social status. Some researchers 
suggest that diversity leads to a greater knowledge base, creativity, higher quality decision 
making and innovation because of the diverse experience of members of the group, and 
therefore becomes a competitive advantage (Watson et al., 1993; Bilimoria and Wheeler, 
2000). 
  Simons and Pelled (1999) in their study on executive diversity found that both 
educational level and cognitive diversity were associated with positive effects on 
organizational performance. However, they argued that experience diversity had a negative 
impact on return on investment and overall organizational performance due to informal 
communication among top teams. Even though the study was targeted at top management 
team, the results could be extrapolated to boards. 
Hambrick et al. (1996) found that homogeneous top-management teams actually 
outperformed heterogeneous ones. They also reported that heterogeneous teams were slower 
in their actions and responses and less likely than homogeneous teams to respond to 
competitors‘ initiatives. The explanation they offered was that in a heterogeneous group 
individuals were more likely to disagree, thereby weakening the team consensus. The board 
of directors can therefore be regarded as a top management team and so Hambrick‘s findings 
can be applicable to the board. The implication of this result for boards is that a highly 
diverse board might not lead to better board effectiveness. 
liability 
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Erhardt et al. (2003), in their research with Fortune 1000 companies in the United 
States of America, concluded that diversity was associated with effectiveness in the oversight 
function of boards of directors. They opined that the oversight function may be more 
effective if conflict emerges which allows for a broader range of opinions to be considered. 
Boards exhibit a considerable degree of diversity on the dimensions of functional 
background, industry background, and educational background. In their review of the 
literature on the effects of diversity in organizational groups, Milliken and Martins (1996) 
note that diversity is a ―double-edged‖ sword for groups; although it increases the aggregate 
level of resources at the group‘s disposal, it is also associated with higher levels of conflict 
interaction difficulties, and lower levels of interaction. Table 3.6 below shows a compilation 
of various studies the impact of board diversity on firm performance. 
 
Authors 
No. of                   
Firms  Positive  Negative  
Insignificant /No 
Relationship  
Darmadi, 2011 169   
Finds that both 
accounting and market 
performance have 
significant negative 
associations with 
gender diversity   
Tibben, 2010 126 
Found a significant 
influence of TMT 
diversity on firm 
performance.     
Carter et al, 
2010 641     
Find no significant 
relationship between the  
gender or ethnic diversity of 
the board, or important board 
committees, and financial 
performance for a sample of 
major US corporations. 
Marinova et al, 
2010  186     
 Found no evidence that there 
is a relationship between 
board gender diversity and 
firm performance. 
Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009 638 
Found that Tobin‘s Q is 
positively related to the 
percentage of women in 
the top management teams     
Eklund et al, 
2009  105   
Gender diversity has a 
small but negative 
effect on investment 
performance   
Wilson and 
Altanlar, 2009 900,000 
Found that having at least 
one female board director 
reduces the risk of 
bankruptcy     
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Campbell and 
Minguez-Vera, 
2008 68 
Find that board gender 
diversity has a positive 
effect on firm value as 
measured by Tobin‘s Q.     
Dezso and 
Ross, 2008 1,500 
Find a positive association 
between firm performance 
and female participation 
below the CEO level     
Rose, 2007  443     
Found no significant link 
between gender, nationality, 
and educational diversity and 
firm performance, measured 
by Tobin‘s Q. 
Francoeur, 
Labelle and 
Sinclair-
Desgagné, 
2007 500 
Found that firms operating 
in complex environments 
generate positive and 
significant abnormal 
returns of 0,17% monthly 
when they have a high 
proportion of female 
directors     
Bøhren and 
Strøm, 2007 203   
Found that TMT 
homogeneity in terms 
of gender is  associated 
with higher firm 
performance   
Randøy et al, 
2006 500     
find no significant diversity 
effect of gender, 
 age, and nationality on stock 
market performance 
 or on ROA 
Smith et al, 
2006 2500   
find a negative 
relationship between 
gender diversity of the 
board and gross profits 
to sales   
Farrell and 
Hersch, 2005 300     
Found that adding a woman 
to the board of  
directors does not result in 
value creation or  
destruction 
Carter et al, 
2003 1,066 
Found that nationality 
diversity is positively 
related with firm 
performance     
Erhardt et al, 
2000 127 
Found evidence for a 
positive influence of 
gender and nationality 
diversity on financial 
performance measured by 
return on equity and return 
on assets      
O‘Reilly, 1993 200   
TMT homogeneity in 
terms of tenure is  
associated with higher 
firm performance   
Table 3.6: The Impact of Board Diversity on Firm Performance: Summary of Previous 
Studies 
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Several scholars have emphasised that one of the main functions of the board of 
directors is to provide quality support and advice to the CEO otherwise unavailable from other 
corporate staff (Hillman and Danziel 2003; Dalton et al. 1998; 1999; Lorsch and MacIver 1989; 
Zahra and Pearce. 1989).  The effectiveness of this role of the board depends on the board‘s 
cumulative human capital that is often linked to various board demography characteristics, such 
as tenure, professional diversity, etc. Boards that are composed of directors with different 
backgrounds may be more effective in terms of bringing important expertise, experience and 
skills to facilitate advice and counsel. A number of studies argue that board diversity in terms 
of directors‘ professional experiences should lead to more efficient service/expertise/counsel 
roles of the board and, as a result, to better performance (Carpenter and Sanders, 2002; Wagner 
et al. 1998; Westphal 1999;  Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990; Kaplan and Reishus 1990). 
3.6   Board Human Capital   
 Human capital is the individual knowledge and skills, which develops typically 
through investments in education, trainings and various experiences Becker in (Yusoff and 
Fauziah; 2010). The collective human and social capital of corporate board members, referred 
to as board capital, is seen as a proxy for the ability of the board to govern the corporation 
and is associated with firm performance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Board human capital is 
an intangible asset of an organization, which comprises of individuals‘ knowledge, skills and 
expertise, including intuitions, rules of thumbs and unconscious values (Hitt et al., 2001) 
experience, reputation and expertise (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). They serve as a director‘s 
capability to perform his functions effectively in a variety of situations.  
In examining prior literature, two theories are employed. First, resource dependency 
theory was used to examine the essential resources that are needed by any firm to maximize 
its performance. Resource dependency theory postulates that firms‘ performances rely on 
their abilities and capacities to secure crucial resources from the environment (Hillman et al., 
2000; Brown, 2007). In this regard, this theory posits that members of board of directors are 
one of the most important resources for a firm. In particular, their knowledge and experience 
in business is found to be essential for the effectiveness of the boards and firm performance 
(Hansell, 2003). For instance, (Huse 2007; Kroll, Walters and Le, 2007; Arthurs, Hoskisson, 
Busenitz and Johnson, 2008) stated that board members contribute to effective governance 
primarily by utilizing information and expertise that can be used to enhance creativity and 
coherence in the decision-making process. Therefore, to be effective, firms need to have 
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boards made up of members who possess functional or firm-specific knowledge and skills, in 
accordance with firms‘ activities (Milliken and Martins, 1996; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
Second, human capital theory was employed to explore the advantage of having 
diversity of individual‘s expertise to an organization (Becker, 1993; Baron and Armstrong, 
2007). It was argued that the greater the human-capital intensity of the board members, the 
greater percentage of high value-added performance contributed by the board to the success 
of company strategy (Stewart, 1997). This can be explained because directors who possesses 
relevant knowledge and skills found to be effective, particularly in analyzing different 
viewpoints of other directors (Nicholson and Kiel 2003), and engaging in strategic processes 
(Offstein and Gnyawali, 2006). 
The two theories indicate that human capital of company directors, played important roles in 
effective governance. Therefore, to be effective, firms need to have boards composed of 
directors who possess expertise, knowledge and skills, which are relevant to their business 
activities. 
3.7   Board Effectiveness 
There are multiple approaches to determine the concept of board effectiveness, which 
depends on the scholar‘s background and research objectives (Kuo, 2004; and Van den 
Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Board effectiveness is mainly concerned with ―task‖ outcomes 
and occurs by fulfilling a role set (Nicholson and Kiel 2004). The approach is, however, still 
subject to considerable debate in the literature. The role set is often not defined as an 
integrated set of activities. In contrast, based on diverging theoretical assumptions, the role of 
the board is conceptualized in a multiple, and in some cases, contradictory way (Johnson et 
al., 1996; and Hung, 1998). Board roles have been the focus of numerous authors‘ research 
since the 1980s (e.g., Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Weir, Laing, and McKnight, 2002; Denis 
and McConnell, 2003; Babić, 2010). The roles of boards of directors are commonly classified 
as: control, service and strategic role (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; and Maassen, 1999). Some 
authors refer to the control role as oversight or monitoring, and the service role as advisory. 
 
3.7.1   Board Control Role (Oversight or Monitoring) 
The control, which is also referred to as oversight or monitoring role, of the board 
consists of controlling the managerial behavior to avoid the investors‘ wealth expropriation 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Regarding the control role, the board of directors, which represents 
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an organization‘s owners, has a legal duty to provide oversight and is expected to carry out 
this duty with sufficient loyalty and care. Particularly, in Anglo-American countries (like 
Nigeria), it is emphasized that the board has a fiduciary duty to oversee the company‘s 
operations and monitor top management performance in order to protect shareholders‘ 
interests (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989).  
The board is responsible for adopting control mechanisms to ensure that 
management‘s behaviour and actions are consistent with the interests of the owners. The 
important control mechanisms are the selection, evaluation and if necessary removal of a 
poorly performing CEO and top management, the determination of managerial incentives and 
the monitoring and assessment of organizational performance (Johnson et al., 1993; 
Mizruchi, 1983; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). The main driver of these control mechanisms is the 
board‘s obligation to ensure that management operates in the interests of the company‘s 
shareholders – an obligation that is met by scrutiny, evaluation, and regulations of top 
management‘s actions by the board (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
The board‘s duty to monitor management and corporate performance has also been 
addressed in other disciplines apart from law. In particular, the dominant theory underlying 
the control role of the board is agency theory. This theory, as discussed in section 2.3.3, is 
concerned with resolving problems that may occur in the relationship between the principals 
(owners) and agents (the managers) (Eisenhardt, 1989). The board of directors can therefore 
be seen as one of the internal control mechanisms designed to address the conflicts of interest 
between managers and shareholders and to bring their interests into congruence (Walsh and 
Seward, 1990). Within this context, a board of directors is the guardian of shareholders‘ 
welfare and fulfil the critical tasks of hiring, firing and compensating the CEO (top 
management) and to ratify and monitor important decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
The monitoring function is clearly a vital one for boards to play, and if anything it has 
become even more salient following the wake of recent global corporate scandals and 
legislations. Heidrick and Struggles (2007) report that 84% of respondents in their survey of 
directors indicated that ―to at least some extent they are now spending more time on 
monitoring and less on strategy.‖ 
Various researchers have established relationships between board characteristics and 
the board control role. Some have established that the board‘s monitoring or control role is 
more efficiently performed by larger and more independent boards (Lehn et al., 2009; Guest, 
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2008; and Raheja, 2005). This relation is particularly relevant in industries such as 
commercial banking, in which the benefits from a larger board include political influence 
with a regulatory body or assistance in attracting more business (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; 
Gillan et al., 2003). 
It has also been argued that a more independent board will be more effective in 
performing their control role as they will not be under the influence of management. Having 
an independent chair could also result in superior monitoring by the board. However, Adams 
(2009) found that intense monitoring can result in poor strategic advising since directors will 
be over burdened with excessive compliance and monitoring responsibilities. This could 
leave such directors with little time, less information, and poorer focus on strategic advising. 
Adams (2009) also provides empirical evidence suggesting that directors who perform 
extensive monitoring duties receive less strategic information from management. . She also 
shows that such directors are less likely to participate in strategic decision-making and their 
inputs are valued less by the CEO. Thus, increased monitoring, especially by a large number 
of independent directors, can lead to significant reduction in the effectiveness of board 
advising. 
That monitoring and controlling of managers is the board's main role does not of 
course imply that boards do not have other tasks to perform. Part of the board‘s job and that 
of its individual members is to assist, encourage, and advise management on the running of 
the firm by setting goals, assessing investment opportunities, and so on, and by making 
available to management both the general and specific knowledge individuals possess as 
board members (Ferreira, 2007; Helland and Sykuta, 2004). 
 
3.7.2   Board Service Role (Advisory) 
The service or advisory role of the board of directors is seen as one of the main 
functions of the board (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Raheja, 2005). It consists of providing the 
CEO and his top management team with expert counsel and access to information and 
resources that directors have. The role primarily stems from a resource dependence view and, 
to a limited extent, from stewardship theory. From a resource dependence perspective, the 
board of directors is seen ―as a vehicle for co-opting important external organizations with 
which the company is interdependent‖ (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Within this context, 
Mintzberg (1983) distinguishes at least four service roles of the board of directors: (1) co-
opting external influencers; (2) establishing contacts (and raising funds) for the organization; 
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(3) enhancing the organization‘s reputation; and (4) giving advice and counsel to the 
organization. In particular, the latter refers to the board‘s potential to provide high-level 
advice to the CEO (Dalton et al., 1998; and Jensen, 1993). However, an alternative approach 
of the service role, mainly based on stewardship theory, excludes legitimacy and resource 
dependence functions in favor of strategic engagement. According to stewardship theory, 
managers are good stewards of the company assets. Managers do not misappropriate 
corporate resources at any price because they have a range of nonfinancial motives, such as 
the intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance, the need for achievement and recognition 
etc. Given the absence of self-interested behavior by managers, the issue becomes to what 
extent organizational structure facilitates the aspiration of management for high performance 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991; and Muth and Donaldson, 1998).  
From stewardship theory perspective, the board of directors is seen as an important 
strategic device. The board of directors can serve the CEO and management with their 
expertise through their active involvement in the strategic decision-making process, 
particularly by advising top management on the initiation, formulation and implementation of 
strategy (Johnson et al., 1996; and Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Ogbechie et al., 2008). 
This approach however blurs a clear distinction between the service and the strategic role of a 
board of directors. 
The service (advisory) role of the board of directors is more efficiently performed by 
a larger and more independent board that can provide important connections and greater 
information, knowledge, and expertise to the CEO and top management team (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Guest, 2008). 
Results from non-financial firms show that advisory needs are positively related to 
firm‘s size and complexity size (Baker and Gompers, 2003; Guest, 2008; Iwasaki, 2008; 
Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Lehn et al., 2009). 
For the board to carry out its advisory function more effectively there is the need for 
directors to have a good knowledge of the firm‘s business and the industry it plays in and to 
have regular timely and quality information about the affairs of the firm they govern. 
 
3.7.3   Board Strategic Role 
The strategic role of the board of directors has historically been subject to many 
disputes. The strategic role of the board taps insights from different theoretical perspectives. 
In essence, there are two broad schools of thought on the involvement of boards in strategy, 
67 
 
referred to in the literature as ‗active‘ and ‗passive‘ (Golden and Zajac, 2001). The passive 
school views the board of directors as a rubber stamp or a tool of management with little or 
no impact on a company‘s strategy process. In contrast, the active school views the board of 
directors as an ‗independent‘ body that actually contributes in shaping the strategic course of 
a company and guiding the management to achieve corporate mission and objectives (Hung, 
1998; and Maassen, 1999). The board‘s contribution can occur in many ways, such as 
through advice and counsel to the CEO, through careful refinements of strategic plans, by 
initiating own analyses or suggesting alternatives, by probing managerial assumptions about 
the firm and its environment, or by ensuring that an agreement exists among the executives in 
the strategic direction on the firm (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; and Zahra, 1990). According to 
Goodstein et al. (1994), the strategic role is of particular importance in critical cases such as 
periods of environmental turbulence or declines in company‘s performance, because such 
events provide the opportunity to a board to initiate strategic change. As pointed out by 
different scholars, the active school of thought is receiving growing attention and is gaining 
ground (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; and Hendry and Kiel, 2004).  
Bob Garratt (2005) found that many board directors do not budget time for, nor have 
little sustained interest in, thinking regularly and rigorously about the future health of their 
businesses. This surprising finding comes from his work on the preferred thinking patterns of 
statutory directors in the UK (Pierce, 2000), the work on ―Directoral Dashboards‖ by Ram 
Ramakrishnan in South East Asia (2003), Clive Morton‘s work published in By The Skin Of 
Our Teeth (2003), and Garratt‘s empirical observations through working with boards of 
directors in Europe, East Asia, Australia, and the US over many years. This implies that 
boards that strive to be effective have to set aside time at board meetings to discuss strategic 
issues, for in addition to making decisions concerning the hiring and firing of CEOs, boards 
may also be involved in the setting of strategy and in the selection of important projects. 
The boards‘ strategic role comprises both oversight of strategy formulation (e.g. 
reviewing, ratifying and evaluating the proposed strategy) and execution and has become of 
major interest (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; McNulty and 
Pettigrew, 1999; Stiles, 2001; Felton and Watson, 2002; Useem, 2003). In addition, the 
highly competitive nature of many industries has made directors to take more interest in their 
strategic role. In a survey by Leblanc and Gillies (2005), directors spoke on their desire ―to 
move beyond their ‗compliance‘ (monitoring) role to a more ‗value-added‘ (strategic) role.‖  
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3.7.4 Overview of the Three Board Roles 
An overview of the three board roles and the functions that make up each role is 
presented in Table 3.7. Although the literature recognizes three board roles, the importance 
attached to each role is not equal. As agency theory dominates corporate governance 
research, it is obvious that the board‘s control role is emphasized as the most important one 
and this role is well-documented by a rich body of empirical literature. At the same time, the 
importance of the board‘s strategic role is supported by a limited but increasing amount of 
empirical research. Several scholars have attempted to understand actual board involvement 
in the strategic decision-making process mainly relying on qualitative research techniques 
(Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Judge and Zeithalm, 1992; 
Goodstein et al., 1994; Johnson et al., 1996; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Short et al., 1999; 
Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Applied to this study, we value the view of a three-fold 
role set which comprises the control, service and the strategic role. Different arguments 
underpin our choice. First, previous studies on boards of directors have relied on a single 
theoretical perspective favoring one board role at the expense of the other, resulting in an 
incomplete picture (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In order to get a more holistic and richer 
understanding of what boards do, it is important that a multiple lens approach is used. 
Second, as argued above, the service and strategy role are not mutually exclusive as there 
exists some overlap with respect to the prescribed tasks performed by the board, particularly 
regarding the strategic decision-making process. Finally, a recent study by Levrau and Van 
den Berghe (2006) revealed that the strategy role was strongly emphasized (in comparison to 
the other board functions) in directors‘ perceptions.  
Board activities tend to be confidential in nature and as such it is not easy to measure 
board task performance in ways that are both reliable and comprehensive. Forbes and 
Milliken (1999) suggested using certain publicly announced board actions, for example, CEO 
replacement as proxy for performance of the control functions. Still, this approach appears to 
be less suitable for the assessment of board task performance on the strategic dimension. In 
particular, it can be argued that it is difficult to isolate the real impact of the board of 
directors (from the impact of management) when assessing publicly announced strategic 
decisions, such as a take-over. Alternatively, Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) suggest that 
researchers measure board task performance by identifying various board functions related to 
the strategic and monitoring role and then asking respondents to assess how well these 
functions are being performed. In spite of their limitations, these self-evaluation approaches 
69 
 
have been commonly used in previous empirical studies on board effectiveness in the non-
profit sector (e.g., Slesinger, 1991; Bradshaw et al., 1992; Green and Griesinger, 1996; and 
Cornforth, 2001).  
 
 Control Role Service Role Strategic Role 
Board 
Responsibilities 
• Maximizing shareholder‘s 
wealth 
• Primarily the board has to 
monitor actions of agents 
(executives) to ensure their 
efficiency and to protect 
principals‘ (owners) 
interests 
• Boards are a co-operative 
mechanism to extract resources  
vital to company performance 
• Boards serve a 
boundary spanning role 
• Boards enhance 
organizational legitimacy 
• Boards serves as 
‗sounding board‘ for 
Management 
• Boards are rubber 
stamps (‗passive‘ 
school of thought) 
• Boards are an 
important strategic 
device contributing 
to the overall 
stewardship of the 
company (‗active‘ 
school of thought 
Board Tasks • Selecting, rewarding and 
replacing the CEO 
•Monitoring/evaluating 
company performance 
• Articulating shareholders‘ 
objectives and focusing the 
attention of key executives 
on company performance 
• Reducing agency costs 
• Ratifying and monitoring 
important decisions 
• Scanning the environment 
• Representing the firm in the 
community 
• Securing valuable resources 
• Providing advice to the 
organization and CEO 
• Involvement in strategy 
formulation and 
implementation 
• Satisfying the 
requirements of 
company law 
(‗passive view‘) 
‗Active‘ view: 
• Guiding 
management to 
achieve corporate 
mission and 
objectives 
• Involvement in the 
strategic decision 
making process 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
• Legalistic Agency Theory • Resource Dependence 
Theory 
Stewardship theory 
• A broad range of 
theories e.g., 
managerial hegemony 
theory and 
stewardship theory 
Source: Adapted from Zahra and Pearce, 1989. 
Table 3.7: Board Directors’ Role Set 
3.8   Board Processes and Board Effectiveness 
The board is responsible for the long-term success of the firm by ensuring that the 
firm is appropriately managed and achieves the strategic objectives it sets. The board 
discharges these responsibilities through annual programme of board meetings where issues 
are discussed and decisions taken. How boards commonly organize themselves to work 
together effectively, how directors relate to one another, how the board interacts with 
management, and how decisions actually get made both inside and outside of the boardroom, 
constitute board processes (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007). The literature survey identified 
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several board process attributes ranging from the extent of exchange of ideas at board 
meetings to the use of formal procedures to evaluate board and managers. Several researchers 
have chosen the set of board processes they are interested in; for example Forbes and 
Milliken (1999) and Huse (2005) chose cognitive conflict, efforts norms and the use of 
knowledge and skills. However, in this study three specific board processes have been 
proposed as antecedents of board task performance: board cohesiveness, decision-making 
and operations.  
These three processes have been chosen because of their importance in the research 
environment, Nigeria. Boards of public companies in Nigeria tend to have directors from 
different parts of the country and so cohesiveness of these diverse members is important. The 
boards of many public companies work primarily for the interests of dominant shareholders 
and so the decision-making process is important. The level of infrastructural development in 
Nigeria is still relatively low and so the issue of administrative operations is also important.  
 
3.8.1   Board Cohesiveness 
Board Cohesiveness refers to the degree to which board members are attracted to each 
other and are motivated to stay on the board (Summers, Coffelt, and Horton, 1988). 
Cohesiveness captures the affective dimension of members‘ inclusion on the board and 
reflects the ability of the board to continue to work together. Board members who are 
attracted to each other are likely to appreciate coming together for board meetings. 
Cohesiveness will also include having a good atmosphere at board meetings. 
Much of the work that boards of directors must do in order to produce effective 
outcomes involves cooperative decision-making and joint efforts. Board members are 
required to work together as a team by mutual interaction, sharing information, resources and 
decisions (Siegel and Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick, 2007). In this respect, the board of 
directors is considered to be a collegial body and only if board members coalesced into a 
group can collective judgment emerge (Charan, 1998). This implies that a board must act a 
strong team and operate collegially for it to be effective. Sharon Kemp (2010) argued that 
teamwork is seen as important to the board process and it was mentioned by ninety percent 
(90%) of board members in her study.   
Boards are charged with complex, interactive tasks, and as such the degree of 
interpersonal attraction among members is likely to influence the effectiveness with which 
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those tasks are performed (Williams and O‘Reilly, 1998). Qualitative research on boards of 
directors (e.g., Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; and Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004) 
revealed that directors value the chemistry of the board and the team spirit of their colleagues, 
which implies cohesiveness, as important elements of board effectiveness.  
 Cohesion aids collaboration and communication among board members, and these in 
turn influence performance outcomes. Both the control and service components of the 
board‘s tasks require extensive communication and deliberation, and board members must 
have a certain minimum level of interpersonal attraction in order to engage in these things. 
Cohesiveness has been found to enhance decision making in some ways, such as by 
promoting earlier and more extensive discussion of alternative scenarios (Hogg, 1996). 
However, boards that are unable to work as a team are less able to control powerful CEOs 
and are also likely to be less effective at providing the advice and counsel to top 
management. 
 
Study       Results 
Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) 
In their study of corporate governance and board 
effectiveness used board cohesiveness and debate as 
intervening variables 
Wan and Ong (2005) 
In their study of Singaporean Plcs, hypothesized board 
process as an intervening variable between structure 
and performance and also treated cohesiveness as part 
of board process 
 
Yukl (2002) 
Developed a multiple –linkage model which identifies 
6 intervening variables (in which cohesiveness was 
one) as important in determining workgroup 
performance  
  Table 3.8: Studies that have used board cohesiveness as an intervening construct 
 
3.8.2   Board Decision-Making 
Much of the work of boards involves making decisions, such as decisions about 
policies, strategies, goals, selection of projects, and recruitment of management staff. How a 
board makes these decisions is important. 
Board decision-making entails rigorous debates at board meetings and also board 
committee meetings. These debates can be open discussions in friendly environment or in 
antagonist environment. Cognitive conflicts might arise during these debates. Cognitive 
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conflict refers to task-oriented differences in judgement among group members (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999). Cognitive conflict is likely to arise in groups that, like boards, are 
independent and face complex decision-making tasks. Because the issues facing boards are 
complex and ambiguous, board members are liable to characterize issues differently and to 
hold different opinions about what the appropriate responses to these issues are (Dutton and 
Jackson, 1987). Cognitive conflict results in the consideration of more alternatives and the 
more careful evaluation of alternatives – processes that contribute to the quality of strategic 
decision-making in boards (Eisenhardt, et al., 1997; Jackson, 1992; Milliken and Vollrath, 
1991). The expression of cognitive conflict during discussions is considered to be a critical 
component of decision-making groups like boards. Since the complexity of the board‘s tasks 
overwhelms the knowledge of one person, board members are supposed to share their own, 
unique experiences or perspectives via discussions or other forms of interaction (Schweiger et 
al., 1986). In particular, board members must find ways to let their views aired, to challenge 
one another‘s viewpoint without breaking the code of congeniality. Debate facilitates the 
generation of ideas and provides the opportunity to critically assess multiple alternatives and 
question false assumptions (Eisenhardt et al., 1997). A recent study by Levrau and Van den 
Berghe (2006) revealed that directors perceive the occurrence of objective debate as one of 
the key criteria for board effectiveness. Their findings are consistent with the evidence of a 
qualitative study by Finkelstein and Mooney (2003).  
3.8.3   Board Operations 
Board operations refer to the various administrative activities that will enhance the smooth 
running of boards which will enable directors perform their various activities more 
effectively.  
 Board operational issues of interest include number and schedule of board and 
committee meetings; structure and complexity of agendas; quality, timeliness, sufficiency and 
accuracy of board information, presentation and communication. Effective board and 
committee meetings are essential for successful board roles. Effective meetings require that a 
well thought out agenda be distributed, along with pertinent data, to directors beforehand; 
that meetings be held promptly; that issues are discussed in sufficient depth; that dissenting 
directors have a forum to express their views freely, but without monopolizing the discussion; 
that a true majority of directors make decisions, rather than acquiescing to the CEO; and that 
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good minutes of meetings are kept for documentation of progress made (Mueller, 1981; 
Vance, 1983). 
Another area of board operations that could impact board effectiveness is the conduct of 
board meetings, such as time management, the quality of presentations and the frequency of 
board meetings (Levrau and Van den Berghe, 2006). Board operations also include processes 
for ensuring that board decisions are implemented. 
3.9   The Board as a diverse Team  
Forbes and Milliken (1999) looked at boards as working groups and they defined 
working groups as intact social systems that perform one or more tasks within an 
organizational context. The board of directors can be considered as a multi-member 
governing body, standing at the apex of the organization (Bainbridge, 2002). However, being 
a collection of individuals, boards of directors show some distinctive features which make 
them, to some extent, unique among organizational teams (see Table 3.9 for a summary).  
A first feature of the board is partial affiliation since outside directors are not 
employees of the company and do not assume management tasks. In most cases, outside 
directors sit on several boards, in addition to their regular full time jobs. In this respect, 
outside board members are only partially affiliated to the company on whose board they serve 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999; and Nadler et al., 2006). Second, boards of directors are 
characterized by episodic interactions as most boards of directors only meet a few times a 
year. Although some board committees meet more frequently, the meetings involve only a 
small subset of the whole board. By consequence, board members spend only a limited time 
together in the boardroom resulting in less personal contact. Besides, without little or no 
contact between formal board meetings, there is little opportunity to build strong working 
relationships (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; and Nadler et al., 2006). A third feature is limited 
time and information directors have to perform their functions. Outside directors devote only 
limited amount of their time on board-related work as they have other full-time jobs that 
occupy the bulk of their time (Lorsh and MacIver, 1989). Moreover, they heavily depend on 
the goodwill of management to obtain relevant and timely information. In this respect, it is 
obvious, that outside directors—compared to executive directors—are restricted in their 
ability to become deeply familiar with the company, its people and its business (Nadler et al., 
2006). Fourth, boards of directors are commonly composed of a preponderance of leaders, 
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such as former or present CEO (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). It is often because of their 
outstanding professional achievements that they have been appointed to the board of 
directors. At the same time, these individuals are used to sitting at the head of the table and 
have their own psychological needs for power, recognition, and influence. For many of these 
directors, the setting of a board of directors might be sensed as an unusual and uncomfortable 
situation (Nadler et al., 2006). Fifth, authority relationships within a board of directors are 
complex. In contrast to management teams, the role and position of outside directors do not 
reflect their status in the company‘s hierarchy (Nadler et al., 2006). Still, some outside 
directors may have more authority than others, due to their status in the corporate world or 
the business community at large. Moreover, when the positions of the chairman of the board 
and CEO are combined, a strong power relationship may exist. A sixth feature relates to the 
changing expectations of work. Compared to other teams, the role of the board is often not 
well-defined and can substantially differ among companies. In addition, boards of directors 
are increasingly confronted with unprecedented scrutiny and public pressure (Van den 
Berghe and Levrau, 2004). As a result, many boards are struggling to agree on what their 
tasks are, also vis-à-vis management. Seventh, boards of directors operate in a formal way. 
The format, physical setting, social rituals and conduct of board meeting create a sense of 
formality and status which is uncommon among other teams (Nadler et al., 2006). Finally, 
boards of directors have a larger number of members in comparison to the size of other 
organizational team (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
 Boards as Teams Typical Teams 
Affiliation Outside directors may be 
members of more than one 
board; this is not their ―day job‖. 
Members work for the same 
organization. 
Interaction Directors spend little time 
together, making it difficult for 
them to build working 
relationships. 
Members spend considerable 
time together, experience 
intense personal interaction. 
Time and information Limited time and information 
available to master issues of a 
complex company. 
Constantly immersed in 
company‘s business. 
Leaders as members Majority of members may be 
CEOs, who are used to leading, 
not following. 
Most members are not 
accustomed to sitting at the 
head of the table. 
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Authority relationships Lines of authority are complex 
and unclear; chairmen/CEOs 
both lead and report to boards. 
Members‘ roles on the team 
often reflect their status in 
the company. 
Changing expectations Difficult to achieve consensus in 
a climate of unprecedented 
scrutiny and pressure. 
Usually created with a 
reasonably clear charter—
such as completing a project 
in mind. 
Formality Physical setting and social rituals 
reinforce aura of power and 
privilege. 
High degree of formality is 
rare, generally reflects the 
culture of the company. 
Team size Average number of members is 
rather high. 
Average number of member 
is rather low. 
(Source: Adapted from Nadler et. al., 2006) 
Table 3.9: Characteristics Differentiating Boards from other Teams 
Boards of directors can therefore be characterized as large, elite, and episodic 
decision-making groups that face complex tasks pertaining to strategic issues. Because boards 
are not involved in implementation, the ―output‖ that boards produce is entirely cognitive in 
nature. In addition, because boards are large, episodic, and independent, they are particularly 
vulnerable to ―process losses‖ (Steiner, 1972) – the interaction difficulties that prevent groups 
from achieving their full potential.  
Forbes and Milliken (1999) developed a model that is concerned with two criteria of 
board effectiveness: board task performance (control and service tasks) and board‘s ability to 
continue working together as a cohesive team. Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) proposed 
three group process variables that will significantly influence the task performance of boards, 
i.e., cohesiveness, debate and conflict norms.  
 Our research is based on a model that is adapted from those of Forbes and Milliken 
(1999) and Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007). This is based on three board process 
variables (cohesiveness, decision-making, and operations) that will significantly influence the 
task performance of boards – control, service, and strategic roles. 
3.10   Summary 
 This chapter looks at the three types of governance models- Anglo-Saxon, European, 
and Japanese and explores the various empirical studies on the performance and effectiveness 
of boards. It shows that the board of directors performs the pivotal role in any system of 
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corporate governance. It is accountable to the stakeholders and directs and controls the 
management. It stewards the company, sets its strategic aim and financial goals, and oversees 
their implementation, puts in place adequate internal controls and periodically reports the 
activities and progress of the company in a transparent manner to the stakeholders. 
 The chapter further covers the various theories that explain board performance such 
as managerial hegemony, agency, resource dependency, stewardship and stakeholder 
theories. 
 It goes on to review the impact of board characteristics and processes on 
effectiveness. It then defines board effectiveness from the point of view of various authors. 
 This sets the stage for the next section that describes the theoretical framework on 
which this study is based and hypothesis development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
4.1   Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework of this thesis. It discusses the linkage 
between board characteristics, board processes and board effectiveness. It also looks at the 
controlling variables of organization type, ownership, age and size.  Mainstream empirical 
studies have assumed the effectiveness of the board is a function of its structure and 
independence from management. Only a few studies have attempted to adopt a 
comprehensive approach by studying the effect of board functions, processes, and behaviour 
on the effectiveness of the board. The thesis is based on this later stream of research work and 
it is based on a framework that is adopted from the works of Nicholson and Kiel (2004) and 
Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007).  
 
4.2 The Nicholson and Kiel Framework 
Nicholson and Kiel (2004) developed a framework (Figure 4.1) for diagnosing board 
effectiveness which has not been tested empirically. It is based on the concept of board 
intellectual capital and the aim is to have a basis for examining how boards of directors affect 
corporate outcomes.  The framework, which conceptualises the board as part of a governance 
system, employs the construct of intellectual capital and seeks to explain how a board‘s 
intellectual capital informs board behaviours and how this pattern of behaviour ultimately 
links to corporate performance. 
It proposes a series of inputs (organisation type, company‘ legislative and societal 
framework, company history, organisation‘s constitution, and company strategy) that lead to 
a particular mix of board intellectual capital. The first input, organization type, recognises 
the nature and purpose of the organisation which have a powerful impact on board 
composition, board roles and board performance (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Johnson et al., 
1996). Organisation type also determines the constituency base of the ownership or 
membership of the company, for example for-profit and not-for-profit organisations will 
have different objectives and different governance structures. 
The second input is the company‘s legislative and societal framework. They argue 
that all companies operate with a set of rules or laws established in the countries they 
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operate. In Nigeria this set of laws is the Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) and 
such laws set out clearly the responsibilities of boards and other governance matters. In 
addition to these legal requirements, expectations of stakeholders and societal customs have 
impact on board operation. 
The third major input is the organisation‘s constitution, which is an internal document 
that states policies and processes that shape the relationships between owners, directors and 
managers. These will have a substantial impact on how the board is constituted and run and 
also on its effectiveness. 
Company history is the fourth input and this will influence who gets on the board. The 
history of the company consists of its past performance, its corporate culture, values and the 
board‘s composition and this will affect how the board functions. The final input is the 
organisation‘s strategy, which is defined as how a company uses its resources (Judge and 
Zeithaml, 1992). A company‘s strategy will determine the roles the board will need to 
perform. They argue that these five fundamental inputs into board system discussed above 
determine the intellectual capital requirements and roles of the board. The board intellectual 
capital is what is used in performing the various roles of the board output is dependent on 
how well these roles are performed. 
Nicholson and Kiel model uses individual-level outputs and group-level outputs of a 
board as a measure of the board‘s effectiveness rather using corporate performance. To them 
understanding how boards add value to organisations requires an understanding of how 
boards contribute to organisational, group-level and individual-level outputs. Corporate 
performance is dependent on both board effectiveness and senior management effectiveness. 
They see a board as a bundle of intellectual capital that enables it to enact a role set 
and they contend that the balance of the different elements of board intellectual capital will 
lead to a series of board behaviours.  They argue that board intellectual capital is 
fundamental to transforming inputs into organisational performance. The components of 
board intellectual capital as defined by them include human capital, social capital, structural 
capital (policies and procedures), and cultural capital (values and norms).  
According to Nicholson and Kiel (2004), board human capital, which is the first 
component, is the individual knowledge, skills and abilities possessed by directors that are 
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relevant to the organization. Boards carry out their roles effectively when individual 
directors apply their knowledge, skills and abilities to the tasks they have to perform.  
The second component, board social capital refers to the implicit and tangible set of 
resources available to the board by virtue of social relationships (adapted from Gabbay and 
Leenders, 1999, p. 3).  There are three dimensions to board social capital; the goodwill that 
exists between board members, the goodwill that exists between members of the board and 
senior managers, and the relationship between board members and external parties. Social 
capital can lead to better board productivity, effective exchanges between the board and 
management and supply of appropriate resources by external parties. 
The third component, board structural capital includes the various procedures, 
policies, processes and methods the board has developed for its smooth operation (Bontis, 
1998, p. 65). Structural capital will influence the quality and timeliness of board materials, 
board behavioural/ethical expectations and board culture.  
The final component, cultural capital, deals with the degree to which board members 
share norms, values and rules that guide their behaviour (Lin, 2001; Schein, 1992). These 
values would include expectations of transparency, honesty and accountability. 
They have conceptualised boards as a set of five components – the human, social and 
cultural capital of individual directors and the social and structural capital of the board as a 
whole. They argue that it is important to identify the nature of interaction between these 
components and the resultant dynamics and relationships between them. This interplay 
between the various components of intellectual capital has impact on the board‘s 
performance.   
According to the framework the effectiveness of the board is dependent on how well 
the board performs the roles of controlling the organisation and monitoring management, 
providing advice to management, and providing access to resources. The ability of the board 
to execute these roles will determine how effectively the company is governed. They also 
proposed that the board‘s effectiveness will depend on the alignment between the various 
board capitals and its required role set. To them the challenge in governance is to understand 
the roles required of the board and then to match the intellectual capital of the board to those 
roles. To the best knowledge of the researcher this framework has not yet been tested 
empirically. 
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Figure 4.1: The Board Intellectual Capital Framework (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004) 
 
4.3 The Levrau and Van den Berghe Framework 
Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) developed a process-oriented framework (figure 
4.2) for board effectiveness. The authors distinguished multiple intervening constructs that 
they believe mediate the direct impact of board characteristics on firm performance. Their 
model strongly relies on the input-process-output approach used in research frameworks for 
studying organizational teams (Gladstein, 1984; and Cohen and Baily, 1997).  
In their model, board effectiveness is determined by the extent directors carry out 
their control role and strategic role. Their control role is similar to that in Nicholson and Kiel 
(2004) model while their strategic role is a combination of service and strategic, while 
Nicholson and Kiel included strategic role in their service role. Levrau and Van den berghe 
argued that the impact of boards of directors on company performance occurs indirectly 
through the effectiveness of boards performing these two key roles. 
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The authors also argue that three group process variables will significantly influence 
the task performance of boards and hence impact how well the board performs its role of 
control, service and strategy. These three process variables are cohesiveness, debate and 
conflict norms. Board members are required to work together and cohesiveness will aid 
collaboration and communication among directors. The authors argued that a minimum 
degree of cohesion among the board members is required for the board to become a team, 
which will lead to board effectiveness.  Considering the board as a decision-making group, 
directors are expected to discuss and debate issues constructively before making decisions 
that will affect the performance of the board. Cognitive conflict will exist when there is 
disagreement among directors, particularly on how best to perform their duties. Conflict 
norms are seen as playing a moderating role between board characteristics and debate. 
The inputs in their model are the board characteristics of board size, board 
independence and board diversity. They propose that large board size will have a negative 
impact on board debate and will lead to less cohesiveness of board members. They also 
propose that an increase in board independence will increase debate but will reduce 
cohesiveness. As for board diversity, they are of the opinion that board diversity will improve 
debate but when it becomes too diverse then it will be negative on debate and board members 
will become less cohesive. They argue that conflict norms will have a moderating effect such 
that the greater the conflict norms, the stronger the relationships between board size, 
independence, diversity and debate. 
Their model goes beyond the traditional structural attributes of boards of directors to 
include behavioural measures of board effectiveness. However, the authors have not tested 
the model empirically. 
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Figure 4.2: Board Effectiveness Framework (Levrau and Van den Berghe, 2007) 
 
4.4   The Research Theoretical Framework 
The framework on which this thesis is based is derived from the two frameworks of 
Nicholson and Kiel (2004) and Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) discussed above.  It is 
based on an inputprocessoutput approach based on the premise that board characteristics 
of board size, leadership, independence, and diversity, and human capital have influence on 
board processes of board decision-making, cohesiveness and administrative operations, 
which have significant impact on the effectiveness of boards.  Board effectiveness in this 
model is defined as the outcomes of the main tasks of the board of control, service, and 
strategy. The control role includes oversight of management activities and internal control; 
while the service role includes advice to management and providing resources to the firm 
such as information/data and generating business. The strategy role includes participating in 
strategy development and monitoring implementation by management. 
 The inputs in this framework are board characteristics of board size, board leadership, 
board independence, board diversity and board human capital. Only board size, independence 
and diversity are in the Levrau and Van den Berghe model. Board leadership and human 
capital are the additions in this framework. Board size is the number of directors on the board 
and this will impact, positively or negatively, on the board processes of decision-making, 
cohesiveness and board operations. Board leadership in the framework is actually board 
duality and it is argued that separating the position of chairperson from that of the CEO will 
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have a different impact on the board processes mentioned above from that of combining the 
positions. Board independence is achieved to some extent when the number of non-executive 
directors is more than that of executive directors on a board. Board diversity is an indication 
of the diverse backgrounds, education, professions, age and gender of directors on the board. 
Board human capital in this framework is the same as in the Nicholson and Kiel framework. 
The thesis is an empirical test of the model and a step beyond Nicholson and Kiel 
(2004) and Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Research Theoretical Framework on Board Effectiveness 
A review of various literatures on corporate governance, top management team and 
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1984; and Cohen and Baily, 1997).  This approach has also inspired other board models 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Huse, 2005; and Levrau and Van den Berghe, 2007). 
Frameworks of how boards work are central to corporate governance research and 
practice; they dictate the type of data collected, the analysis process employed and the action 
plan that is developed.  Zahra and Pearce (1989) developed an integrative model that could be 
used to study how the roles and attributes of the board influence firm performance; Hermalin 
and Welsbach‘s (1998) model is used to investigate the dynamics of the Board-CEO 
relationship, and in particular board independence from the CEO; and Boyd (1990) devised a 
model to determine whether boards respond to different types of environmental uncertainty.  
There have also been some recent attempts to model board dynamics theoretically 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). 
Forbes and Milliken argue that the effectiveness of boards depends on socio-psychological 
processes, related to group participation and interaction, the exchange of information and 
critical discussion.  They define an effective board as one that can perform distinctive service 
and control activities successfully yielding task effectiveness, and yet continue working 
together, that is, cohesiveness. Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) propose a ‗simultaneous 
need for control and collaboration‘ in the working style and dynamic of boards.  Zona and 
Zattoni relate group‘s social-psychological processes to different board tasks. 
The aim of the thesis is to develop a holistic framework for examining how 
characteristics of boards of directors affect board performance, which in turn affects 
corporate outcomes and to empirically test it.  Rather than relying on any single governance 
research agenda, such as agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, etc, 
a general framework that conceptualises the board as part of a governance system is outlined. 
This model is based on the assumption that board effectiveness is determined by the outcome 
of the main tasks of boards – control (oversight), service (advice and resource availability), 
and involvement in strategy development (strategic role).  The main challenge is how to 
measure the outcomes.  An analysis of the various components of the framework and their 
interrelationship will provide a better insight into the framework. 
The framework includes four independent variables, namely  firm size, age, 
ownership, and type as controls for potential influences on board effectiveness. These control 
variables have been introduced in order to investigate any specific effect of board 
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characteristics and board processes on board effectiveness under various conditions. The 
control variables will be used to account for other important factors which might influence 
the results of the study. 
The size of the company can have an effect on board performance and hence firm 
performance (Short and Keasey, 1999). The effect is believed to be two fold. In the first 
instance, large companies may be able to access funds more easily and can afford to put 
governance processes in place. Secondly, large companies may be able to create entry 
barriers arising from better strategic decisions (Mangena and Tauringana, 2006), and hence 
better performance. As the size of the firm increases its complexity also increases, board size 
may increase due to need for advice and environment monitoring (Pfeffer, 1972; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). 
 Board effectiveness may also be influenced by firm age; the older firms are likely to 
be more efficient than younger firms (Ang et al, 2000). Older firms may have proven 
processes that have been developed and tested over the years, while younger firms might still 
be experimenting with their processes. 
Studies have shown that as firms grow over the years, their capital structure will 
likely change with age (Berger and Udell, 1998), which puts much demand on the board in 
terms raising capital. New firms are expected to have smaller earnings than old ones because 
they have less experience in the market, are still building their market position, and might 
have a higher costs structure. Such new firms might not have the clout to attractive good 
directors and could lack resources to put good governance processes in place. 
 Ownership in this case implies that the companies can either be locally owned or are 
subsidiaries of multinational organisations. Subsidiaries of multinational organisations are 
likely to have better governance structures and practices in place as a result of the influence 
of their parent companies that are inclined to adopt global best practices. The locally owned 
companies in Nigeria face the challenges of staying alive and remaining viable no matter 
what it takes and so could close their eyes to governance and ethical issues. 
 Companies in this framework are classified as either manufacturing or non-
manufacturing (service). This constitutes the ‗type‘ control variable in the framework. 
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4.5 Theory and Hypotheses Development 
This section deals with the various hypotheses that have been developed to attempt to 
answer the research questions. 
4.5.1 The Impact of Board Characteristics on Board Processes  
The starting point of the framework is the board characteristics and the impact they 
have on board processes. Board characteristics have some bearing on how boards are run and 
how they perform their roles. The model is based on the premise that ultimately, board 
effectiveness is dependent on the structure of the board, (its size, leadership structure and 
degree of independence) and the effective use of the skills and knowledge on the board in 
driving board processes which in turn drives outcome of board tasks.    
Board size refers to the number of board members, while board independence refers 
to the ratio of outside directors (Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2009; and Ferreira, Ferreira, & 
Raposo, 2009); and board leadership structure refers to CEO duality. Board job-related 
diversity refers to the degree to which a board is heterogeneous with respect to directors‘ 
background and experience. 
4.5.1.1 Board Size and Board Processes 
Board size is an important and much-studied board characteristic that is likely to have 
effect on board processes and performance. Determining the ideal board size for 
organisations is very important because the number and quality of directors in a firm 
determine and influence the board functioning and hence corporate performance. Board size 
is an important factor in the performance of the board for the reason that the effectiveness of 
each board member is directly influenced by the number of other members with whom each 
individual interacts. This is an indication of the resource available to the board and is in line 
with resource dependency theory, which expects directors to bring their social capital and 
competences to the firm. 
The size of the board of directors has been a controversy in the management literature 
and economic research. The proponents of a large board size believe it provides an increased 
pool of expertise because larger boards are likely to have more knowledge and skills at their 
disposal and more robust debate. They are also capable of reducing the dominance of an 
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overbearing CEO (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). It is argued that the reduction of this 
dominance will enhance the quality and speed of decision-making by directors as they cannot 
be unduly influenced by a dominant CEO.  
Tsui and Gul (2000) however, believe that the quality of the directors is more 
important than the quantity for effective corporate governance. The quality of directors is 
assumed will lead to quality of decision and will also lead to fewer arguments on the board 
which will speed up decision making. But Dalton (1993) states that the more the dependence 
on the external environment, the larger the board of directors. The board‘s monitoring and 
supervising capacity is increased as more and more directors join the board (Jensen, 1993). 
However, monitoring and supervising functions could also mean that directors‘ time could be 
taken up by these functions and less time could be devoted to decision making. If, however, 
the size of the board is larger, then more directors will be available for these assignments and 
speed up decision-making. Agency theory proponents argue that a substantial increase of the 
board size could result in a slowdown in decision making and an increase in costs (Callen, 
Klein and Tinkelman, 2003; O‘Regan and Oster, 2005; Yermack, 1996). In Nigeria, where 
board appointments are still influenced by dominant shareholders, chairpersons and CEOs, it 
is likely that board decision-making might be fast as directors could be doing the bidding of 
dominant shareholder and so would avoid lengthy discussions. 
Accordingly the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1a: Board size and speed of decision-making are positively related. 
Much of the work that boards of directors must do in order to produce effective 
outcomes involves cooperative decision-making and joint efforts. Board members are 
required to work together as a team by mutual interaction, sharing information, resources and 
decisions (Siegel and Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick, 2007). The difficulty of coordinating the 
contributions of many directors in a large board is likely to make it difficult to get the most 
from them. Large boards may also have difficulty building the interpersonal relationships that 
enhance cohesiveness, and are very prone to fractionalisation and coalitions that delay 
strategic decision-making processes (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). More cohesive boards are 
likely to perform better and this might be achieved in a small board. 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
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H1b: Board size is negatively related to board cohesiveness.  
On the other hand, small boards will not have enough directors to man the various 
committees required for the smooth running of the board and directors will therefore be 
stretched and this could have an adverse effect on their performance. On the other hand large 
boards will help solve these problems as there will more directors to engage in committee 
activities. Effective board and committee meetings are essential for successful board roles 
and these will require well organized administrative backup. The timeliness and quality of 
board papers and the time available for directors to serve the board will enhance the 
effectiveness of boards. It is argued that small board size might not effectively monitor 
powerful CEOs particularly in Nigeria where the CEO could be a surrogate for an important 
shareholder. 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1c: Board size and efficiency of operations are positively related.   
The three hypotheses indicate that a board should therefore be large enough to include 
a diversity of the competencies it needs to exercise its responsibilities but small enough to 
engage in active strategic discussion, make timely strategic decisions that will move the 
organization forward and bond together as a team.  
4.5.1.2 Board Leadership and Board Processes 
Board leadership structure, implies CEO duality which is a situation in which the 
same person serves as CEO and chairperson, is also to some extent a measure of board 
independence. According to agency theory, duality structure can lead to entrenchment by the 
CEO, thereby reducing the monitoring effectiveness of the board (Finkelstein and D‘Aveni, 
1994).  A CEO who is also the chairperson is responsible for organizing board meetings and 
this gives him/her a large influence on the meeting agenda and can also control the quantity, 
quality and timeliness of board materials and information provided to directors. This could 
adversely affect the quality of decision-making but can increase the speed as such meetings 
would be guided by the CEO. In Nigeria the SEC code demands the separation of the two 
positions, but this is restricted to publicly quoted companies.  
Given the peculiarity of Nigeria, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
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 H2a: Board CEO Duality is positively correlated to board decision-making speed 
As a result of the early 2000‘s corporate scandals, regulators and reformers are 
increasingly demanding that the role of the CEO be separated from that of the Chair (Wilson 
2008, Lorsch and Zelleke 2005). Advocates claim that having an independent Chair results in 
superior monitoring by the board. CEOs become more effective leaders when the two 
positions are separated because it allows them to concentrate on the firm‘s operations while 
empowering the board (Wilson 2008). Kajola (2008) argued that concentration of decision 
management and decision control in one individual hinders boards‘ effectiveness in 
monitoring top management. However, a strong CEO cum chairperson would ensure that the 
board operates in unison and achieve good cohesion and would not allow fractionalization of 
the board. Given the weak enforcement of external and internal governance laws in Nigeria, 
CEO duality may promote entrenchment which is likely to force directors to act as a team. 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H2b: Board CEO Duality is positively correlated to cohesiveness. 
 CEO duality will lead to a CEO who dominates the board and could determine the 
quality and quantity of information to the board. However, a strong CEO cum chairperson 
could display a tendency to impose his ideas and restrict open debate and decision-making 
(Golden and Zajac, 2001) and so have shorter board meetings. He would ensure that meetings 
are held promptly, the quality of presentations is high, that good minutes are kept, and that 
board decisions are implemented, since these decisions are likely to be driven by him. In 
Nigeria company secretaries are responsible for managing board administrative activities and 
report to the CEO even though they serve the board. This relationship makes them 
accountable to the CEO for their career progress and so could strive to be efficient.  
 Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
 H2c: Board CEO Duality is positively correlated to board operations efficiency 
 
4.5.1.3 Board Independence and Board Processes 
Independence of the board is considered a key criterion in the governance of firms. A 
reliable and meaningful measure of board independence is difficult to obtain. Some previous 
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studies consider the proportion of outside directors on the board as a proxy for independence. 
This is a crude approximation, but it might be the most significant measure of board 
independence (Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2009; and Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo, 2009).  
Agency theory favours board independence as it provides for better oversight of 
management activities by the board. Independence could lead to the syndrome of board 
versus management and will adversely affect the quality and speed of decision making. Inside 
directors have a better understanding of the business than outside directors and so can make 
better decisions (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007), but may not have their way in a board that has 
more outside directors. However, outside board members are thought to contribute 
objectively in evaluating managerial decisions (Byrd and Hickman, 1992), and they may ask 
the difficult questions, which management may not face because of ‗an unconscious pride of 
authorship‘  ( Winter, 1977, p. 285).  The larger the proportion of outside directors, the higher 
the chances of more questions being asked and the slower the decision-making speed.  
The Nigerian code of corporate governance specifies that the number of outside 
directors should be more than that of inside directors as a means of ensuring board 
independence. However, the inside directors have access to more information about the 
business than the outside directors and so if the information is not shared in advance board 
decision-making could be slower as majority of the directors will need to be better informed 
during the board meetings.  
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3a: Board independence is negatively correlated to board decision-making speed. 
The percentage of outside directors on a board is likely to have a direct effect on 
board cohesiveness. According to Adams and Ferreira (2009), increased independence comes 
at a cost – the possibility of breakdowns in communication between CEO and directors, 
which has adverse effect on cohesion. In Nigeria most of the inside directors depend directly 
on the CEO for their career advancements, and may thus hesitate to oppose and challenge 
strategic and operational proposals of the CEO and this could lead to further division on the 
board between inside and outside. 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
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 H3b: Board independence is negatively correlated to cohesiveness. 
Information between CEOs and directors is essential for boards to carry out their 
responsibilities (Adams and Ferreira, 2009).  They also conclude that excess independence 
may lead to communication breakdown between CEO and the board. However, an 
independent board is likely to make demands on the quality, timeliness, sufficiency and 
accuracy of board information, presentation and communication. An independent board is 
likely to have board committees that are operational and efficient. The Nigerian code 
recommends that boards should undertake a formal annual evaluation of its own 
performance, that of its committees, the chairman, and individual directors. This could spur 
directors to ensure effective administrative support that will enable do perform their roles 
better. 
 Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3c: Board independence is positively correlated to board operations efficiency 
 
4.5.1.4 Board Diversity and Board Processes 
The concept of diversity that this thesis is interested in relates to board composition 
and the varied combination of attributes, characteristics and expertise contributed by 
individual board members in relation to board processes and decision-making. In a broad 
sense, the various types of diversity that may be represented among directors in the 
boardroom include age, gender, ethnicity, culture, religion, constituency representation, 
independence, professional background, knowledge, technical skills and expertise, 
commercial and industry experience, career and life experience (Milliken and Martins, 1996). 
Boardroom diversity, thus, refers to the mix of human capital, which is a combination of 
intellectual and social capital.   Human capital is defined as the skills, general or specific, 
acquired by an individual in the course of training and experience (Dictionary of Business, 
1996). 
Resource dependency theory implies that for effectiveness a board should be 
composed of directors with the right background and experience, have the right social capital 
and are on other boards.  
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 In this study the forms of diversity that have been focused on include functional 
background, industry background, and educational background, and these are job-related. 
Diversity of this sort, usually referred as job-related diversity, enhances the presence of 
functional area knowledge and skills on the board.  
A more diverse board may be more innovative, creative and capable of higher quality 
decision making (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000), and better at 
strategic decision making and planning (Coffey and Wang, 1998). Board diversity 
encourages higher-problem solving and constructive dissent (Stephenson, 2004, and 
Robinson and Dechant, 1997), which improve information flow and decision-making. Board 
members that have different educational, functional, and industry backgrounds are more 
likely to experience differences in the ways that they perceive, process, and respond to issues 
on the board (Milliken and Martins, 1996; and Williams and O‘Reilly, 1998), and these 
differences are likely to ignite higher levels of debate and delayed decision-making.  
In Nigeria board diversity usually reflects ethnic and sectional group diversity and this 
could promote mediocrity. This implication is that some directors might be slow in grasping 
issues and as such board decision-making could be slow. 
 Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H4a: The degree of job-related diversity on the board is negatively related to the 
speed of decision-making.  
Diversity for boards has pros and cons for even though it increases the level of 
resources at the board‘s level, it creates higher levels of conflict, interaction difficulties and 
lower levels of integration (Milliken and martins, 1996). Diversity can therefore decrease the 
board‘s level of cohesiveness and its use of knowledge and skills. 
Ethnicity and religion have played dominant roles in the way of life and governance 
in Nigeria and these two issues can lead to tension and less cohesion on the board. In 
addition, the situation where many directors in Nigeria are nominees or representative of 
shareholders could also lead to various interest groups and divisions on the board. 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
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H4b: The degree of job-related diversity on the board is negatively related to the 
board’s cohesiveness  
Diversity also provides access to important constituencies and resources in the 
external environment. A more diverse Board may be more innovative, creative and capable of 
higher quality decision making (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; and Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000) 
as a result of the diverse skills and expertise on the board. Such directors are likely to be 
more demanding in ensuring efficient board administrative processes. Diversity will have a 
strong influence on the way information is gathered in the board and the type of information 
that is required as directors are likely to show interest in information in their areas of 
specialty. 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H4c: Board job-related diversity is positively correlated with board operations 
efficiency.   
4.5.2 The Impact of Board Human Capital on Board Processes 
Board human capital is the individual knowledge, skills and abilities possessed by 
directors. However, they have to be relevant to the organization rather than general business 
acumen. They have to be functional, industry, board-specific and organization-specific 
knowledge, skills and abilities of the directors. Boards require a high degree of specialized 
knowledge and skill to function effectively. A board with a good knowledge of the industry, a 
proper understanding of the firm‘s business and experience on board matters is likely to 
perform more effectively. The knowledge and skills most relevant to boards can be 
categorized into two groups. Firstly, functional area knowledge and skills which span the 
traditional business areas such as accounting, finance, marketing, and operations. Secondly, 
firm-specific knowledge and skills which refer to the understanding of the firm, its operations 
and internal management issues. Boards often need this kind of knowledge (Nonaka, 1994) in 
order to deal effectively with strategic issues and be effective. 
Boards carry out their roles when individual directors apply their knowledge, skills 
and abilities to the tasks at hand and no amount of teamwork and efficient processes can 
substitute for a lack of basic ability. Application of their knowledge and skills leads to 
effective and fast decision-making. A board with knowledgeable members is likely to make 
faster and high quality decisions. 
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The Nigerian code recommends that directors should have relevant core competences 
and should be knowledgeable in board matters. This is to ensure that are perform their roles 
effectively and take decisions that could add value to the firm. Such knowledgeable directors 
will spend less time arguing during board meetings and will be fast in decision-making. 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H5a: Level of human capital on the board is positively correlated to board decision-
making speed. 
Resource dependency theory implies appointing directors that can bring their human 
capital and competences to the firm. It is expected that once appointed to a board, the 
directors will support and work to assist the firm. However, they have to cooperate and work 
together to be able to harness their combined skills and competences. Unfortunately a 
knowledgeable board is likely to engage in lengthy and divisive discussions and debates that 
could impede cohesiveness. In the Nigerian situation, knowledgeable directors from diverse 
background are likely to demonstrate their expertise and in an attempt to protect their interest 
groups will less cohesive.  
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H5b: Level of human capital on the board is negatively correlated to board 
cohesiveness. 
 A board with knowledgeable members could be demanding in terms of the 
administrative support required to perform its duties. They know what they want in terms of 
information and are knowledgeable enough to know the type of questions they will ask 
management. Such directors will also demand prompt service from management and 
company secretary. 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H5c: Level of human capital on the board is positively correlated to board 
operations efficiency. 
4.5.3 Board Processes and Board Effectiveness 
95 
 
board is a social system (Cascio, 2004 and Sonnifield, 2002) that is driven by 
interpersonal relationships, quality of teamwork, debate, and efficiency of the administrative 
machinery. Board members are required to work together by mutual interaction, sharing 
information, resources and making collaborative decisions. Boards of directors are 
characterized as large and elitist teams and in many cases face complex tasks that deal with 
strategic issues (Jackson, 1992). The outside directors on boards are part-time and are usually 
members of more than one board, and majority of them may be CEOs and chairpersons who 
are used to leading, not following. Directors meet only several times in a year and so spend 
little time together , at each meeting, thereby making it difficult for them to build strong 
working relationships. In addition boards are different from top management teams in that 
they are responsible only for monitoring and influencing strategy and not for implementing 
strategic decisions or for day-to-day administration (Fama and Jensen, 1983).   
The board should also be seen as a group where individual behaviours and 
relationships between board members are important as these have impact on the board 
processes. Much of the work that board of directors must do in order to produce effective 
outcomes involves teamwork and cooperative decision-making. They will also require 
efficient board administrative machinery and operations for effectiveness. 
These board processes are intervening variables between board characteristics and 
board task performance. The three board process variables that are considered to have 
significant influence on the task performance of boards are decision-making, cohesiveness 
and administrative operations. This implies that the nature of the interactions among board 
members, the quality of the debate and the quality of the administrative support will influence 
their effectiveness.  
4.5.3.1 Board Decision-Making Process and Board Effectiveness 
 Decision making is the board‘s contribution to governance. Decision making is an 
outcome of board process. Board process has an important impact on overall board 
effectiveness and firm performance (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). The board has a 
fiduciary duty to oversee the firm‘s operations and monitor top management performance in 
order to protect shareholders‘ interest. This will require the directors to make important and 
timely decisions on control mechanisms, and monitoring and assessment of organizational 
performance. The service role consists of providing the CEO and his top management team 
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with expert counsel and access to information and resources that directors have. These will 
require timely interventions and support for them to be valuable. The strategic role is of 
particular importance in critical cases such as periods of environmental turbulence or declines 
in company‘s performance. These cases require speedy and urgent intervention from the 
board and as such call for speedy decision-making. 
Speedy and good quality decision-making process in a board will therefore lead to better 
board oversight (control), help the board to be more strategic and offer quality advice to 
management. The Nigerian code outlines the main duties and responsibilities of directors to 
include ensuring that the company performs to high business and ethical standards and 
providing sound advice to management. With the turbulence in the Nigerian economy and the 
high rate of change speedy decision making will be required of directors. 
 Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
 H6a: Speed of Board decision-making will be positively related to  
 
Board Control Role 
Board Service Role  
Board Strategic Role 
 
4.5.3.2 Board Cohesiveness and Board Effectiveness 
As a result of the uniqueness of a board as a team, scholars have suggested that the 
board should transform itself from a loose aggregation of powerful individuals into an 
effective team (for example, Conger et. al., 2001; Carter and Lorsch, 2004; Nadler, 2004 and 
2006). For boards of directors becoming a collegial team, a minimum degree of cohesion 
among the board members is required, as this will aid communication and collaboration 
among board members.  
Board Cohesiveness, which refers to the degree to which board members are attached 
to each other and motivated to stay on the board (Summers, Coffelt, and Horton, 1988), is 
critical for board effectiveness. Since more-cohesive groups are better able to influence their 
members‘ behaviour (Janis, 1983; Shaw, 1981), cohesive boards are likely to have high level 
of interpersonal attraction among the members which will influence the effectiveness with 
which the tasks are performed (Williams and O‘Reilly, 1998). A more cohesive board is more 
likely to perform its oversight function more effectively as it is not likely to be under the 
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influence of management. A more cohesive board is likely to act more collectively to be of 
better service to management, such as giving advice and counsel, establishing contacts and 
enhancing the organisation‘s reputation. The highly competitive nature of many industries 
has made directors to take more interest in their strategic role and to realise that they can be 
more effective by working closely together.  
 Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
 H6b: The effect of cohesiveness on  
 
Board Control Role will be positive 
Board Service Role will be positive 
Board Strategic Role will be positive. 
 
 
4.5.3.3 Board Operations and Board Effectiveness 
Board operations include various operational activities undertaken by a board to 
enhance its efficiency. It includes the use of board committees, the frequency and conduct of 
board meetings, the quality and timeliness of board papers and the evaluation process 
adopted. For the board to perform its oversight more effectively, it needs to have the relevant 
information regularly and on time. This will require an efficient company secretary‘s office 
and cooperation of the CEO and his top management team. The board‘s service role will be 
more effective if the CEO and his team keep them well informed of the company‘s problems 
and challenges. The board‘s strategic role, which includes strategy development and 
monitoring of execution, requires information on both the external and internal environments 
through an efficient process.  
Various board committees will have significant roles to play in ensuring the 
effectiveness of the board. The Nigerian code recommends the establishment of board audit, 
governance/remuneration and risk committees. The audit committee will help the board 
perform its oversight function as regards financial performance and integrity of financial 
reports. The governance committee assist the board in ensuring that the firm‘s performance is 
in line with good governance practices and that executive remunerations are realistic. While 
the risk committee will help the board give management proper advice and minimise the risks 
taken by the firm. 
Frequency of board meeting is another board operation that could influence board 
effectiveness. More frequent board meetings could be seen as directors‘ dedication to their 
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job and the need to serve the company by giving more of their time. However, the limited 
amount of available evidence seems to point to the belief that more frequent meetings are a 
reaction to poor company performance, rather than a desire to monitor and safeguard against 
poor results (Vafeas, 1999). 
Board operations will significantly influence the effectiveness of boards since a board 
that is efficiently organized will play its monitoring and strategic roles more effectively. It 
will also be in a better position to offer good advice to management.  
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H6c: The effect of efficient board operations on  
 
Board Control Role  
Board Service Role 
Board Strategic Role 
  will be positive.  
 
4.6   Summary 
This chapter examined Nicholson and Kiel‘s framework (2004) for diagnosing board 
effectiveness based on board intellectual capital.  This framework was an attempt at 
determining corporate outcomes through board behaviours.  The chapter also examined the 
framework developed by Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007) which was more focused on 
board internal processing of inputs to achieving effective outcomes.    From these ensued the 
research theoretical framework which guided the study; and the various hypotheses were then 
developed.  The interrelatedness of the board characteristics, process and effectiveness were 
all considered as issues with a view to checking the effectiveness of boards.   
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the research theoretical framework with its associated 
constructs, dimensions and variables, as well as a number of hypotheses were presented. This 
chapter deals with the methodology used to test the framework and the set of hypotheses 
presented in chapter 3. The chapter also covers the research design, survey design, the study 
questionnaire, the pre-testing stages, context of the study, sampling issues, the data collection 
procedure, the operationalization and measurement of the variables, and statistics regarding 
the response rate as well as the adopted methodology for the statistical analysis. It also covers 
the qualitative research that is used to validate some of the findings at the quantitative phase.  
 
5.2 Board Research 
The most appropriate method of studying board activities and processes is to sit in 
board meetings, but it is impossible to adopt this method, as board meetings are highly 
confidential. It is rare for an outsider – that is neither a director, officer, manager, employee 
of the company, nor an independent advisor – to be invited to a board or committee meeting. 
Board deliberations involve sensitive and ―inside‖ information that, if released, could in 
certain circumstances irreparably harm the company and the reputation of board members 
and management. Board researches therefore tend to focus on individual directors. 
A number of researchers have at least to some extent accessed individual board 
members via qualitative research in order to understand boards better. 
For example, Mace (1972) in his research interviewed 75 board members in the United States 
in the late 1960s. Lorsch and MacIver (1989) interviewed ―nearly 100‖ directors for their 
study. While Demb and Neubauer (1992) interviewed 71 board members in eight countries 
using structured questions, with interviews lasting between two and three hours.  
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European researchers appear to have been even more successful in accessing boards 
in order to engage in qualitative research. Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) conducted in-depth 
interviews with 20 non-executive board members to examine the power and influence of non-
executive board members. McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) also used data gathered from 108 
interviews with company directors to examine the contribution to strategy by chairmen and 
nonexecutive directors in large UK companies. Pye (2001) interviewed chairmen, chief 
executives and executive team members in 12 large UK organisations. Spira and Bender 
(2004) interviewed directors in audit and remuneration committees as part of their study on 
board sub-committees.  
Roberts et al. (2005) assessed board effectiveness through an examination of the work 
and relationships of non-executive directors, based on 40 in-depth interviews with company 
directors. While Huse et al. (2005) observed the meetings (as ―independent researchers‖) of a 
single board of a major Scandinavian corporation for over one year. They refer to their direct 
observation methodology as ―fly on the wall‖ research (Huse et al., 2005, p. 286).  
These qualitative surveys have helped in exploring issues interactively but did not 
cover large samples as a result of the difficulties associated in gaining access to directors. 
They also enabled respondents to explain some decision dynamics and relationships. 
However, the limited sample coverage problem is usually solved by using the quantitative 
approach. 
The quantitative approach will help cover larger sample size; produce descriptive that 
is close to reality and can help draw inferences about cause and effect. However, it tends to 
have response bias and might be difficult to test causation. 
Many researchers must therefore rely on their individual respondents‘ perceptions 
regarding boards‘ activities and processes, as opposed to their own observations. This 
research follows this approach as it is difficult to get invited to a board meeting as a means of 
studying the board‘s processes. 
5.3 Research Design 
In seeking to understand board effectiveness, this study adopts, to some extent, a 
mixed research approach. A quantitative approach that seeks to provide empirical evidence 
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and a qualitative approach that seeks to confirm or validate some of the findings at the 
quantitative phase. 
 
5.3.1 Mixed Research Method 
The use of mixed methods in the conduct of research has been in existence for about 
three decades drawing its antecedents from multiple operationalism (or multi-method 
research) and methodological triangulation (Johnson et al., 2007). Mixed methods research 
that combines both qualitative and quantitative methods (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004) 
has evolved as a result of the weaknesses of both quantitative and qualitative methods even 
though the qualification of methods as ―mixed is still somewhat unclear. Tashakkori and 
Creswell (2007, pp. 4) define mixed methods as ―research in which the investigator collects 
and analyses data, integrates the findings, and draws inferences using both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches or methods in a single study or a program of inquiry‖. 
Thus, as an approach to research, mixed methods serve five purposes: 1) triangulation 
(convergence of results through the application of multiple methods and designs in a study); 
2) complementarity (elaborate results using two different methods); 3) initiation (discovery of 
research questions); 4) development (use findings of one method to inform the next); 5) 
expansion (expansion of breath and range of research) (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
5.4 Quantitative Research  
Quantitative research methods use numerical data and measurements to deduce facts 
from theory. Quantitative data can be gathered from natural settings in the field or from 
controlled laboratory experiments (Bryman and Bell, 2007, Jupp, 2006). Thus, as quantitative 
data units are predominantly numerical, statistical analysis tools and techniques are widely 
applied.  
Measurement is one of the critical aspects of quantitative research that is characterised 
by reliability and validity. Reliability refers to the degree of consistency an instrument 
measures a concept; it is a measure of the proportion of variance of the true score (the latent 
variable). Methods to ascertain instrument reliability are defined in Figure 4.1 (DeVellis, 
2003). Whilst reliability measures deal with accuracy, validity assesses the measurement 
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ability of the instrument. Methods for establishing instrument validity are described in figure 
5.2 (DeVellis, 2003, Thompson and Panacek, 2007). 
 
Method Description 
Stability across time 
 
Internal reliability / 
consistency 
 
An instrument is considered reliable if it is stable across 
time. The split-half reliability test is employed to assess 
stability 
An instrument is considered to be internally consistent / 
reliable when its items are homogeneous. Cronbach‘s 
coefficient alpha is usually used to measure internal 
consistency. 
      Figure 5.1: Reliability Assessment Methods 
    
Method Description 
Face validity 
 
Content validity 
 
 
Predictive / criterion-
related validity 
 
Construct validity 
The easiest and weakest form of validity that intuitively 
and subjectively assesses an instrument measures what it 
should be measuring. 
Extends face validity by assessing the relevance of the 
items to the phenomenon of interest. A panel of experts 
usually conducts content validity. 
 
Involves the comparison of the new measurement to an 
existing measurement evaluating the same phenomenon. 
Thus, an instrument has predictive validity when it has an 
empirical association with some criteria measure. 
The strongest form of validity that examines how well the 
instrument measures the theoretical phenomenon. An 
instrument is said to possess construct validity when it 
behaves the way it has been theorised. 
      Figure 5.2: Validity Evaluation Techniques  
 
5.4.1 Survey Research Method 
Quantitative methods have been widely applied in cross-disciplinary research; and in 
this study, are used in the measurement verification of the conceptual model and hypotheses. 
The survey research method was the quantitative method employed using surveys as primary 
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data collection instruments. This method supports the collection and analysis of large sets of 
quantitative data collected from multiple subjects. Surveys are a relatively inexpensive 
method of quick data collection that sample people under real world conditions as opposed to 
controlled laboratory environments (Panacek, 2008, Totten et al., 1999). Survey data can be 
collected at a single point in time (cross-sectional) or at multiple intervals of time 
(longitudinal) by interviews (face-to-face or telephone) or self-administered surveys (mailed 
or in-person) (Krosnick, 1999, Totten et al., 1999). 
Surveys, which are made up of scales which consist of 2 parts – stimuli and response, 
are developed to measure the respondents‗ judgements (appreciation or understanding of 
issues), feelings or expressions, opinions, attitudes, and perceptions (Jupp, 2006). The stimuli 
part consists of phrases or statements describing the phenomenon of interest whilst the 
response part corresponds to the actual measurement. Scale responses measure a specific 
dimension such as agreement, liking, frequency can use either ordinal or ratio measures. 
Popular scale measurement methods summarised in Figure 5.3 include paired comparison, 
rank order, direct magnitude estimation, and rating (DeVellis, 2003, Jupp, 2006). 
 
Measurement Method Description 
Paired comparison 
 
 
Rank order 
 
Direct magnitude estimate 
 
Rating  
Respondents compare pairs of stimuli along a dimension of 
interest. 
 
Respondents place stimuli in order along a defined dimension. 
 
Respondents are asked to score stimuli on a dimension. 
 
Respondents are asked to select a response choice from several 
ordered along a dimension. Major rating scales are: Thurstone, 
Likert (summate), and Guttman (cumulative) scales. 
 
A Thurstone scale has equal intervals and is used to measure 
attitudes using the principle of paired comparison. The Likert 
scale is also an attitudinal scale that measures the degree of 
agreement or disagreement. The number of point scores on an 
agreement dimension Likert scales can contain as few as 3-
points to as many as 7-points. A Guttman scale progressively 
evaluates higher levels of stimuli. By arranging the stimuli 
according to their level of difficulty, Guttman scales cannot 
only be used to indicate the presence or absence of the 
phenomenon of interest, but also the degree.  
  
Figure 5.3: Scale Measurement Methods. 
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In spite of the popularity of survey research, they are not without criticism or 
challenges such as generalisation, measurement, and response quality. 
 The present thesis, before considering the adoption of one or more research design 
approaches, has carefully explored two important issues; namely the theoretical model of the 
thesis (presented in chapter 3), as well as the research objectives of the study (presented in 
chapter 1). After careful consideration of the pros and cons of the various data collection 
methods and bearing in mind the difficulty of interviewing and collecting data from directors 
in Nigeria, a descriptive, cross-sectional approach, with primary data through the use of mail 
(postal) questionnaire was adopted. 
5.4.2 Scales 
 Four types of scales have been identified in the literature, the nominal, ordinal, 
interval and ratio. Each one represents a higher form of measurement precision. Thus the 
ordinal scale provides the least precision measurement whereas ratio the highest one. One of 
the most commonly used scales was developed by Likert (1932), who developed a technique 
that increases the variation in the possible scores that a respondent can choose from. Initially, 
it had the form of a 5 point scale (e.g. from strongly disagree to strongly agree), although 
sometimes a 7 point version is used. 
Lietz (2008) found that the 5-7 options are more generally used. John Dawes (2008) 
in his study found that the 5- and 7-point scales produced the same mean score as each other, 
once they were rescaled. However, the 10-point format tended to produce slightly lower 
relative means than either the 5- or 7-point scales. 
 Bearing in mind the above as well as findings from the pre-testing phase, this thesis 
adopted seven point scales throughout the questionnaire. In terms of response item layout, the 
layout adopted in this research ran left to right, ascending numerically and from negative to 
positive responses (as in figure 4.4 below). The opposite has been found to distort results 
(Hartley and Betts, 2009) and running left to right better matches the reading direction of 
Latin text. 
 
 1                      2                    3                    4                    5                     6                    7 
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Strongly      Disagree      Slightly          Neutral        Slightly              Agree        Strongly 
Disagree                          Disagree                             Agree                                  Agree 
Figure 5.4: Response items runs from left to right 
 
 In summary, a descriptive approach was undertaken, using the questionnaire 
approach, based on primary data and utilising seven point scales (both Likert and Semantics). 
The questionnaires were put in envelopes and mailed by courier to the respondents. 
The following section deals with the survey research design, data sources and scale 
construction that were employed in the research project. 
5.4.3 Survey Design 
 This section deals with issues relating to a number of important themes that were 
taken into account throughout the process of constructing and developing the research 
instrument of the empirical part of this thesis. More specifically, issues relating to the right 
size of envelope, content of the questionnaire, the cover letters and the reminder letters. 
5.4.3.1. Envelopes 
 Lagos Business School, Pan-African University branded A4 size white envelopes 
were used for the main mail shots. In this way I avoided curling up the questionnaire, which 
could have made it less presentable. Brunel Business School branded stationery was not used 
as Lagos Business School is better known in the Nigerian market. The questionnaire could 
have been seen as being sponsored by the Lagos Business School, which could have been 
positive, in view of the reputation of the School in Nigeria. 
  
As a result of the very poor postal service in Nigeria, the questionnaires were not posted but 
sent by courier and there is no known literature to back this approach of reaching 
respondents. The questionnaires were returned either by post or by courier at the expense of 
the respondents because of the reputation of Lagos Business School, which is seen as being 
close to the private sector and helping to solve their problems. 
5.4.3.2 Cover Letters 
 All the mailed questionnaires were accompanied by a cover letter that was printed. 
The printing of the questionnaire was meant to give it a more professional look.  The printed 
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stationery of Lagos Business School was used for all the cover letters which were produced 
on 12 pt size Times New Roman fonts. 
 All the letters were personalised and addressed directly to the recipients, e.g. Dear Dr. 
Kolade, as this might increase the chance of the questionnaire being completed by the 
respondent. Although to sign about 1,200 cover letters is boring and time consuming, the 
researcher followed this procedure for maximum personalisation. 
 
 The basic aim of the cover letter was to persuade the recipients to complete the 
questionnaire and inform them about the purpose and the importance of the study. Thus in the 
four cover letters used in the study (notification, letter with questionnaire, reminder and final 
reminder), the researcher stressed the importance of this study for directors, boards and 
corporate governance practices (Appendices 2, 3, 4, 5). 
 
 Another issue of great importance is the anonymity and confidentiality of the 
respondents. In the cover letters as well as in the first and last pages of the questionnaire, the 
fact that the responses will be absolutely confidential and anonymity is guaranteed was 
stressed. However, respondents who would like to receive a complementary report of the 
major findings of the survey report were invited to attach their business cards on the last page 
of the questionnaire. 
5.4.3.3 Research Instrument 
The construction and development of the questionnaire took approximately three 
months to complete. More than 8 versions through revisions were produced in order for the 
questionnaire to take its final form. This section provides a brief account on issues relating to 
physical questionnaire itself such as, the length, font types and the kind of questions used. 
5.4.3.3.1 Length of the Questionnaire 
 The questionnaire used in my study was 12 pages with 106 items (Appendix III). The 
front page included the title of the project, about 12 lines text explaining the main objectives 
of the study, offering broad guidelines to the respondent and repeating the sensitive issue of 
confidentiality, and finally the address to send the completed questionnaire to. 
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 On the last page (page 12) of the questionnaire there was a blank space for the 
respondents to make further comments, a space to attach his/her business card or write down 
his/her address, and finally some words of gratitude for the invaluable support. 
 The questionnaire was printed in a booklet form for a more professional appearance. 
The booklet was white with some background design that gave it a pleasant look and feel and 
made it easy and friendly to read. 
 
 The questionnaire was divided into eleven sections (from A to K), each one exploring 
the various components of the theoretical framework. It contained 75 questions in total with 
106 items. Same font size was used for all the questions and items. 
5.4.3.3.2 Types of Questions 
 Closed-ended questions with ordered answered choices were mainly used in this 
questionnaire. Seven-point (7) scales (Likert and Semantic) were consistently used with the 
same order throughout the questionnaire.  The questions and statements were kept as short as 
possible in order to increase respondents‘ comprehension (Lietz, 2008, Holbrook et al., 
2006). The questions employed the active rather than the passive voice (Dornyei, 2003) and 
the researcher avoided using leading questions, generalisations, ambiguous expressions 
(Lietz, 2008; Martin, 2006). The sequence of the questions was developed upon the diagram 
(figure 3) illustrated in chapter 4. 
5.4.3.3.3 Pre-testing 
The survey instrument was pretested by administering the questionnaire to a small 
sample of respondents (ten directors) made up of participants of the Lagos Business School 
Chief Executive Program (CEP 19), whose responses and general reactions were sought and 
examined. Suggestions for refinement and clarification of questions and items in the 
instrument were made by respondents with regard to meaning and clarity of each statement, 
relevance and adequacy of items, and any problems or uncertainties they had in completing 
the questionnaire. 
Even though the respondents in this pre-testing exercise were not sufficiently 
knowledgeable about matters of questionnaire design, they had experience of serving on 
boards of quoted companies. As part of the pretesting process the questionnaire was also 
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submitted to four senior academics with extensive combined experience in survey research, 
who were able to provide critical assessment of the content validity of each item, as 
suggested by Sudman and Bradburn (1982) and Schilling and Steensma (2002). These expert 
suggestions during the questionnaire design and revision process helped ensure a close match 
between the pre-test and final versions of the instrument. 
5.4.4 Sampling Environment 
This section sets out to discuss context of the research, issues relating to sample size 
and selection, key respondents, reminders and response rates, as well as non-response bias. 
 The research was carried out in Nigeria which is one of the leading economies in 
Africa and regarded as an emerging market. The private sector is made of subsidiaries of 
multinational companies and indigenous Nigerian companies. It has a thriving stock market 
that has been attractive to foreign investors. The country with a population of about 150 
million has abundant human resources. It is the sixth largest exporter of crude oil in the world 
and relies on oil and gas for the bulk of its foreign exchange earnings. Businesses operating 
in Nigeria have to contain with poor infrastructure, particularly road networks and electricity 
supply; inadequate physical security; weak enforcement of contracts, and high cost of 
finance. 
 The public sector is very weak and, on top of this, corruption threatens to crumble the 
country. Corruption has increased the cost of doing business in the country and has also 
thrown up governance challenges. The Nigerian corporate governance system is based on the 
Anglo-US model  
 In Nigeria, less than 1 per cent of companies operating in Nigeria are list, while most 
of them are operating outside the legislation governing the capital market. These companies 
are mainly small and family owned.  
5.4.5 Research Population and Frame 
 Although it would have been desirable to study the entire population of boards of 
businesses (quoted, private, and family) in Nigeria, it will be impossible because of the 
closed nature of most family and private companies. I therefore decided to restrict the study 
to only publicly quoted companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange as they have formal 
boards and provide information of their operations in the public domain. In this research the 
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population was defined as chairpersons and directors (executive and non-executive) of all 
companies that are quoted in the Nigerian Stock Exchange. As at May 1, 2010 there were 213 
quoted companies in the Nigerian Stock exchange with 199 in the first (1
st
) tier and 14 in the 
second (2
nd
) tier market. The 2
nd
 tier securities market, which is now known as alternative 
securities market are for indigenous (local Nigerian) companies; while the 1
st
 tier securities 
market is for both indigenous and foreign companies. Table 4.1 shows the characteristics of 
both markets. 
 
  1st Tier 
 
2
nd
 Tier 
1 Company must be registered as a Public 
Limited Liability Company under the 
provision of Companies and Allied  Matter 
Act 1990. 
 
Company must be registered as a Public 
Limited under the federal Inland Revenues 
Service. 
2 Must submit its financial statements / business 
records of past 5 years to the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange on registration. 
 
Must submit its financial statements / business 
records of past 3 year to the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange on registration.  
3 Date of last audited accounts must not be 
more than 9 months. 
Date of last audited accounts must not be more 
than 9 Months. 
 
4 Amount of money that can be raised in the 
market is unlimited. 
Amount of money that can be raised may not 
exceed N100 million.  
 
5 Annual quotation fee is based on the Market 
Capitalization of the company. 
Annual quotation fee is a flat rate of N30,000. 
 
6 At least 25% of share capital must be offered 
to the public. 
At least 15% of share capital must be offered 
to the public. 
 
7 Number of shareholders must not be less than 
300. 
Number of shareholders must not be less than 
100. 
 
8 After listing, company must submit 
quarterly, half-yearly and annual accounts 
to SEC. 
 
After listing, company must submit half-yearly 
and annual accounts to SEC.  
9 Securities must be fully paid up at the time of 
allotment. 
  
Securities must be fully paid up at the time of 
allotment. 
10 Un-allotted Securities must be sold on NSE 
trading floors. 
Un-allotted Securities must be sold on NSE 
trading floors 
Source: Nigerian Stock Exchange – Monthly Stock Market Review, July 2010 Edition 
Table 5.1: Differences between the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 tier Securities Market in Nigeria 
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The companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange are classified as follows: 
1. Aviation and road transportation 
2. Commercial services 
3. Construction and real estate 
4. Financial services 
5. Healthcare 
6. Hotel and tourism 
7. Information and Communication Technology 
8. Media, Printing and Publishing 
9. Petroleum Marketing 
10. Manufacturing 
 
5.4.6   Administration of the Survey Questionnaires 
 
For the purposes of the study, the companies were classified into manufacturing and non-
manufacturing (which were then labelled as services). The non-manufacturing included the 
first nine classifications above. The companies were further classified, in terms of ownership, 
as Local Nigerian companies (owned by Nigerians but operate locally), Nigerian 
International companies (owned by Nigerians and operate in Nigeria and other countries), 
Subsidiaries of Foreign companies, and Joint ventures between Nigerians and Foreigners. 
The entire population (all chairpersons and directors of quoted companies) constituted 
the research sample. This approach was taken because of the limited number of publicly 
quoted companies in the Nigerian stock market and the need to have a sizeable data to work 
with. The lists of the directors were obtained from the current published annual reports of the 
companies, which are of public record. However directors that served on multiple boards 
were required to complete only one questionnaire for the board of their choice.  
There were 1,449 directors that served on one board and 133 directors that served on 
multiple boards. A total of 1582 questionnaires were sent by courier to all these directors. 
The use of courier companies is to ensure delivery as the postal system in Nigeria is very 
inefficient.  However, notification letters were first sent out to all the potential participants, 
about one week before the first mail shot. This was aimed at generating awareness for the 
study and preparing the directors mentally before the questionnaires were sent out.  
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5.4.7 Reminders and Response Rate 
 In order to improve the response rate, some follow-up activities were embarked upon. 
Two weeks after the first mail, which was sent out on May 14, 2010 a reminder letter was 
sent to the respondents who had not returned their questionnaires. The researcher chose two 
weeks, instead of one week that is common in developed countries, for the following reasons: 
firstly, the Nigerian postal system is very slow and inefficient. Secondly, letters to the 
directors of a company were sent to the company secretary who then forwarded them to the 
directors. Finally, two weeks after the first reminder letter was sent, a final mail shot was sent 
out including a cover letter and an additional copy of the questionnaire, in case the first 
questionnaire was misplaced. 
 As can be seen from table 5.2, the first mail shot produced fifty three (53) responses 
which were all found to be usable. The second wave produced seventy nine (79) responses 
which again were found to be usable.  The third and final wave produced eighty one (81) 
responses which were found to be usable. Residual responses (twenty) were received after 
eight weeks when the field work was closed. The poor postal service forced me to extend 
receipt of responses to eight weeks.  
Twenty eight (28) questionnaires from four (4) companies were returned for reason of 
wrong addresses. This means that of the total 1582 questionnaires sent out only 1554 
probably got to their destinations. The response rate, based on 233 returned usable 
questionnaires is 15.0 percent. The research on boards of directors has usually had a low 
response rate (often lower than 20%) since board members are busy professionals, and further 
they know private information that cannot be revealed outside the company (Pettigrew, 
1992). Minichilli, et. al. (2009) in their study of Italian boards achieved a response rate of 15 
percent. McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2009) in their study of corporate governance 
preferences of top management teams of institutional investors, they had a response rate of 
10%. Other studies of directors and top management teams had similar response rates such as 
10% in Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), 8% in Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely 
(2005), and between 15% and 19% in Jenkinson and Jones (2009).  
 However, Ruigrok, et al. (2006) in their study of the chairperson or vice chairpersons of 
quoted Swiss firms had a relatively high response rate of 28.5 percent.  
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Mail Shots -Waves Usable 
Questionnaires 
Non-usable  
First Wave, 2 weeks after 53 0 
Second Wave, 4 weeks after 79 0 
Third Wave, 6 weeks after 81 0 
Fourth Wave, 8 weeks after 20 0 
Total 233 0 
Table 5.2: Returned Questionnaires 
 
 
5.4.8   Constructs and Variables 
Variable Name 
 
Dependent Constructs 
Operationalization of the 
constructs and variables 
References 
Board oversight 
(control) role 
 
Assessed with a 7-point Likert 
scale of 7 items  
Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004; 
Cornforth, 2001; 
Board service role 
 
Assessed with a 7-point Likert 
scale of 7 items 
Ingley and van der Walt, 
2005; Cornforth, 2001; 
Board strategic role 
 
 
Independent 
Variables/Constructs 
Assessed with a 7-point Likert 
scale of 9 items 
Ruigrok et al., 2006; 
Ingley and van der Walt, 
2005, Dulewicz and Herbert, 
2004 
CEO duality 
 
Coded ‗1‘ if CEO also holds the 
position of chairperson or ‗0‘ if 
both are separated 
 
Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004;  
Kiel and Nicholson, 2003, 
Board size 
 
Number of directors on the board Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004 
Board independence 
 
Proportion of outside directors and 
CEO duality 
Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004 
Board diversity 
 
Assessed with a 7-point Likert 
scale of 6 items  
Nicholson and Kiel, 2004 
Board human capital 
 
 
Mediating Constructs 
Assessment of the professions of 
the directors on the boards, and a 
five-item scale 
 
Nicholson and Kiel, 2004 
Board decision-
making 
 
Assessed with a 7-point Likert 
scale of 10 items 
Nielsen and Huse, 2010 
Board cohesiveness 
 
Assessed with a 7-point Likert 
scale of 7 items 
Gabrielsson et al., 2007  
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Board operations 
 
Assessed with a 7-point Likert 
scale of 10 items 
Minichilli et al, 2009; 
Melkunov 2011;  
 
 
Control Variables 
  
Firm type 
 
Manufacturing or service 
company 
Minichilli et al, 2009; 
Hillman et al, 2000 
Firm ownership 
 
Multinational company or local 
company 
Kang, 2004 
Firm age 
 
Number of years since 
incorporation 
Peng et al 2007 
Firm size 
 
Amount of sales revenue per year 
and number of employees 
Muth and Donaldson 1998; 
Khodadadi et al 2010 
Table 5.3: Board characteristics, processes and effectiveness constructs and variables 
 5.4.8.1   Dependent Constructs 
 The dependent constructs are board control (oversight) role, board service role and 
board strategic role. Each of the constructs is measured with a set of scaled- questions. The 
summation of these scores was used to arrive at a mean figure for each of the constructs. 
 The researcher is not aware of any similar work that has been done in Nigeria or in 
any emerging market and as such had to rely on research instruments used in the developed 
markets. The items used in evaluating the control and service roles of the board were 
identical to those used by Cornforth (2001) in his study of board effectiveness in non-profit 
organizations. The items used in evaluating the strategic role of the board were similar to 
those used by Ruigrok et al. (2006) in their study of the involvement of the boards of Swiss 
companies in strategic decision making. 
5.4.8.1.1 Board Control Role 
The board control construct was assessed with 7 items that cover issues that include 
oversight of financial management and control, monitoring of firm and CEO performance, 
accountability to stakeholders, and fulfilment of legal obligations.  
5.4.8.1.2 Board Service Role 
The board service construct was assessed with 7 items that cover issues that include 
support and advice to management, review of board performance, and representative of 
stakeholders, link with important groups and organizations, representing the organization 
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externally, helping to raise funds and other resources for the firm, and helping to generate 
businesses for the firm. 
 
5.4.8.1.3 Board Strategic Role 
The board service construct was assessed with 9 items that cover issues that include setting 
the firm‘s mission and values, firm‘s vision and objectives, firm‘s strategic direction, 
determination and enforcement of company policies, SWOT analysis, determination of 
corporate and financial options, firm‘s structure and strategy implementation, and 
performance management.. 
 5.4.8.2   Independent Constructs and Variables 
 The independent constructs and variables are CEO duality, board size, board 
independence (proportion of outside directors), board diversity and board human capital. 
Each of the constructs is measured with a set of scaled- questions. The summation of these 
scores was used to arrive at a mean figure for each of the constructs. 
5.4.8.2.1 CEO Duality 
This variable was assessed by counting the number of boards that have separate 
chairperson and CEO and those that have the same chairperson and CEO. It is also a measure 
of board independence. 
5.4.8.2.2 Board Size 
 Board size was assessed by counting the number of directors (inside and outside) on 
the board. It is total number of directors on the board. 
5.4.8.2.3 Board Independence 
 Board independence was measured by assessing the proportion of outside directors on 
the board (number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors) and also by 
board duality. 
5.4.8.2.4 Board Diversity 
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 This construct assesses diverse experiences (in terms of occupation and functional 
positions), background (in terms of education) and demography (in terms of tribal and 
religious affinities) of directors. It is implied that diversity will lead to greater knowledge 
base which could lead to better decision making by the board of directors. 
 This was assessed with a six-item scale and also by direct enumeration of the various 
professions represented on the board 
5.4.8.2.5 Board Human Capital 
 This construct was assessed with a five-item scaled adapted from the work done by 
Nicholson and Kiel (2004) in coming up with a framework for diagnosing board 
effectiveness. It seeks to capture directors‘ knowledge of the business of the firm and the 
industry it operates in, and also their knowledge of financial, risk and legal matters. 
5.4.8.3 Mediating Constructs 
 The mediating constructs are board decision-making, board cohesiveness and board 
operations.  Each of the constructs is measured with a set of scaled- questions. The 
summation of these scores was used to arrive at a mean figure for each of the constructs. 
5.4.8.3.1 Board Decision-Making 
Board decision-making construct was assessed with 10 items that covered issues that 
include agenda of board meetings, adequate notice of important issues to be discussed, 
conduct of board meetings, discussions at board meetings and how board reach conclusions.  
5.4.8.3.2 Board Cohesiveness 
Board cohesiveness construct was assessed with 7 items that covered issues that 
include periodic review of board-management working relationship, conflict resolution 
between board and management, respect and trust level between board and management, how 
disagreements are dealt with, and degree of socialization amongst directors. 
Organizational demography literature has emphasized cohesiveness as a potential 
intervening construct and it is one of the most extensively studied variables in group settings 
(Bettenhausen, 1991; and Williams and O‘Reilly, 1998). This is why board cohesiveness is 
considered as one of the intervening variables in this study. 
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5.4.8.3.3 Board Operations 
Board operations construct was assessed with 9 items that covered issues that include 
clear understanding of roles, conduct of board meetings, quality and timeliness of board 
papers, and time available to directors to do their job.  
 5.4.8.4   Control Variables 
In order to identify the specific effect of board characteristics, board processes on 
board effectiveness, the researcher controlled for the effect of firm type, firm ownership, firm 
age and firm size.  
5.4.8.4.1 Type of Firm 
 In this study all the firms are grouped into two categories, manufacturing and non-
manufacturing. For convenience, the non-manufacturing firms are regarded as service firms.  
 
5.4.8.4.2 Firm Ownership 
 Firm ownership in this study refers to whether the firm is a subsidiary of a foreign 
multinational company or a locally owned company. A subsidiary of a multinational 
company is one where the parent company owns at least 51 percent of the share capital, while 
a locally owned company is one where Nigerians own majority of the shares.  
5.4.8.4.3 Firm Age 
 Firm age refers to the number of years a firm has been in operation from its inception. 
Firm age has been linked to many decisions of the firm and it has been found that complexity 
increases with firm age (Gregory et al., 2005; Boone et al., 2007). In view of the uncertain 
relationships of firm age on board characteristics as well as board performance, it was 
decided to control for firm age. Firm age is measured by the number of years of the firms 
existence from the time the firm was established. 
5.4.8.4.4 Firm Size 
 Firm size is usually taken as a proxy for the complexity of the firm and the need for 
higher amount of advice to the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Booth and Deli, 1996).  As 
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firms grow in size they become more complex to manage. Two of the most widely used 
parameters for measuring firm size are sales revenue and number of employees (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998).  For this study, both number of employees and sales revenue have been 
used to measure firm size.  
5.5   Analytical Procedure for the Quantitative Research   
 The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 19.0 was used to analyse 
the data. For the questionnaire, statements other than single response items were formatted on 
a seven-point Likert-type scale. Data were first examined using normal descriptive statistics 
to identify any peculiarities in frequencies. Preliminary cross-tabulations were also 
conducted. The scales were treated as metric level data, with the mean used as the central 
tendency measure. For variables measured by open-ended questions the number of 
observations, relative frequencies and the mode were computed and presented. 
5.5.1 Statistical Techniques Deployed for Data Analysis 
 Constructs were analysed using descriptive statistics of Mean and Standard deviation 
(Chapter 6). This provided a good initial understanding of the data set. The variables in each 
construct were subjected to factor analysis, a data reduction technique. Factor analysis ―is a 
generic name given to a class of multivariate statistical methods whose primary purpose is to 
define the underling structure in a data matrix (Hair et al., 2010)‖. The main purpose was to 
detect patterns of variables within each construct, which may lead to the identification of 
underling concepts or dimensions, and a possible reduction of data. The variant of factor 
analysis used is component analysis, which is based on total variance and implies that all the 
variance is common or shared (Hair et al., 2010). The objective was to obtain the minimum 
number of factors which accounted for the maximum portion of the variance represented in 
the original set of variables. Factors with the right loading were considered. According to 
Hair et al (2010), a factor loading represents the correlation between an original variable and 
its factor, with higher loadings making the variable representative of the factor. It was 
decided that variables with factor loading over 0.40 were considered to be significant (Kim 
and Mueller, 1978; Bryman and Cramer, 1994). Where factor loadings were split across one 
or more factors, the variable was considered as part of the factor in which it carried the 
highest loading. In the case that factor loadings were nearly equal across one or more factors, 
the variable was included as part of the factor to which was conceptually relevant. 
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 The factor analysis produced new variables that were now used for correlation and 
regression analyses. Correlation analysis was used in order to investigate further the 
hypothetical associative relationships between two or more variables. The correlation 
coefficient (r) is widely used to prove relationship. The correlation coefficient can have 
values ranging from (-1) to (+1); where r = -1 indicates a perfect negative relationship; r = 0 
indicates no linear relationship; and r = +1, a perfect positive relationship (Hair et al., 2010). 
Only correlations at 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels were considered (Chapter 7). 
5.5.2 Regression Analysis 
 Multiple regression analysis is a statistical technique that can be used to analyse the 
relationship between a single dependent variable and several independent variables (Hair et 
al., 2010). The form that the estimated multiple regression model takes is shown in equation 
(1) 
  Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + ......bnXn + u (1) 
 Where: 
 Y = estimated value of the dependent variable; 
 a = value of the constant or intercept derived from the analysis; 
 b = estimated regression coefficients associated with the independent variables; 
 X = the independent variable(s). 
 u = the error term 
 Regression analysis was used to establish the relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables and the effect of the mediator variables on these relationships. 
 Our model assumes a three-variable system (Chapter 8) such that there are two casual 
paths feeding into the outcome (dependent) variable: the direct impact of the independent 
variable (path c) and the impact of the mediator (path b). There is also a path from the 
independent variable to the mediator (path a). The Baron and Kenny (1986) and Judd and 
Kenny (1981) approach was used to test for mediation. First, the dependent variables were 
regressed on the independent variables; second, the mediator variables were regressed on the 
independent variables; third, the dependent variables were regressed on the mediator 
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variables; and fourth, the dependent variables were regressed on both the independent 
variables and the mediator variables.  
 
5.5.3 Hypothesis Testing 
 The next step in the statistical analysis was to test the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 4, using the regression equations developed in Chapter 8. 
5.6   Summary 
 This Chapter presents the research design, methodology, questionnaire administration, 
data collection and statistical analyses of the data. It also covers the research environment. 
The qualitative findings are presented in chapter 5 while the descriptive findings are 
presented in chapter 6 
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CHAPTER 6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics of the study, which is the starting point 
for answering the research questions. The specific questions are: 
1. What are the effects of board characteristics on board cohesiveness, board 
decision-making, and board operations? 
2. What are the effects of board human capital on board cohesiveness, board 
decision-making, and board operations? 
3. What are the effects of board cohesiveness, decision-making and operations on 
board task performance (board control, service, and strategic roles)? 
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section discusses the background 
profile, the second section covers board characteristics, while the third section discusses 
board human capital. This is followed by description of the board processes and the final 
section describes board effectiveness.  
Further analyses, correlation and regression that were carried out to help answer the 
research questions are covered in the next chapter. 
6.2 Background Profile 
In terms of background information, the companies were classified into 
manufacturing and services (all others that are not manufacturing). They were further 
classified as Local Nigerian companies, Nigerian International companies, Subsidiaries of 
Foreign companies, and Joint ventures between Nigerians and Foreigners. 
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Figure 6.1: Type of Company (n = 233) 
 
Figure 6.1 gives the breakdown of the types of companies of the respondents. 47.1 per 
cent of the directors are from local Nigerian companies, 36.6 per cent are from Nigerian 
international companies, 10.1 per cent are from subsidiaries of foreign companies and 6.2 per 
cent are from joint venture companies between Nigerians and foreigners. About 84 per cent 
of the directors are from Nigerian companies and as such the results will reflect the true 
picture of Nigerian boards rather than those of subsidiaries of multinational companies whose 
operations are usually controlled by their parent companies. In terms of years of operation, 
most of the directors are from companies that been in business for over ten years and about 
half of them had been operating in Nigeria for a period of between ten and thirty years. 
Figure 6.2 gives a detailed breakdown. The respondents are from mature companies that 
should have proper processes in place both at board and management levels. 
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Figure 6.2: Years of Operation of the Companies (n = 233) 
The companies were classified in line with the classification in the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. One of the control variables in our questionnaire was the organization type which 
could either be manufacturing or non-manufacturing (labelled services). All the respondents 
companies were classified into these two categories and 18.4 per cent of the directors were 
from manufacturing companies while 81.6 per cent were from non-manufacturing. The 
financial services sector accounted for about half of the total respondents (58.6 percent of 
non-manufacturing).The financial services companies accounted for over 40 percent of the 
capitalisation of the Nigerian stock market as at May 2010.  The number of directors of 
quoted financial services companies was about 34 percent of the total number of directors of 
all quoted companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange. This is not surprising as the average 
size of boards of banks is about 1.5 to 2 times the average size of boards in other sectors. 
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Figure 6.3: Industry Classification (n = 233) 
Over half of the respondents worked for companies with employee size of not more 
than 500 people.  Companies with employee size of 101 to 200 people account for 26.1 per 
cent of the directors. The control variable organization size was based on number of 
employees and considered two options – big and small – where big represented an 
organization size of over 1000 people and small represented organization with not more than 
1000 employees. The directors of small organizations accounted for 58.9 per cent and those 
big organizations accounted for 41.1 percent. Figure 6.4 shows details of the distribution of 
organization size, based on number of employees, amongst the respondents. 
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Figure 6.4: Number of full-time Employees (n = 233) 
Annual turnover was also used to measure the size of organizations. A big 
organization is one with a turnover of more than N5 billion
11
 (five billion Naira), while a 
small one has a turnover of not more than N5 billion (five billion Naira). The directors of big 
organizations accounted for 48.9 percent of respondents while those small ones accounted for 
51.1 percent. Figure 6.5 shows details of the distribution of organization size, based on 
annual turnover, amongst the respondents. 
                                                          
11
 USD1 = N150 
125 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Turnover of the organizations (n = 233) 
 
6.3 Board Characteristics 
 The structure and characteristics of board of directors is very important in corporate 
governance research (Dalton, 1993). Board structure and characteristics include board size, 
leadership structure (CEO duality), board composition, diversity, and board committees. 
Board size refers to the total number of directors on the board of the organization. Leadership 
structure refers to the division of labour between the board chairperson and the CEO. Board 
composition refers to the proportion of executive directors and non-executives directors on 
the board. Diversity refers to the various backgrounds, demographics and competences of 
directors on the board. Existence of board committees and their composition are also part of 
the board characteristics. 
This section looks at the board structure and characteristics of Nigerian quoted 
companies. 
126 
 
6.3.1 Board Leadership 
 Board leadership structure indicates how the positions of chairperson and CEO are 
held. In the independence structure two individuals serve in the roles of CEO and board 
chairperson.  A situation in which these roles are held by the same person is called CEO 
duality.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6: CEO Duality 
The Nigerian code of corporate governance (2003, 2010) recommends that the roles 
of chairman and CEO should be separate and where the chairman is also the CEO, it is 
important to have a ―strong independent element‖ on the board. In our survey it was found 
that 96.6 per cent of the directors are from companies that have separate chairpersons and 
CEOs, while 3.4 per cent are from companies that have same chairperson and CEO (Figure 
6.6). Enforcement of the Nigerian code by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
has been very weak and so it is not out of place to find some subsidiaries of American 
multinationals and some small Nigerian companies having the same persons occupying the 
two positions of chairperson and CEO.   
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Ogbechie and Koufopoulos (2007) in their research of quoted companies in Nigeria 
found that 76.9 percent of the companies had separation of chairperson and CEO.  There has 
been significant improvement since then in terms of CEO duality. A common practice found 
in many public companies in Nigeria is the appointment of former CEOs as chairpersons of 
boards (Ogbechie and Koufopoulos, 2007). Such appointments might not enhance board 
independence. Another factor in Nigeria that tends to affect board independence adversely is 
the role of powerful shareholders that influence the appointment of CEOs and chairpersons. 
The representation of women at the leadership cadre is very low. Only 13.4 per cent 
of the CEOs of Nigerian quoted companies are female (figure 6.7), while 3.9 per cent of the 
chairpersons are female (figure 6.8) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 6.7: Gender of CEO 
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Figure 6.8: Gender of Chairperson 
No known study has been done in Nigeria on gender issues at the board level and so we are 
not in a position to compare. 
6.3.2. Board Size 
Board size is the total number of directors (both inside and outside) on the board of a 
corporate organization. 
The results show that the smallest board size of quoted companies in Nigeria is four 
(4) directors, while the largest board size is twenty (20) directors. Banks in Nigeria tend to 
have large boards as the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) corporate governance code (2006) 
allows for a maximum board size of twenty (20) directors. Table 5.1 shows the distribution of 
board size. The board sizes with the highest frequency are seven (12.9 percent) and eleven 
(12.0 percent).  
The average size of boards of publicly quoted companies in Nigeria is 10.62 directors, 
with the median being 10 directors.  
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Board Size Frequency 
Valid  
% 
   4 1 0.4 
5 6 2.6 
6 15 6.4 
7 30 12.9 
8 23 9.9 
9 26 11.2 
10 26 11.2 
11 28 12.0 
12 11 4.7 
13 17 7.3 
14 10 4.3 
15 18 7.7 
16 3 1.3 
17 8 3.4 
18 6 2.6 
20 5 2.1 
   N 233 
 Mean 10.62 
 Median 10.00 
 Minimum 4 
 Maximum 20 
  
Table 6.1: Distribution of Board size 
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Figure 6.9: Distribution of Board size  
There has been an increase in the average size of boards of quoted companies in 
Nigeria since 2007.  Ogbechie and Koufopoulos (2007) found an average board size of 7.8 
directors in Nigeria in 2006 as against 10.6 directors in 2010. Similar research studies carried 
out on boards in Africa indicates that in general African publicly listed firms have between 8 
and 19 directors. Adeysekera (2010) shows an average board size of 8 for Kenyan firms and 
Okeahalam (2004) reports average board sizes of 7 for Ghanaian, 8 for Ivoirian, 9 for 
Zimbabwean, 8 for Zambian, 10 for Mauritian, 12 for Namibian firms respectively. Spencer 
Stuart (2010) reveals that the size of boards in South-Africa averages 12.4 while Abdelsalam 
et al (2008) informs that the average size for Egyptian boards is 19. 
 
6.3.3 Board Independence 
Board independence is considered at two levels: at one level is the chairperson – CEO 
separation and at the other level is the dominance of outside directors on the board. The 
separation of roles will avoid the entrenchment of powerful CEO (Rhoades et al., 2001; 
Jensen, 1993) and hence establish independence between the board and top management. 
Without an independent chair, a board would not be able to perform its control (oversight) 
role effectively (Carlssaon, 2001; Finkelstein and D‘Aveni, 1994). CEO duality may reduce 
the effectiveness of the board and may create a conflict between management and the board 
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(Zahra, 1990; Solomon, 2007) and hence reduce the board‘s ability to exercise its governance 
function. Balsam and Upadhyay (2009) found that firms separating the positions of chief 
executive officer (CEO) and board chair perform better and are more highly valued by the 
market. 
The second level of board independence is the dominance of outside directors on the 
board. Outside directors are usually independent of the firm‘s management and so can be 
more objective and provide independent supervision of the firm‘s management (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Randoy and Jenssen (2004) found that board independence (board 
compositions) is not associated with firm performance based on accounting measures. 
However, Guest (2008) found that board composition was significantly associated with firm 
performance. 
With 96.6 percent of the boards having separate chairmen and CEOs, this is slightly 
higher than 94 percent reported by Spencer Stuart (2009) and significantly greater than 54.6 
percent reported by Tusiime et al (2011) for Ugandan firms and  52 percent for Egyptian 
firms (Abdelsalam et al, 2008). In the area of dominance of outside directors on the board 
there is some degree of independence as the average independence ratio of the boards of 
Nigerian public companies is about 65 percent of outside directors and 35 percent inside 
directors. In the case of Egyptian firms the average independence ratio of the boards is 55 
percent (Abdelsalam et al, 2008). In the case of South-African companies, 
PriceWaterCoopers report (2011) reveals that in Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listed 
firms the total number of directors is 3,148. Out of this number 2,002 representing 63.6 
percent of directors are non-executive directors while 1,148 representing 36.4 percent are 
executive directors. 
6.3.4 Board Committees 
 Most corporate boards in Nigeria meet between 4 and 6 times in a year. Since 
meetings tend to last for several hours, functional board committees that will assist the board 
in carrying out their functions are the only way out. The effectiveness of boards will, to some 
extent, depend on the type and quality of board committees. 
 The key board committees that are in existence are shown in figure 6.10. The 
committee with the highest incidence is the audit committee at 86.6 percent. This is similar to 
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the findings of Ogbechie and Koufopoulos (2007), who reported 86.1 percent. This is an 
indication that not all the quoted companies are compliant as both the Nigerian Code of 
Corporate Governance (2003) and the Corporate and Allied Matters Act (CAMA 1990) make 
audit committee mandatory for all quoted companies. Yet this a far cry from what we find  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Incidence of Board Committees 
 
obtainable in the South-African business environment; in a study on board and governance 
trends by SpencerStuart (2009) establishes that audit committees are present in all quoted 
firms of the JSE in compliance with the Kings III report 2009 which mandates all public 
listed and state owned companies to have an audit committee. 
Many companies in Nigeria combine Remunerating, Nominating, Personnel and 
Governance into one board committee, usually referred to as Governance Committee.  
The relatively high incidence of risk management committee (52.6%) is because of 
the high proportion of financial services industry (47.8%) in the population. However, when 
compared with 96 percent in South-African publicly quoted firms (SpencerStuart, 2009) this 
is significantly low. In Nigeria, banks and insurance companies are expected to have risk 
management committees. The global financial crisis of 2008/09 and the near collapse of some 
banks in Nigeria in 2009 have revealed the importance of enterprise risk management in the 
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Nigerian financial services sector. All banks and many insurance companies in Nigeria now 
have risk management committees. Some other companies outside the financial services 
sector have also embraced the concept. 
6.4 Board Professional Human Capital 
An assessment of professions of the directors on the boards of Nigerian quoted 
companies show that the most popular profession is accounting (table 6.2) this might be the 
reason why the directors rate knowledge of financial matters as the highest competence on 
boards (table 6.3).  Directors in Nigeria are expected to be able to read and interpret the 
financials of a company as this will put them in a good position to carry out their oversight 
function. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2: Profession of Directors 
 
Profession (multiple responses) % of Directors 
 
Accountants  90.5 
 
Engineers 
 
67.6 
Lawyers 64.4 
 
Economists 60.8 
 
Bankers 45.0 
 
Academicians 32.0 
 
Medical Doctors 19.8 
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Knowledge of industry 1 
Very  
Low 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
High 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Understanding of the business of your firm 3 
(1.4%) 
2 
(0.9%) 
7 
(3.2%) 
20 
(9.0%) 
55 
(24.9%) 
70 
(31.7%) 
64 
(29.0%) 
5.66 1.25 
Understanding of the industry in which 
your firm operates 
3 
(1.3%) 
3 
(1.3%) 
8 
(3.6%) 
29 
(12.9%) 
47 
(20.9%) 
81 
(36.0%) 
54 
(24.0%) 
5.55 1.28 
Knowledge about financial matters 1 
(0.4%) 
1 
(0.4%) 
9 
(4.0%) 
26 
(11.6%) 
41 
(18.3%) 
83 
(37.1%) 
63 
(28.1%) 
5.71 1.18 
Knowledge about legal matters 1 
(0.4%) 
6 
(2.7%) 
17 
(7.6%) 
58 
(25.9%) 
69 
(30.8%) 
54 
(24.1%) 
19 
(8.5%) 
4.90 1.21 
Knowledge about risk matters 1 
(0.4%) 
4 
(1.8%) 
14 
(6.2%) 
46 
(20.4%) 
63 
(27.9%) 
68 
(30.1%) 
30 
(13.3%) 
5.17 1.22 
Table 6.3: Ratings of directors on diverse knowledge
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The next important competence/knowledge areas are proper understanding of the 
firm‘s business and industry. It could be argued that a director will not be in a position to add 
value to the board and firm if that director does not have a good understanding of the firm‘s 
business and the industry the firm operates in. Knowing the right questions to ask 
management and being able to contribute to strategy development will require a good 
knowledge of the business and industry. 
 A good knowledge of legal matters was rated lowest (4.90) by directors as knowledge 
base on the boards. This could be explained by the practice of most boards in Nigeria 
appointing lawyers as company secretaries and also having legal advisers that work with 
them on permanent basis.     
 
6.4.1 Board Diversity 
 Diversity is a factor that is considered in the evaluation of board performance 
and effectiveness. Board diversity implies that the directors have different skills, knowledge 
and experience, and they are also from different age groups and social status. Some 
researchers suggest that board diversity leads to a greater knowledge base, creativity and 
innovation because of the diverse experience of members of the board (Watson et al., 1993). 
Board diversity was assessed with a six-item scale. The survey data show that the 
degree of diversity of Nigerian boards is high in terms of educational background (6.01), 
occupational background (5.97) and relatively low on religious affinity (4.24) and tribal 
affinity (4.27) (see table 6.4). 
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Board Diversity 1 
Very 
Low 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
High 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Educational background 
4 
(1.7%) 
6 
(2.6%) 
2 
(0.9%) 
7 
(3.1%) 
35 
(15.5%) 
74 
(32.3%) 
101 
(44.1%) 
6.01 1.29 
Occupational background 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(0.9%) 
4 
(1.7%) 
13 
(5.6%) 
39 
(16.9%) 
95 
(41.1%) 
78 
(33.8%) 
5.97 1.02 
Functional positions 
2 
(0.9%) 
4 
(1.8%) 
12 
(5.3%) 
23 
(10.1%) 
65 
(28.5%) 
74 
(32.5%) 
48 
(21.1%) 
5.45 1.26 
Network ties 
4 
(1.8%) 
4 
(1.8%) 
7 
(3.1%) 
31 
(13.6%) 
61 
(26.8%) 
74 
(32.5%) 
47 
(20.6%) 
5.42 1.30 
Religious affinity 
17 
(7.6%) 
28 
(12.5%) 
31 
(13.8%) 
44 
(19.6%) 
37 
(16.5%) 
46 
(20.5%) 
21 
(9.4%) 
4.24 1.76 
Tribal affinity 
24 
(11.0%) 
21 
(9.6%) 
26 
(11.9%) 
41 
(18.8%) 
39 
(17.9%) 
41 
(18.8%) 
26 
(11.9%) 
4.27 1.86 
Table 6.4: Ratings of board diversity (n = 233)
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  In Nigeria top management appointments in federal and state institutions / 
organizations are made on diversity basis, called ‗federal character‘. Such appointments 
should show acceptable representation of the ethnic and religious diversity of the country. 
This diversity principle is enshrined in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(1999) and it is enforced by the Federal Character Commission (FCC), which was established 
by section 153 of the constitution of the country. Diversity has therefore been engraved into 
the psyche of Nigerians. A company in Nigeria with multi-stakeholders must be aware of the 
diversity problem in the country. Some companies operating in the country have consciously 
spread their board and top management appointments to reflect the diversity of the country. 
 Interestingly, the results of our study show that boards of quoted companies in Nigeria 
rated religious and tribal affinity are low as diversity factors. Ensuring diversity on the basis 
of educational and occupational background was most important to them. This trend might 
have arisen from the fact that government investment in quoted companies is negligible or 
none existent. 
 
6.5 Board Processes 
 Board processes that are considered in evaluating board effectiveness are board 
operation, board cohesiveness and board decision-making process. Board operation includes 
how board meetings are conducted, quality and quantity of board papers, how the chairperson 
leads the board, board‘s understanding of its roles and responsibilities, and time committed 
by directors to do their job well. Board cohesiveness includes teamwork by directors, conflict 
resolution, socializing and respect and trust of directors. Decision-making process includes 
constructive discussions during board meetings, quality of debate, and level of integrity and 
transparency that pervades board meetings. 
 
6.5.1 Board Operations 
Board operations were assessed with a nine-item scale. Results of the study show that 
most companies (87.4 percent) hold board meetings quarterly (every three months). Most 
corporate governance codes, including the Nigerian code, recommend a minimum of 
quarterly board meetings. 
138 
 
The leadership of the chairperson was rated highest (mean score 6.13) by directors in 
evaluating their board operations. The other important factors for ensuring smooth board 
operations include ensuring that there are clear responsibilities for following up actions 
agreed by the board (mean score 6.12) and conducting board meetings well (mean score 
6.00). The chairperson‘s leadership style can either cause division on the board or strong 
cohesion. An autocratic chairperson may make it difficult for directors to express their views 
openly and make constructive contributions in board meetings. Directors are not particularly 
worried about the length of time of board meetings (mean score 4.42) 
  
139 
 
Board Operations 1 
Strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
agree 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Board members have time to do their job 
well 
1 
(0.4%) 
3 
(1.3%) 
7 
(3.0%) 
32 
(13.7%) 
44 
(18.9%) 
84 
(36.1%) 
62 
(26.6%) 
5.64 1.21 
Board has a clear understanding of its 
roles and responsibilities 
3 
(1.3%) 
6 
(2.6%) 
9 
(3.9%) 
11 
(4.7%) 
36 
(15.5%) 
76 
(32.6%) 
92 
(39.5%) 
5.86 1.35 
Board meetings run for too long 
19 
(8.3%) 
28 
(12.2%) 
23 
(10.0%) 
43 
(18.8%) 
35 
(15.3%) 
46 
(20.1%) 
35 
(15.3%) 
4.42 1.87 
Board meetings are well conducted 
0 
(0.0%) 
6 
(2.6%) 
7 
(3.0%) 
12 
(5.2%) 
22 
(9.5%) 
94 
(40.5%) 
91 
(39.2%) 
6.00 1.18 
It is clear who has responsibility for 
following up actions agreed by the board  
1 
(0.4%) 
3 
(1.3%) 
6 
(2.6%) 
10 
(4.3%) 
21 
(9.0%) 
89 
(38.2%) 
103 
(44.2%) 
6.12 1.11 
Board member have right quality of board 
papers 
1 
(0.4%) 
1 
(0.4%) 
6 
(2.6%) 
17 
(7.3%) 
54 
(23.3%) 
73 
(31.5%) 
80 
(34.5%) 
5.85 1.12 
The board papers are timely 
1 
(0.4%) 
10 
(4.4%) 
15 
(6.6%) 
34 
(14.8%) 
56 
(24.5%) 
73 
(31.9%) 
40 
(17.5%) 
5.24 1.36 
Quality of Board Charter is high 
2 
(0.9%) 
7 
(3.0%) 
4 
(1.7%) 
15 
(6.5%) 
54 
(23.5%) 
82 
(35.7%) 
66 
(28.7%) 
5.70 1.25 
Chairperson leads the board well 
1 
(0.4%) 
2 
(0.9%) 
2 
(0.9%) 
13 
(5.7%) 
29 
(12.6%) 
78 
(33.9%) 
105 
(45.7%) 
6.13 1.06 
Table 6.5: Evaluation of Board Operations
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6.5.2 Board Cohesiveness 
 Board cohesiveness was assessed with a seven-item scale. Table 6.6 shows that the 
three most important issues for cohesiveness of Nigerian boards are ability of board members 
to resolve conflict between themselves (mean score 6.08), the extent board members respect 
and trust each other (mean score 6.00), and the ability of the board and management to 
resolve conflict between themselves constructively (mean score 5.99). A board where 
members can resolve conflict between themselves respect and trust each other and can 
constructively resolve conflict with management is likely to be cohesive. 
The least important issue in driving board cohesiveness is the level of socializing 
amongst directors outside board meetings (mean score 4.63). 
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Board Cohesiveness 1 
Strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
agree 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
The Board and management periodically 
review how they are working together 
10 
(4.3%) 
17 
(7.4%) 
30 
(13.0%) 
32 
(13.9%) 
42 
(18.3%) 
61 
(26.5%) 
38 
(16.5%) 
4.80 1.71 
Misunderstandings are rare between the 
board and management 
4 
(1.7%) 
6 
(2.6%) 
11 
(4.7%) 
23 
(9.9%) 
55 
(23.7%) 
72 
(31.0%) 
61 
(26.3%) 
5.50 1.39 
Board members and management are able 
to resolve conflict between themselves 
constructively 
3 
(1.3%) 
1 
(0.4%) 
5 
(2.2%) 
16 
(7.0%) 
33 
(14.4%) 
75 
(32.8%) 
96 
(41.9%) 5.99 1.20 
Board members are able to resolve 
conflict between themselves 
constructively 
2 
(0.9%) 
3 
(1.3%) 
1 
(0.4%) 
14 
(6.1%) 
25 
(10.9%) 
87 
(38.0%) 
97 
(42.4%) 6.08 1.11 
Board members respect and trust each 
other 
1 
(0.4%) 
3 
(1.3%) 
5 
(2.2%) 
18 
(7.8%) 
31 
(13.5%) 
74 
(32.2%) 
98 
(42.6%) 
6.00 1.18 
Board members socialize with each other 
outside board meetings 
3 
(1.3%) 
22 
(9.5%) 
30 
(13.0%) 
50 
(21.6%) 
55 
(23.8%) 
39 
(16.9%) 
32 
(13.9%) 
4.63 1.55 
Disagreement is dealt with openly in the 
board 
12 
(5.2%) 
6 
(2.6%) 
16 
(7.0%) 
24 
(10.4%) 
44 
(19.1%) 
70 
(30.4%) 
58 
(25.2%) 
5.28 1.64 
Table 6.6: Evaluation of Board Cohesiveness
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6.5.3 Board Decision-Making Process 
 Board decision-making process was assessed with a ten-item scale. Table 6.7 shows 
the rating of Nigerian directors on issues that affect quality of decision-making at board 
meetings. The most important issues with mean score of over 6.0 are board meetings have 
clearly constructed agenda (mean score 6.31), board meetings are pervaded with integrity 
(mean score 6.10), discussions during board meetings are constructive (mean score 6.07), and 
the business of the board is conducted with openness and transparency. The least important 
issue is directors‘ willingness to propose different approaches when discussing an issue 
(mean score 4.98). 
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Board decision-making 1 
Strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
agree 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
The Board has adequate notice of 
important issues to be discussed at board 
meetings 
0 
(0.0%) 
4 
(32.0%) 
4 
(35.1%) 
21 
(20.3%) 
47 
(9.1%) 
81 
(1.7%) 
74 
(1.7%) 5.81 1.14 
Board meeting have clearly constructed 
agenda 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(0.9%) 
1 
(0.4%) 
10 
(4.3%) 
25 
(10.8%) 
66 
(28.6%) 
127 
(55.0%) 
6.31 0.96 
Important items are prioritized on board 
agenda 
5 
(2.2%) 
4 
(1.7%) 
5 
(2.2%) 
24 
(10.4%) 
24 
(10.4%) 
76 
(32.9%) 
93 
(40.3%) 
5.85 1.39 
Board has trouble reaching conclusions 
14 
(6.1%) 
14 
(6.1%) 
13 
(5.7%) 
7 
(3.0%) 
24 
(10.4%) 
80 
(34.8%) 
78 
(33.9%) 
5.46 1.81 
Board's business conducted with openness 
and transparency 
3 
(1.3%) 
3 
(1.3%) 
4 
(1.7%) 
11 
(4.8%) 
33 
(14.3%) 
75 
(32.6%) 
101 
(43.9%) 
6.03 1.21 
Board meetings are pervaded with 
integrity 
1 
(0.4%) 
4 
(1.7%) 
3 
(1.3%) 
9 
(3.9%) 
33 
(14.2%) 
76 
(32.6%) 
105 
(45.5%) 
6.10 1.11 
Discussions during board meetings are 
constructive 
2 
(0.9%) 
2 
(0.9%) 
4 
(1.7%) 
10 
(4.3%) 
29 
(12.6%) 
88 
(38.1%) 
96 
(41.6%) 
6.07 1.11 
When discussing an issue directors state 
clear disagreement with each other  
5 
(2.2%) 
5 
(2.2%) 
9 
(3.9%) 
22 
(9.6%) 
42 
(18.3%) 
85 
(37.0%) 
62 
(27.0%) 
5.58 1.38 
Directors openly challenge each others' 
opinion 
16 
(7.0%) 
10 
(4.4%) 
16 
(7.0%) 
30 
(13.1%) 
48 
(21.0%) 
67 
(29.3%) 
42 
(18.0%) 
4.98 1.72 
When discussing an issue different 
directors propose different approaches to 
the issue 
7 
(3.1%) 
7 
(3.1%) 
8 
(3.5%) 
24 
(10.6%) 
57 
(25.1%) 
78 
(34.4%) 
46 
(20.3%) 5.36 1.43 
Table 6.7: Evaluation of Board Decision-Making Process
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6.6 Board Effectiveness 
 Board effectiveness is determined by how well the board performs the following 
roles: Oversight, Service, and Strategic.  
6.6.1 Board Oversight Role 
 Oversight role entails how well the board oversees the financial management of the 
organization, ensuring the effectiveness of the financial systems and controls of the 
organization, monitoring the performance of the organization and taking necessary action, 
ensuring that the organization fulfils its legal obligations, and ensuring accountability to all 
stakeholders. All these will ensure honest behaviour by management, avoid abuse of power 
and minimise agency cost.  
Board oversight role was assessed with a seven-item scale. Table 6.8 shows how well 
boards of Nigerian publicly quoted companies performed this role.  
 The three issues with the highest ratings are: ensure accountability to the 
organization‘s stakeholders (mean score 6.12), ensure that the organization fulfils its legal 
obligations (mean score 5.99), and ensure the organization has adequate financial systems 
and procedures (mean score 5.84). The issue with the least rating is to have procedure for 
recruiting new directors (mean score 5.0). 
 However, all the issues have ratings of 5 and above and this is an indicator that 
Nigerian boards take their oversight function seriously. The various corporate governance 
scandals in Nigeria as indicated in chapter 4 might have prompted boards to take their 
control/oversight role more seriously.  
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Board oversight role 1 
Not at 
all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
To a 
large 
extent 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Oversee the financial management of the 
firm 
0 
(0.0%) 
3 
(1.3%) 
6 
(2.6%) 
21 
(9.0%) 
47 
(20.2%) 
82 
(35.2%) 
74 
(31.8%) 
5.81 1.13 
Ensure the firm has adequate financial 
systems and procedures 
0 
(0.0%) 
5 
(2.1%) 
5 
(2.1%) 
13 
(5.6%) 
57 
(24.5%) 
73 
(31.3%) 
80 
(34.3%) 
5.84 1.15 
Monitor firm performance and taking 
action where necessary 
1 
(0.4%) 
3 
(1.3%) 
8 
(3.4%) 
17 
(7.3%) 
50 
(21.5%) 
82 
(35.2%) 
72 
(30.9%) 
5.77 1.18 
Monitor the firm‘s CEO and top 
management 
4 
(1.7%) 
6 
(2.6%) 
10 
(4.3%) 
25 
(10.8%) 
56 
(24.2%) 
73 
(31.6%) 
57 
(24.7%) 
5.47 1.37 
Have procedure for recruiting new 
directors 
7 
(3.0%) 
22 
(9.6%) 
22 
(9.6%) 
32 
(13.9%) 
34 
(14.8%) 
57 
(24.8%) 
56 
(24.3%) 
5.00 1.76 
Ensure that the firm fulfils it legal 
obligations 
1 
(0.4%) 
1 
(0.4%) 
6 
(2.6%) 
14 
(6.1%) 
37 
(16.0%) 
82 
(35.5%) 
90 
(39.0%) 
5.99 1.10 
Ensure accountability to the firm‘s 
stakeholders 
1 
(0.4%) 
1 
(0.4%) 
4 
(1.7%) 
15 
(6.4%) 
29 
(12.4%) 
76 
(32.6%) 
107 
(45.9%) 
6.12 1.08 
Table 6.8: Evaluation of Board Oversight Role
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6.6.2 Board Service Role 
 The board service role entails the board‘s support and advice to management, how it 
represents the interest of shareholders in the organization, how it acts as a link with important 
groups or organizations that the firm deals with, how it helps to raise funds and other 
resources for the firm, and how it helps to generate business for the firm.  
Board service role was assessed with a seven-item scale. Table 6.9 shows how well 
the boards of Nigerian quoted companies are performing their service role. 
The issues with the highest ratings are, support and advice to management (mean 
score 5.97), representing the interest of shareholders (mean score 5.87), and review of board 
performance and ensure that it works well (mean score 5.44). The issues with the least ratings 
are help to generate businesses for the organization (mean score 4.98) and help to raise funds 
and other resources for the organization (mean score 4.84). These ratings suggest that 
directors of Nigerian quoted companies do not see assistance of generating businesses and 
raising funds for their companies as their main responsibilities.  
 
  
 
 
  
147 
 
Board service to management 1 
Not at 
all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
To a 
large 
extent 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Support and advice management 
1 
(0.4%) 
1 
(0.4%) 
8 
(3.5%) 
16 
(6.9%) 
31 
(13.4%) 
86 
(37.2%) 
88 
(38.1%) 
5.97 1.14 
Review of board performance and ensure it 
works well 
4 
(1.7%) 
5 
(2.2%) 
17 
(7.3%) 
23 
(9.9%) 
51 
(22.0%) 
74 
(31.9%) 
58 
(25.0%) 
5.44 1.41 
Represent the interest of  stakeholders in 
the firm 
3 
(1.3%) 
2 
(0.9%) 
6 
(2.6%) 
18 
(7.9%) 
40 
(17.5%) 
73 
(31.9%) 
87 
(38.0%) 
5.87 1.25 
Act as a link with important groups or 
organizations your firm deals with 
6 
(2.6%) 
8 
(3.5%) 
18 
(7.8%) 
44 
(19.1%) 
56 
(24.3%) 
59 
(25.7%) 
39 
(17.0%) 
5.04 1.48 
Represent the organization externally 
4 
(1.7%) 
6 
(2.6%) 
13 
(5.7%) 
41 
(17.9%) 
59 
(25.8%) 
64 
(27.9%) 
42 
(18.3%) 
5.21 1.38 
Help to raise funds or other resources for 
the firm 
10 
(4.3%) 
17 
(7.4%) 
15 
(6.5%) 
45 
(19.6%) 
52 
(22.6%) 
53 
(23.0%) 
38 
(16.5%) 
4.84 1.64 
Help to generate businesses for the firm 
7 
(3.0%) 
14 
(6.0%) 
15 
(6.5%) 
47 
(20.3%) 
54 
(23.3%) 
48 
(20.7%) 
47 
(20.3%) 
4.98 1.59 
Table 6.9: Evaluation of Board Service Role
148 
 
6.6.3 Board Strategic Role 
 The board strategic role entails setting the organization‘s strategic direction including 
mission and values; determining, supporting and enforcing company policies; evaluating 
opportunities, risks and strategic options; ensuring that organizational structure and 
capabilities are appropriate for strategy implementation; and monitoring strategy 
implementation.  
Board strategic role was assessed with a nine-item scale. Table 6.10 shows how well 
the boards of Nigerian quoted companies are performing their strategic role. 
 The issues with the highest ratings are: reviewing and deciding on the organization‘s 
strategic direction (mean score 5.67), determining, supporting and enforcing the 
organization‘s policies (mean score 5.59), and determining and reviewing the organization‘s 
objectives to match the mission and values, and to form the basis of company strategy (mean 
score 5.55). 
 The issues with the least ratings are, adapts performance measures to monitor the 
implementation of strategies (mean score 5.14) and the determination of the business units 
strategies and plans designed to implement the corporate strategy (mean score 5.06).  
However, all the functions are rated over 5 and this might be an indication of the 
importance attached to the strategic role by boards. 
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Board strategic role 1 
Not at 
all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
To a large 
extent 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Set the firm‘s mission and values 
5 
(2.1%) 
8 
(3.4%) 
14 
(6.0%) 
19 
(8.2%) 
40 
(17.2%) 
75 
(32.2%) 
72 
(30.9%) 
5.55 1.50 
Reviews and decides the firm‘s strategic 
direction 
5 
(2.2an
d) 
8 
(3.4%) 
9 
(3.9%) 
10 
(4.3%) 
42 
(18.1%) 
88 
(37.9%) 
70 
(30.2%) 5.67 1.41 
Determines and reviews the firm‘s objectives 
to match the vision and values  
4 
(1.7%) 
9 
(3.9%) 
11 
(4.8%) 
20 
(8.7%) 
53 
(23.0%) 
71 
(30.9%) 
62 
(27.0%) 
5.48 1.44 
Determines, supports and enforces company  
policies 
2 
(0.9%) 
5 
(2.2%) 
11 
(4.8%) 
24 
(10.4%) 
59 
(25.5%) 
66 
(28.6%) 
64 
(27.7%) 
5.59 1.35 
Reviews and evaluates opportunities, threats 
and risks in the general environment, and 
strengths, weaknesses and risks of your firm 
2 
(0.9%) 
6 
(2.6%) 
16 
(6.9%) 
25 
(10.8%) 
48 
(20.7%) 
64 
(27.6%) 
71 
(30.6%) 5.53 1.41 
Determines corporate and financial strategic 
options, reviews and selects those to be 
pursued, and decides the resources, 
contingency plans and means to support them. 
3 
(1.3%) 
11 
(4.8%) 
11 
(4.8%) 
29 
(12.6%) 
48 
(20.8%) 
68 
(29.4%) 
61 
(26.4%) 
5.41 1.47 
Determines the business unit strategies and 
plans designed to implement the corporate 
strategies 
5 
(2.2%) 
17 
(7.3%) 
18 
(7.8%) 
35 
(15.1%) 
52 
(22.4%) 
54 
(23.3%) 
51 
(22.0%) 5.06 1.61 
Ensures that your firm‘s structure and 
capabilities are appropriate for implementing 
its chosen strategies. 
4 
(1.7%) 
11 
(4.7%) 
23 
(9.9%) 
23 
(9.9%) 
50 
(21.6%) 
64 
(27.6%) 
57 
(24.6%) 5.26 1.55 
Adapts performance measures to monitor the 
implementation of strategy, policies and 
plans, and the legal/fiduciary obligations 
affecting the business and the Board 
4 
(1.7%) 
7 
(3.0%) 
26 
(11.3%) 
38 
(16.5%) 
47 
(20.4%) 
59 
(25.7%) 
49 
(21.3%) 
5.14 1.53 
Table 6.10: Evaluation of Board Strategic Role 
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 Not  
Effective 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
Very 
Effective 
7 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Overall how effective would you say 
your Board is 
5 
(2.2%) 
5 
(2.2%) 
4 
(1.7%) 
22 
(9.6%) 
64 
(27.9%) 
76 
(33.2%) 
53 
(23.1%) 
5.52 1.32 
Table 6.11: Overall Board Effectiveness 
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6.7 Board Effectiveness Drivers  
 The ratings of the factors directors of Nigerian quoted companies think are 
responsible for effective boards are shown in Table 5.12 and Figure 5.11.   
 The five most important factors that affect board effectiveness as rated by the 
directors on Nigerian quoted companies are directors‘ competence, integrity of directors, 
diversity of the board, transparency and openness of the board, and the chairman‘s leadership 
style. This implies that a board that is diverse with directors that are competent and have high 
integrity, which is transparent and open and is headed by a chairperson with the right 
leadership style, is likely to be effective. 
Perceived factors (multiple response) Percentage 
Competence  93.1 
Integrity of directors 92.3 
Diversity of the board 89.7 
Board transparency and openness 88.0 
Chairman‘s leadership style 87.6 
Board oversight/control functions 85.8 
Level of preparation for board meetings 85.4 
Compliance with codes/laws/regulations 85.0 
Board independence 84.1 
Good interpersonal relations  83.7 
Participation of board in strategy 83.3 
Commitment of individual directors 82.4 
Compliance with international best practice 80.7 
Network of extra-organization contacts 80.3 
Timely and balanced reports by management. 79.8 
Ability to accept criticism 79.0 
 Table 6.12: Perceived factors that affect board effectiveness 
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Figure 6.11: Perceived factors that affect board effectiveness 
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CHAPTER 7: PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS AND   
CONSTRUCTION OF SCALE INDICES 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter provided an account of the main descriptive findings generated from the 
survey data, the present chapter aims at discussing more complex statistical methods, which were 
utilised in order to further investigate the relationships within the constructs of the conceptual model. 
The analysis presented in the previous chapter show that most of the research model‘s 
constructs consisted of a large number of variables. Thus, initially correlation analysis was done in 
order to establish the potential relationships within each construct. As a next step, principal 
components analysis was done with selected variables so as to detect the underlying dimensions.  
Finally, additive scales were constructed from the derived factor analysis to facilitate the subsequent 
statistical analysis. 
7.2 Correlation Analysis 
Bivariate correlation analysis was carried out so as to establish any relationships between the 
variables within given constructs. By doing so, it was sought to find whether inter-correlations were 
high, which would have implied that there were sufficient grounds for pursing further statistical tests, 
such as component analysis. 
Correlation matrixes were prepared using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, in 
preference to the Spearman‘s coefficient, to measure the extent of any relationship between each of 
the variables within the constructs that were measured by non-metric scales, such as board size, CEO 
duality and proportion of outside directors; and also those being measured with interval scales; that 
are job-related board diversity, board cohesiveness, decision-making and operations, and also board 
outcomes of control, service and strategic roles.  
A review of the matrixes shows that there is a reasonable number of strong correlations 
amongst the variables within the respective constructs. Thus, in order to understand the underlying 
structure of the correlations, component analysis, a multivariate technique was employed. It was 
important to extract a number of factors, which in essence represent the hidden dimensions within 
each construct as captured from the original set of variables. The following section discusses this 
process for each of the constructs. 
154 
 
 7.3 Components Analysis 
For the purposes of our research, components analysis and more particularly principal 
components analysis was employed as the method for data reduction. This technique ―considers the 
total variance and derives factors that contain small proportions of unique variance and, in some 
instances, error variance‖ (Hair et al, 2010). The technique first extracts the combination of 
variables, which explain the greatest amount of variance and then proceeds to combinations that 
account for smaller amounts of variance (Hair et al, 2010)‖. It is the researcher‘s task to decide how 
many factors to be extracted; and on that, the Kaiser‘s (1958)-normalization criterion was used, 
which prescribes that components with Eigen values over one are considered as significant and thus 
included in the final solution.  
Table 7.1 summarizes the constructs, the number of factors extracted as a result of the 
application of the principal component analysis as well as the number of variables found to load on 
the respective factors.  
 
Constructs 
 
Components Factors Number of Variables* 
Board diversity   1 2 6 
Board Human Capital 1 1 4(1) 
Board Processes 3 5 24(2) 
Board Outcomes 
ctiveness) 
3 3 23 
Total 8 11 57 
*Number in parenthesis indicates the number of variables deleted 
Table 7.1 Constructs Components and Variables 
 
In the following sections the results of the principal components analysis for each one of the 
above constructs are discussed in detail. For clarity, each table in the section 7.3 exhibits the 
percentage of variance explained by the solution, variable communalities, factor loadings and the 
Eigen value attributable to the extracted factors. 
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7.3.1 Principal Components Analysis of Board Diversity Construct 
Table 7.2 illustrates the principal components analysis of the board diversity construct. The 
configuration of the factor structure shows that two factors were found to explain 100.0% of the total 
variance. All the variables loaded and none was deleted. 
 
Factors 
Factor Loading 
Communalities Job-diversity 
DIVJOB 
Affinity 
DIVAFF 
Diversity-Educational 
Background .820  .674 
Diversity-Occupational 
Background .887  .804 
Diversity-Functional Positions .834  .706 
Diversity-Network Ties .595  .597 
Diversity-Religious Affinity  .775 .604 
Diversity-Tribal Affinity  .752 .600 
Eigen values 4.473 1.527  
  % of variance explained 88.598 11.402  
Cumulative % of variance 88.598 100.000  
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization converged in 3 iterations. 
Table 7.2: Principal Component analysis of Board Diversity  
 
7.3.1.1 Factor 1: Job Diversity (DIVJOB) 
This factor is composed of four variables that each loaded heavily onto a vector generating an 
Eigen value of 4.473. These variables are educational background; occupational background; 
functional positions; and network ties. The four variables have conceptual association and they make 
up the factor DIVJOB which has been labeled as job diversity. 
The mean score for the DIVJOB scale is 5.61 (S.D. = 1.08) on the seven point scale employed 
which illustrates the high strength of this factor. 
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7.3.1.2 Factor 2: Affinity (DIVAFF) 
This factor is composed of two variables that each loaded onto a vector generating an Eigen 
value of 1.527. These variables are religious affinity; and tribal affinity. There is a conceptual 
association of these two variables composing he DIVAFF factor which has been labeled as affinity. 
The mean score for the DIVAFF scale is 4.04 (S.D. = 1.76) on the seven point scale 
employed which illustrates the medium strength of this factor. 
 
7.3.2 Principal Components Analysis of Board Human Capital Measures 
Table 7.3 illustrates the principal components analysis of the board human capital. The 
configuration of the factor structure show that only one factor explained 94.9% of the variance 
explained. Four of the five variables loaded and one was deleted. The deleted variable is ‗board 
members knowledge of about risk matters‘. 
 
Factors 
Factor Loading 
Communalities 
Human Capital  Pro 
HUCPRO 
Board members understanding of the 
business of the organization .752 .674 
Board members understanding of the 
industry in which the organization 
operates .703 .769 
Board members knowledge about 
financial matters .659 .213 
Board members knowledge about legal 
matters .633 .664 
Eigen values 4.747  
  % of variance explained 94.947  
Cumulative % of variance 94.947  
Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Table 7.3: Principal component analysis of Board Human Capital 
 
This factor contains four variables with high loadings indicating an Eigen value of 4.747. 
These variables are board members understanding of the business of the organization, the industry in 
which the organization operates financial matters, and legal matters. The factor, HUCPRO, is named 
human capital professional. 
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The mean score for the HUCPRO scale is 5.14 (S.D. = 1.54) on the seven point scale employed 
which illustrates the high strength of this factor. 
7.3.3 Principal Components Analysis of Board Processes Measures 
Tables 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 illustrate the principal components analysis of the board processes 
construct.  The board processes construct is comprised of board operations, board cohesiveness, and 
board decision-making. Board operations were measured by nine items, board cohesiveness was 
measured by seven items, and board decision-making was measured by ten items, making a total of 
twenty six items 
 
7.3.3.1 Principal Components Analysis of Board Operations 
 Table 7.4 illustrates the principal components analysis of the board operations construct. The 
configuration of the factor structure shows that two factors were found to explain 96.317% of the 
total variance. Eight of the variables loaded and one was deleted. The deleted variable is ‗quality of 
board‘s charter is high‘. 
   
Factors 
Factor Loading 
Communalities 
Board 
Operations 
BOPOPE 
Meeting 
Conduct 
BOPMEC 
Board members have right quality 
of board papers .790  .626 
Board has a clear understanding of 
its roles and  responsibilities .675  .554 
Chairperson leads the board well .693  .551 
Follow up responsibilities are well 
assigned .748  .608 
Board members have time to do 
their job well .788  .624 
The board papers are timely .729  .531 
Board meetings are well conducted   .587 .618 
Board meetings run for too long  .868 .762 
Eigen values 
 7.001 1.667  
% of variance explained 77.796 18.521  
Cumulative % of variance 77.796 96.317  
Table 7.4: Principal component analysis of board operations 
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7.3.3.1.1 Factor 1: Board Operations (BOPOPE) 
This factor is composed of six variables that each loaded heavily onto a vector generating an 
Eigen value of 7.001. These variables are board members have right quality of board papers; board 
has a clear understanding of its roles and responsibilities; chairperson leads the board well; follow up 
responsibilities are well assigned; board members have the time to do their job well; and board 
papers are timely. The six variables have conceptual association and they make up the factor 
BOPOPE which has been labelled as board operations. 
The mean score for the BOPOPE scale is 2.58 (S.D. = 0.66) on the seven point scale employed 
which illustrates the low strength of this factor. 
 
7.3.3.1.2 Factor 2: Meeting Conduct (BOPMEC) 
This factor is composed of two variables that each loaded onto a vector generating an Eigen 
value of 1.667. These variables are board meetings are well conducted; and board meetings run for 
too long. There is a conceptual association of these two variables composing the BOPMEC factor 
which has been labelled as meeting conduct.  
The mean score for the BOPMEC scale is 5.78 (S.D. = 0.96) on the seven point scale 
employed which illustrates the high strength of this factor. 
 
7.3.3.2 Principal Components Analysis of Board Cohesiveness 
Table 7.5 illustrates the principal components analysis of the board cohesiveness. The 
configuration of the factor structure show that only one factor explained 93.092% of the variance 
explained. Six of the seven variables loaded and one was deleted. The deleted variable is ‗members 
of the board socialize with each other outside board meetings‘. 
  
Factors 
Factor Loading 
Communalities 
Board Cohesiveness 
BOPCOH 
Board and management periodically review how 
they are working together .650 .423 
Misunderstanding are rare between board and 
management .743 .552 
Board and management are able to resolve conflict 
between themselves constructively .765 .585 
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Board members are able to resolve conflicts 
between themselves constructively .806 .650 
Board members respect and trust each other .820 .673 
Disagreement is dealt with openly in the board .629 .396 
Eigen values 6.516  
  % of variance explained 93.092  
Cumulative % of variance 93.092  
Table 7.5: Principal component analysis of board cohesiveness 
This factor contains six variables with high loadings indicating an Eigen value of 6.516. 
These variables are board and management periodically review how they are working together; 
misunderstanding are rare between the board and management; board and management are able to 
resolve conflict between themselves constructively; board members are able to resolve conflict 
between themselves constructively; board members respect and trust each other; and disagreement is 
dealt with openly in the board. The factor, BOPCOH, is named board cohesiveness. 
The mean score for the BOPCOH scale is 5.40 (S.D. = 1.04) on the seven point scale employed 
which illustrates the high strength of this factor. 
 
7.3.3.3 Principal Components Analysis of Board Decision-Making 
The configuration of the factor structure show that two factors were found to explain 100.0% 
of the total variance as table 7.6 illustrates.  
  
Factors 
Factor Loading 
Communalities 
Meeting 
Structure 
BOPDMS 
Directors’ 
Conduct 
BOPDMC 
Board has adequate notice of 
important issues .710  .548 
Board meeting have clearly 
constructed agenda .757  .624 
Important items are prioritized on 
board agenda .695  .485 
Board has trouble reaching 
conclusions  -.507  .388 
Board‘s business conducted with 
openness and transparency .799  .668 
Board meeting are pervaded with 
integrity .714  .586 
Constructive discussions during 
board meetings  .774  .735 
Directors clearly disagree on some  .719 .660 
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issues 
Directors openly challenge each 
others‘ opinion  .810 .658 
Different director proposes different 
approaches  .678 .496 
Eigen values 9.056 .945  
  % of variance explained 90.548 9.452  
Cumulative % of variance 90.548 100.000  
Table 7.6: Principal component analysis of board decision-making 
7.3.3.3.1 Factor 1: Meeting Structure (BOPDMS) 
The first factor contains seven variables with high loadings and an Eigen value of 9.056. 
These variables are related to the structure and conduct of board meetings and there are the board has 
adequate notice of important issues to be discussed at board meetings; board meetings have clearly 
constructed agenda; important items are prioritised on board agenda. They also include the board has 
trouble reaching conclusions; the business of the board is conducted with openness and transparency; 
board meetings are pervaded with integrity; and discussions during board meetings are constructive.  
The mean score for BOPDMS scale is 5.89 (S.D. = 1.05) on the seven point scale employed 
which shows a high level of agreement on these issues by the respondents. 
7.3.3.3.2 Factor 2: Directors’ Conduct (BOPDMC) 
 The second factor contained three variables with high loadings and an Eigen value of 0.945. 
These variables are directors‘ state clear disagreement with each other when discussing an issue; 
directors openly challenge each others‘ opinion; and different directors propose different approaches 
when discussing an issue. 
The mean score for BOPDMC scale is 5.20 (S.D. = 1.46) on the seven point scale employed 
which shows a high level of agreement on these issues by the respondents. 
7.3.4 Principal Components Analysis of Board Outcomes Measures 
Tables 7.7, 7.8, and 7.9 illustrate the principal components analysis of the board outcomes 
construct. This construct is comprised of three dimensions; that is board control role, service role and 
strategic role. Board control role was measured by seven variables, service role by seven variables, 
and strategic role by nine variables. 
7.3.4.1 Principal Components Analysis of Board Control Role (BOVERF) 
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The configuration of the factor structure shows that all the factors loaded and as such only 
one factor was found to explain 100.0% of the total variance as table 7.7 illustrates.  
This factor is made up of seven variables with high loadings and an Eigen value of 6.999. 
These variables are board‘s oversight role in financial management, in financial system and 
procedures, in monitoring organizational performance, in monitoring the CEO and top management, 
in recruiting new directors, in fulfillment of legal obligations, and in ensuring accountability to 
stakeholders. The common theme from these seven variables which is captured by the name 
(oversight function) given to this factor. 
The mean score for the BOVERF scale was 5.69 (S.D. = 1.04) on the seven point scale 
employed, which represented an overall high importance given to these issues by the respondents.
  
Table 7.7: Principal Components Analysis of Board Control Role 
7.3.4.2 Principal Components Analysis of Board Service Role (BOSERF) 
The configuration of the factor structure shows that all the factors loaded and as such only 
one factor was found to explain 100.0% of the total variance as table 6.8 illustrates.  
This factor is made up of seven variables with high loadings and an eigen value of 6.999. 
These variables are board support and advice to management; review of board performance; 
representing interest of shareholders; act as link with important groups or organizations that deal 
Factors 
Factor Loading 
Communalities 
Oversight Function 
BOVERF 
Oversee the financial management of the organization .844 .712 
Ensure the organization has adequate financial 
systems and procedures .897 .805 
Monitor organizational performance and taking action 
where necessary .869 .755 
Monitor the organization‘s CEO and top management .756 .571 
Have procedure for recruiting new directors .715 .511 
Ensure that the organization fulfils its legal obligations .832 .691 
Ensure accountability to the organization‘s 
stakeholders .802 .642 
Eigen values 6.999  
  % of variance explained 100.000  
Cumulative % of variance 100.000  
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with the firm; represent the organization externally; help to raise funds or other resources for the 
organization; and help to generate business for the organization. The common theme from these 
seven variables which is captured by the name (service function) given to this factor. 
The mean score for the BOSERF scale was 5.27 (S.D. = 1.16) on the seven point scale 
employed, which represented an overall high importance given to these issues by the respondents. 
 
Factors 
Factor Loading 
Communalities 
Service Role 
BOSERF 
Support and advice management .771 .594 
Review of board performance and ensure it works well .797 .636 
Represent the interest of shareholders in the organization .773 .593 
Act as link with important groups or organizations that the 
firm deals with .815 .664 
Represent the organisation externally .785 .616 
Help to raise funds or other resources for the organization .710 .505 
Help to generate businesses for the organization .751 .564 
Eigen values 6.999  
% of variance explained 100.000  
Cumulative % of variance 100.000  
Table 7.8: Principal Components Analysis of Board Service Role 
 
7.3.4.3 Principal Components Analysis of Board Strategic Role (BOSTRF) 
The configuration of the factor structure shows that all the factors loaded and as such only 
one factor was found to explain 100.0% of the total variance as table 7.9 illustrates.  
This factor is made up of nine variables with high loadings and an Eigen value of 9.0. These 
variables are how the board carries out the following functions: sets the organization‘s mission and 
values; reviews and decides the organization‘s strategic direction; determines and reviews company 
objectives; determines supports and enforces company policies; reviews and evaluates the 
company‘s SWOT analysis; determines corporate and financial strategic options; determines the 
business units‘ strategies and plans; ensures that the company‘s organization structure and 
capabilities are appropriate; and adapts performance measures to monitor the implementation of 
strategy. The common theme from these nine variables which is captured by the name (strategic 
function) given to this factor. 
163 
 
The mean score for the BOSTRF scale was 5.37 (S.D. = 1.58) on the seven point-scale 
employed, which represented an overall high importance given to these issues by the respondents 
 
Factors 
Factor Loading 
Communalities 
Strategic Function 
BOSTRF 
Sets the organization‘s mission and values .749 .561 
Reviews and decides the organization‘s strategic 
direction .860 .739 
Determines and reviews company objectives to match the 
mission and values .895 .801 
Determines supports and enforces company policies .802 .643 
Reviews and evaluates the company‘s SWOT analysis .876 .768 
Determines corporate and financial strategic options .889 .791 
Determines the business units‘ strategies and plans .874 .763 
Ensures that the company‘s organization structure and 
capabilities are appropriate .902 .813 
Adapts performance measures to monitor the 
implementation of strategy .794 .630 
Eigen values 9.000  
% of variance explained 100.000  
Cumulative % of variance 100.000  
Table 7.9: Principal Components Analysis of Board Strategic Role 
 
7.3.5 Summary of the Principal Component Results 
As it has been already discussed in Chapter 5 and in the previous section 7.3 principal 
component analysis is a procedure which aims to ―reduce a set of p observed variables to a set of m 
new variables (m p) Velicer and Jackson (1990)‖. 
 
Constructs 
                      
                                                 Factor Labels 
Eigen value %  
of Variance 
Explained 
Board Diversity                                     
Job                                                          
Diversity,  DIVJOB                                                           
Affinity, DIVAFF 
 
4.473 
1.527 
100.000 
88.598 
11.402
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Board Human Capital  
Human  
Capital                                                            
(Professional) HUCPRO  
 
 
 
4.747 
 
94.947 
 
94.947
 
Board Processes 
Board Operations 
Board Operation, BOPOPE 
Board Meeting Conduct, BOPMEC 
 
Board Cohesiveness 
Board Cohesiveness, BOPCOH 
 
Board Decision-Making 
Board Meeting Structure, BOPDMS 
Directors‘ Conduct, BOPDMC 
 
 
 
7.332 
1.667 
 
 
6.516 
 
 
9.056 
0.945 
 
100.000 
81.479 
18.521 
 
93.092 
93.092 
 
100.000 
90.548 
9.452 
Board Outcomes 
Board Control Role 
Board  Oversight, BOVERF 
 
Board Service Role 
Board Service Role, BOSERF 
 
Board Strategic Role 
Board Strategic Role, BOSTRF 
 
 
 
6.999 
 
 
6.999 
 
 
9.000 
 
 
100.000 
 
 
100.00 
 
 
100.000 
 
Table 7.10 Summary of Principal Components Analysis 
In our study as illustrated in Tables 7.2 to 7.9 sixty (60) variables were subjected to principal 
component analysis, which produced eleven (11) distinct factors.  
Table 7.10 summaries the Eigen values and the percentage of variance explained for each one 
of these factors.  
7.4 Construction of Scale Indices from the Extracted Factors 
          As it has been previously argued, one of the aims of component or factor analysis is the 
reduction of data. For this to be achieved, three options have already been discussed: selecting 
surrogate variables, creating summated scales and computing factor scores. Summated scales were 
favoured due to their ability to reduce the measurement error, as well as to grasp the multiple aspects 
of a construct in a single measure (Hair et al, 2010). Thus, scale indices were constructed from the 
variables loading onto factors with coefficients greater than 0.50 (Crawford and Lomas, 1980). The 
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new composite measures were given the same label and notation as those given to the original factors 
discussed in section 7.3 and displayed in Table 7.10. The construction of the new composite measure 
was derived from the arithmetic mean of the corresponding variables‘ means. 
7.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has documented the results of the application of the principal components analysis 
method, which was employed in order some common characteristics shared by one hundred-three 
variables to be identified. The extracted twenty-three factors with their respective Eigen values and 
the percentage of variance explained were presented in Table 7.10. In addition testing the new 
components in terms of reliability and validity was also an issue presented in this chapter. Finally 
new indices were computed from the derived components which are to be used in subsequent 
statistical analysis discussed in the following Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 8: CORRELATION AND REGRESSION ANALYSES  
 
8.1   Introduction 
This chapter presents the results from the correlation and regression analyses after the 
factor analysis, and subsequent review of the hypotheses.  
8.2   Correlation Analysis Results of the new Variables 
The factor analysis reduced the number of variables in each construct and eventually 
produced 11 variables plus the two other variables of CEO duality and board size, making it a 
total of 13 variables as shown in table 8.1. 
Variable Code Mean Std Deviation N 
Board Size BOSIZE 10.620 3.562 233 
Board Independence BODIND 0.790 0.408 233 
CEO Duality CEODUL 0.030 0.182 233 
Board Diversity 
Job Diversity 
Affinity 
 
DIVJOB 
DIVAFF 
 
5.920 
4.080 
 
1.151 
1.913 
 
233 
233 
Board Human Capital 
Human Capital Pro 
 
HUCPRO 
 
5.360 
 
1.613 
 
233 
Board Processes 
   Board Operations 
    Board Operation 
    Meeting Conduct 
   Board Cohesiveness 
     Board Cohesiveness 
   Board Decision Making 
     Meeting Structure 
     Directors‘ Conduct 
 
 
BOPOPE 
BOPMEC 
 
BOPCOH 
 
BOPDMS 
BOPDMC 
 
 
5.820 
4.340 
 
5.920 
 
6.020 
4.890 
 
 
1.185 
1.944 
 
1.354 
 
1.237 
1.825 
 
 
233 
233 
 
233 
 
233 
233 
Board Effectiveness 
(Board Outcomes) 
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   Board Control Role 
      Board Oversight 
   Board Service Role 
      Service Role 
   Board Strategic Role 
     Strategic Role 
 
 
BOVERF 
 
BOSERF 
 
BOSTRF 
 
5.840 
 
4.970 
 
5.240 
 
1.152 
 
1.573 
 
1.584 
 
233 
 
233 
 
233 
Table 8.1: Descriptive Statistics of New Variables 
Apart from four variables (Affinity, Meeting conduct, Directors‘ conduct and Board service 
role), all the others have means with relatively high value (above 5) on a scale of 1 to 7.  
Table 8.2 shows the correlation matrix for all the new variables (independent, 
mediator and dependent). For the correlation analysis the level of significance that is 
considered is 0.05. The results show that CEO duality has positive relationship with board 
operation but it is not significant. However, it has negative relationship with board meeting 
conduct, which is one of the factors of board operation, but the relationship is not significant. 
CEO duality has negative relationship with board cohesiveness but it is not significant. As 
regards board decision making, CEO duality is positively related to the two factors, while it is 
significant with directors‘ conduct at meetings (BOPDMC) at 5% significant level, it is not 
significant with board meeting structure (BOPDMS). This implies that for boards of quoted 
companies in Nigeria CEO duality will positively impact the quality of decision making, 
particularly their conduct, but does not have any significant impact on board cohesiveness 
and operations.  
The results also show that there are no significant correlations between board size and 
board processes mediator variables. However, the relationships with board decision making 
and board cohesiveness are negative, while the relationship with board operation is positive. 
This means that the larger the board size the less cohesive the board will be and the slower 
the decision making, even though the results are not significant.  
As regards board independence, the results show that the relationships with board 
operation, cohesiveness and decision making are negative and not significant. This implies 
that high level of board independence is likely to slow down decision making, reduce board 
cohesiveness and adversely the effectiveness of board‘s administrative operations.  
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The results show that board job diversity is positively related to board operation, 
board cohesiveness and board decision making. However, it is significant at 1% level with 
board cohesiveness (BOPCOH), board operation (BOPOPE) and board meeting structure 
(BOPDMS), while it is not significant with board meeting conduct (BOPMEC) and directors‘ 
conduct at meeting (BOPDMC). This implies that the more diverse the board is the more 
cohesive it will be, the more efficient will the board operation be and the better the decision 
making. Most researchers argue that the more diverse the board is the less cohesive it will 
become. In an emerging market like Nigeria board diversity will produce directors that are 
expert in their fields and so boards could defer to these experts at meetings and this could like 
to a preserved cohesiveness. More diverse boards will insist on better administrative support 
in terms of quality and timeliness of board papers, structure and duration of board meetings. 
As regards board human capital, it was found to be positively related to board 
operation, board cohesiveness and board decision making. However, it is significant at 1% 
level with board cohesiveness (BOPCOH), board operation (BOPOPE), and board meeting 
structure (BOPDMS), while it is not significant with board meeting conduct (BOPMEC) and 
directors‘ conduct at meeting (BOPDMC). This implies that the higher the level of human 
capital on the board the more cohesive the board will be, the more efficient will the board 
operation be and the better the decision making. Most researchers argue that the level of 
human capital on the board, the less cohesive it will become. In an emerging market like 
Nigeria high level of human capital will ensure knowledge directors that understand their 
industry and business and so could add value to the firm and lead to fast decision making and 
board cohesiveness. Boards with high level of human capital will insist on better 
administrative support in terms of quality and timeliness of board papers, and better 
structured board meetings.  
As regards the relation between board characteristics and board task outcomes of 
board control, service and strategic role, the results show that CEO duality is positively 
related to board control, service and strategic roles but not significant. Board independence 
was found to be negatively related to board control, service and strategic roles but not 
significant. This implies that board independence is likely to have adverse effect on the 
board‘s ability to perform its control, service and strategic roles effectively. This is contrary 
to most researchers that found that the more independent a board is the more effective it will 
be in its control, service and strategic roles as the directors are not likely to be influenced by 
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management. Board size was found to have positive relationship with board control and 
strategic roles and negative relationship with service role, but none of these relationships is 
significant. The negative relationship between board size and board service role goes against 
main stream research findings that show that the larger the board the more effective it is in its 
service role as they are more directors that could be of use to management. In emerging 
markets, like Nigeria, where it is difficult to get quality directors it appears that the larger the 
board the less effective it is in its advisory role as it might not have the right directors that 
could be of help. 
Board job diversity was found to be positively related to board control at 1% 
significant level and positively related to service and strategic roles at 5% significant level. 
This shows that a board with high level of diversity is likely to have directors with the right 
background and exposure to be effective in their control, service and strategic roles. Board 
human capital was found to have positive relationship with board control, service and 
strategic roles and at 1% significant level. This shows that a board with high level of human 
capital is likely to have directors with the right skills, competence and experience to be 
effective in their control, service and strategic roles.  
As regards the effect of board processes on board task outcomes of board control, 
service and strategic roles, the results show that board operation is positively related to board 
control, service and strategic roles at 1% significant level. However, board meeting conduct 
was found to be positively related to board control, service and strategic roles but it is only 
significant with the control role at 5%. This implies that a board that has efficient operations 
in terms of quality and timeliness of board papers, clear understanding of its roles and 
responsibilities, well assigned follow up responsibilities, leadership style of the chairman and 
that the directors have time to do their job, is likely to perform its control, service and 
strategic roles more effectively. It also means that a board that a well conducted meeting that 
spends adequate time at meetings is likely to perform its control run more effectively than the 
other two roles. 
Board cohesiveness was found to have positive relationship with board control, 
service and strategic roles and at 1% significant level. This implies that a cohesive board is 
likely to be more effective in the performance of its control, service and strategic roles as the 
directors will perform in harmony and towards the same objectives. 
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As regards the relationship between board decision making and board control, service 
and strategic roles, board meeting structure was found to have positive relationship with 
control, service and strategic roles at 1% level. However, directors‘ conduct at meetings was 
found to be positively related to board control, service and strategic roles but is significant at 
1% level to only service and strategic roles. This implies that a board that has well-structured 
meeting, with well prioritised agenda, discussions conducted with openness and transparency, 
have no trouble in reaching decisions, and meeting pervaded with integrity, is likely to be 
more effective in its control, service and strategic roles. It also implies that the way directors‘ 
conduct themselves in meetings will have more impact on their control and strategic roles and 
less on their service role.  
The results also show that the three board task outcomes of board strategic role 
(BOSTRF), board service role (BOSERF) and board control (BOVERF) roles are positively 
related amongst themselves at 1% significant level. This implies that  the three board roles 
are interrelated and so for board effectiveness, a board must perform all three effectively. 
The overall results show that board processes have more impact than board 
characteristics on board task outcomes of board control, service and strategic roles and these 
board outcomes determine board effectiveness. The correlation results therefore reveal that in 
Nigeria processes factors are more important than structural factors in determining board 
effectiveness. 
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  CEODUL BODIND BOSIZE DIVJOB DIVAFF HUCPRO BOPOPE BOPMEC BOPCOH BOPDMS BOPDMC BOVERF BOSERF BOSTRF 
CEODUL Pearson 
Correlation 
1              
Sig. (2-tailed)  
             
BODIND Pearson 
Correlation 
-.134* 1             
Sig. (2-tailed) .041              
BOSIZE Pearson 
Correlation 
-.205** .001 1            
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .982             
DIVJOB Pearson 
Correlation 
.095 -.082 .029 1           
Sig. (2-tailed) .146 .210 .657            
DIVAFF Pearson 
Correlation 
.029 .115 .041 .148* 1          
Sig. (2-tailed) .655 .081 .533 .024           
HUCPRO Pearson 
Correlation 
-.056 -.056 -.018 .341** .050 1         
Sig. (2-tailed) .392 .396 .779 .000 .450          
BOPOPE Pearson 
Correlation 
.048 -.104 .036 .286** .097 .333** 1        
Sig. (2-tailed) .466 .115 .582 .000 .139 .000         
BOPMEC Pearson 
Correlation 
-.021 .010 -.074 .068 .037 .126 .122 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) .747 .880 .261 .298 .575 .055 .063        
BOPCOH Pearson 
Correlation 
-.058 -.070 -.005 .272** .097 .317** .364** .192** 1      
Sig. (2-tailed) .375 .287 .944 .000 .139 .000 .000 .003       
BOPDMS Pearson 
Correlation 
.016 -.128 -.028 .234** .005 .351** .458** .182** .516** 1     
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Sig. (2-tailed) .810 .052 .676 .000 .942 .000 .000 .005 .000      
BOPDMC Pearson 
Correlation 
.141* -.094 .056 .096 .068 .023 .161
* -.008 .167* .295** 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .032 .152 .394 .142 .302 .724 .014 .906 .010 .000     
BOVERF Pearson 
Correlation 
.109 -.018 .009 .295** .047 .437** .598** .150* .367** .526** .207** 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .098 .782 .890 .000 .477 .000 .000 .022 .000 .000 .001    
BOSERF Pearson 
Correlation 
.093 -.015 -.006 .135* .074 .231** .280** .111 .341** .275** .125 .345
** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .156 .818 .932 .040 .262 .000 .000 .090 .000 .000 .056 .000   
BOSTRF Pearson 
Correlation 
.061 -.030 .053 .162* .061 .372** .307** .073 .270** .411** .168* .579** .494** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .351 .654 .425 .013 .355 .000 .000 .267 .000 .000 .010 .000 .000  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Sample size  N = 233 
Table 8.2 Correlation matrix for all the variables (independent, mediator and dependent)
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8.3 Summary of Hypotheses Testing on Correlation Results 
Hypotheses Regression Analysis Results 
Board size and speed of decision-making are positively related. Negative relationship that is not 
significant 
Board size is negatively related to board cohesiveness.  Positive relationship that is not 
significant  
Board size and efficiency of operations are positively related Positive relationship that is not 
significant 
Board CEO Duality is positively correlated to board decision-
making speed 
Positively related at 5% significant 
level   
Board CEO Duality is positively correlated to cohesiveness Negative relationship that is not 
significant 
Board CEO Duality is positively correlated to board operations 
efficiency 
Positive relationship that is not 
significant 
Board independence is negatively correlated to board decision-
making speed 
Negative relationship that is not 
significant 
Board independence is negatively correlated to cohesiveness Positive relationship that is not 
significant 
Board independence is positively correlated to board operations 
efficiency 
Negative relationship that is not 
significant 
The degree of job-related diversity on the board is negatively 
related to the speed of decision-making 
Positive relationship that is not 
significant 
The degree of job-related diversity on the board is negatively 
related to the board‘s cohesiveness 
Positively related at 5% significant 
level  
Board job-related diversity is positively correlated with board 
operations efficiency.   
Positively related at 1% significant 
level 
Level of human capital on the board is positively correlated to 
board decision-making speed. 
Positively related at 1% significant 
level 
Level of human capital on the board is negatively correlated to 
board cohesiveness. 
Positively related at 5% significant 
level 
Level of human capital on the board is positively correlated to 
board operations efficiency. 
Positively related at 1% significant 
level  
Speed of Board decision-making will be positively related to  
   Board Oversight Role 
    
   Board Service Role  
    
   Board Strategic Role 
 
Positively related at 1% significant 
level  
Positive relationship that is not 
significant 
Positively related at 1% significant 
level  
 
The effect of cohesiveness on  
   Board Oversight Role will be positive 
   
   Board Service Role will be positive 
    
   Board Strategic Role will be positive. 
Positive relationship that is not 
significant 
Positively related at 1% significant 
level  
Positive relationship that is not 
significant 
The effect of efficient board operations on  
   Board Oversight Role  
    
   Board Service Role 
    
   Board Strategic Role 
 
will be positive.  
 
Positively related at 1% significant 
level 
 
Positively related at 5% significant 
level  
Positively related at 5% significant 
level  
 
     Table 8.3: Summary of Hypotheses Testing on Correlation Results 
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8.4  Regression Analysis Results 
Figure 8.1 below shows the relationships between the independent variables, 
dependent variables and the mediator variables. The effects of the independent variables on 
the dependent variables are better measured not by correlation coefficients but by 
unstandardized regression coefficients (Duncan, 1975). The new theoretical model assumes a 
three variable system such that there are two casual paths feeding into the outcome variable; 
the direct impact of the independent variable (path c), the impact of the mediator (path b), and 
the impact of the independent variable on the mediator (path a). 
Regression analyses were carried out between the independent variables on each of 
the mediator variables, between the mediator variable on each of the dependent variable, and 
finally between the combined independent and mediator variables on each of the dependent 
variables.  
The acceptable levels of the various coefficients for the various regression analyses 
are: significance level should be 0.05 or less, collinearity statistics VIF should be less than 
10, and the adjusted R square figure that is higher than 0.30 
 
 
 
 
175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control Variables 
Figure 8.1: New Theoretical Framework 
8.4.1 Regression Analysis Results – Mediator Variables on Independent variables 
 Table 8.4 shows the regression of Board Operations (BOPOPE) on board 
characteristics. Only three of the variables are significant, board independence (BODIND) at 
.05 significance level; job related diversity (DIVJOB) and professional human capital 
(HUCPRO), at 0.01 significance level. 
 
 
 
Organization Type 
(Services vs. Mfg) 
Ownership 
(MNC vs. Local) 
Organization Age 
(Young vs. Mature) 
Organization Size 
(Big vs. Small) 
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     Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.349 .457  7.2328 .000   
CEODUL .315 .408 .048 .772 .441 .935 1.069 
BODIND -.657 .314 -.127 -2.092 .038 .991 1.009 
BODSIZ .016 .021 .049 .793 .429 .950 1.052 
DIVJOB .186 .068 .181 2.753 .006 .851 1.175 
DIVAFF .039 .038 .062 1.013 .312 .972 1.029 
HUCPRO .199 .048 .271 4.170 .000 .873 1.145 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPOPE 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.146 
Table 8.4: Regression of Board Operation on Board Characteristics 
 
The regression equation is:  
BOPOPE = 3.349 – 0.657*BODIND + 0.186*DIVJOB + 0.199*HUCPRO 
 This implies that board operation is improved with lower level of board 
independence; higher level of diversity and professional human capital on the board. The 
relatively low adjusted R square figure suggests that this relationship is a weak one. 
 
Table 8.5 shows the regression of Board Meeting Conduct (BOPMEC) on board 
characteristics. None of the variables is significant at both 0.05 and 0.01 significance levels. 
This implies that the conduct of board meeting is not significantly influenced by any of the 
board characteristics. 
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                     Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.670 .812  4.521 .000   
CEODUL -.379 .724 -.036 -.523 .602 .935 1.069 
BODIND .047 .558 .006 .084 .933 .991 1.009 
BODSIZ -.045 .037 -.082 -1.212 .227 .950 1.052 
DIVJOB .054 .120 .032 .451 .650 .851 1.175 
DIVAFF .032 .068 .031 .461 .646 .972 1.029 
HUCPRO .132 .085 .110 1.562 .120 .873 1.145 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPMEC 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.002 
 
Table 8.5: Regression of Board Meeting Conduct on Board Characteristics 
 
Table 8.6 shows the regression of Board Cohesiveness (BOPCOH) on board 
characteristics. Only two of the variables, job related diversity (DIVJOB) and professional 
human capital (HUCPRO) are significant at the 0.01 significance level. 
     Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.445 .531  6.490 .000   
CEODUL -.498 .473 -.067 -1.052 .294 .935 1.069 
BODIND .206 .365 .035 .565 .573 .991 1.009 
BODSIZ -.009 .024 -.023 -.368 .713 .950 1.052 
DIVJOB .219 .079 .186 2.781 .006 .851 1.175 
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 DIVAFF .041 .044 .058 .928 .354 .972 1.029 
HUCPRO .207 .055 .247 3.744 .000 .873 1.145 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPCOH 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.117 
Table 8.6: Regression of Board Cohesiveness on Board Characteristics 
The regression equation is:  
BOPCOH = 3.445 + 0.219*DIVJOB + 0.207*HUCPRO 
 This implies that board cohesiveness is enhanced with higher level of diversity and 
professional human capital on the board. The relatively low adjusted R square figure suggests 
that this relationship is a weak one. 
Table 8.7 shows the regression of Board Meeting Structure (BOPDMS) on board 
characteristics. Only two of the variables are significant, job related diversity (DIVJOB) at 
0.05 significance level, and professional human capital (HUCPRO) at the 0.01 significance 
level. 
    Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 4.064 .484  8.391 .000   
CEODUL .102 .432 .015 .235 .814 .935 1.069 
BODIND -.249 .333 -.046 -.748 .455 .991 1.009 
BODSIZ -.007 .022 -.019 -.307 .759 .950 1.052 
DIVJOB .144 .072 .134 2.003 .046 .851 1.175 
DIVAFF -.017 .040 -.027 -.427 .669 .972 1.029 
HUCPRO .235 .051 .306 4.647 .000 .873 1.145 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMS 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.119 
Table 8.7: Regression of Board Meeting Structure on Board Characteristics 
179 
 
The regression equation is:  
BOPDMS = 4.064 + 0.144*DIVJOB + 0.235*HUCPRO 
 This implies that structure of board meetings is positively influenced by higher level 
of diversity and professional human capital on the board. The relatively low adjusted R 
square figure suggests that this relationship is a weak one. 
 
Table 8.8 shows the regression of Directors‘ Conduct (BOPDMC) on board 
characteristics. Only one of the variables, CEO duality (CEODUL) is significant at the 0.05 
significance level. 
 
 
    Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.499 .755  4.632 .000   
CEODUL 1.464 .673 .146 2.175 .031 .935 1.069 
BODIND -.637 .519 -.080 -1.229 .220 .991 1.009 
BODSIZ .044 .034 .086 1.283 .201 .950 1.052 
DIVJOB .113 .112 .071 1.011 .313 .851 1.175 
DIVAFF .052 .063 .055 .829 .408 .972 1.029 
HUCPRO .006 .079 .006 .079 .937 .873 1.145 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMC 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.017 
Table 8.8: Regression of Board Directors’ Conduct on Board Characteristics 
 
The regression equation is:  
BOPDMC = 3.496 + 1.464*CEODUL 
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 This implies that the conduct of directors is significantly influenced by CEO duality. 
However, the relatively low adjusted R square figure suggests that this relationship is a weak 
one. 
  
8.4.2 Regression Analysis Results – Dependent Variables on Mediator Variables 
Table 8.9 shows the regression of Board Oversight Role (BOVERF) on board 
processes of board operation (BOPOPE), conduct of board meeting (BOPMEC), board 
cohesiveness (BOPCOH), structure of board meeting (BOPDMS) and directors‘ conduct 
(BOPDMC).  Only two of the variables, board operation (BOPOPE) and structure of board 
meeting (BOPDMS), are significant at the 0.01 significance level. 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.299 .358  3.628 .000   
BOPOPE .428 .055 .441 7.785 .000 .766 1.305 
BOPMEC .022 .030 .037 .729 .467 .949 1.054 
BOPCOH .041 .050 .048 .814 .416 .704 1.420 
BOPDMS .260 .059 .279 4.398 .000 .611 1.637 
BOPDMC .029 .033 .046 .887 .376 .908 1.102 
a. Dependent Variable: BOVERF      
Adjusted R Square is 0.431 
Table 8.9: Regression of Board Oversight Role on Board Processes 
 
  
The regression equation is:  
BOVERF = 1.299 + 0.428*BOPOPE + 0.260*BOPDMS 
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 This implies that board oversight function is improved with more efficient board 
operation and structure of board meeting. The relatively high adjusted R square figure 
suggests that this relationship is a strong one. 
 
Table 8.10 shows the regression of Board Service Role (BOSERF) on board processes 
of board operation (BOPOPE), conduct of board meeting (BOPMEC), board cohesiveness 
(BOPCOH), structure of board meeting (BOPDMS) and directors‘ conduct (BOPDMC).  
Only two of the variables are significant, board operation (BOPOPE) at 0.05 significance 
level, and board cohesiveness (BOPCOH) at 0.01 significance level. 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 1.366 .604  2.262 .025   
BOPOPE .203 .093 .153 2.185 .030 .766 1.305 
BOPMEC .029 .051 .036 .570 .569 .949 1.054 
BOPCOH .278 .085 .239 3.280 .001 .704 1.420 
BOPDMS .080 .100 .063 .802 .423 .611 1.637 
BOPDMC .037 .055 .042 .661 .510 .908 1.102 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSERF      
Adjusted R Square is 0.132 
 
Table 8.10: Regression of Board Service Role on Board Processes 
The regression equation is:  
BOSERF = 1.366 + 0.203*BOPOPE + 0.278*BOPCOH 
 This implies that board service function is more effective with better board operation 
and increase in board cohesiveness. The low level of the adjusted R square figure suggests 
that this relationship is a relatively weak one. 
Table 8.11 shows the regression of Board Strategic Role (BOSTRF) on board 
processes of board operation (BOPOPE), conduct of board meeting (BOPMEC), board 
cohesiveness (BOPCOH), structure of board meeting (BOPDMS) and directors‘ conduct 
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(BOPDMC).  Only two of the variables are significant, board operation (BOPOPE) at 0.05 
significance level, and structure of board meeting (BOPDMS) at the 0.01 significance level. 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 1.238 .593  2.087 .038   
BOPOPE .187 .091 .140 2.055 .041 .766 1.305 
BOPMEC -.008 .050 -.010 -.164 .870 .949 1.054 
BOPCOH .065 .083 .055 .778 .437 .704 1.420 
BOPDMS .393 .098 .307 4.013 .000 .611 1.637 
BOPDMC .040 .054 .046 .735 .463 .908 1.102 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSTRF      
Adjusted R Square is 0.173 
Table 8.11: Regression of Board Strategic Role on Board Processes 
 The regression equation is: 
BOSTRF = 1.238 + 0.187*BOPOPE + 0.393*BOPDMS  
This implies that board strategic function is more effective with more efficient board 
operations and better structure of board meetings. The low level of the adjusted R square 
figure suggests that this relationship is a relatively weak one. 
 
8.4.3 Regression Analysis Results – Dependent Variables on combination of 
Independent and Mediator Variables 
 
Table 8.10 shows the regression of Board Oversight Role (BOVERF) on combination 
of board characteristics and board processes. Only three of the variables are significant, board 
professional human capital (HUCPRO), board operation (BOPOPE), and structure of board 
meeting (BOPDMS) at the 0.01 significance level. 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 (Constant) .901 .429  2.110 .037   
 CEODUL .600 .319 .095 1.880 .061 .904 1.106 
 BODIND .020 .245 .004 .081 .936 .961 1.041 
 BODSIZ .008 .016 .024 .481 .631 .932 1.073 
 DIVJOB .039 .054 .039 .727 .468 .808 1.238 
 DIVAFF -.011 .030 -.019 -.383 .702 .955 1.047 
 HUCPRO .149 .039 .208 3.776 .000 .761 1.314 
 BOPOPE .376 .056 .387 6.762 .000 .704 1.419 
 BOPMEC .019 .029 .033 .657 .512 .942 1.062 
 BOPCOH .018 .050 .022 .366 .714 .666 1.501 
 BOPDMS .218 .059 .234 3.722 .000 .585 1.709 
 BOPDMC .032 .033 .051 .982 .327 .867 1.154 
 
a. Dependent Variable: BOVERF 
Adjusted R Square is 0.464 
Table 8.12: Regression of Board Oversight Role on combination of Board 
Characteristics and Board Processes 
 The regression equation is: 
 BOVERF = 0.901 + 0.149*HUCPRO + 0.376*BOPOPE +   
                             0.218*BOPDMS 
This regression equation shows that with the combination board operations and board 
decision making still have positive impact on board oversight. In addition, board human 
capital also has positive impact on board oversight role. The relatively high adjusted R square 
figure indicates that the relationship is strong. 
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Table 8.13 shows the regression of Board Service Role (BOSERF) on combination of 
board characteristics and board processes. Only two of the variables are significant, board 
operation (BOPOPE) at 0.05 significance level, and board cohesiveness (BOPCOH) at the 
0.01 significance level.  
Coefficients
a 
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 1.193 .744  1.604 .110   
CEODUL .945 .553 .110 1.711 .089 .904 1.106 
BODIND .636 .425 .093 1.494 .137 .961 1.041 
BODSIZ .005 .028 .012 .192 .848 .932 1.073 
DIVJOB -.053 .093 -.039 -.570 .569 .808 1.238 
DIVAFF .020 .051 .024 .381 .703 .955 1.047 
HUCPRO .106 .068 .109 1.558 .121 .761 1.314 
BOPOPE .189 .096 .142 1.958 .052 .704 1.419 
BOPMEC .026 .051 .033 .521 .603 .942 1.062 
BOPCOH .264 .087 .227 3.040 .003 .666 1.501 
BOPDMS .062 .101 .049 .611 .542 .585 1.709 
BOPDMC .035 .056 .041 .625 .532 .867 1.154 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSERF 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.137  
Table 8.13: Regression of Board Service Role on combination of Board Characteristics 
and Board Processes 
 The regression equation is: 
 BOSERF = 1.193 + 0.189*BOPOPE + 0.264*BOPCOH 
This regression equation shows that the board characteristics factors do not have any 
significant impact on board service role with the combination. Board service role was found 
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to be positively impacted by board operations and board cohesiveness but the low adjusted R 
square figure indicates that the relationship is weak. 
 
Table 8.14 shows the regression of Board Strategic Role (BOSTRF) on combination 
of board characteristics and board processes. Only two of the variables, board professional 
human capital (HUCPRO) and structure of board meeting (BOPDMS) are significant at the 
0.01 significance level. 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) .660 .715  .923 .357   
CEODUL .688 .531 .079 1.296 .196 .904 1.106 
BODIND -.152 .409 -.022 -.372 .710 .961 1.041 
BODSIZ .033 .027 .075 1.243 .215 .932 1.073 
DIVJOB -.053 .089 -.038 -.591 .555 .808 1.238 
DIVAFF .029 .049 .035 .583 .560 .955 1.047 
HUCPRO .256 .066 .261 3.912 .000 .761 1.314 
BOPOPE .108 .093 .080 1.161 .247 .704 1.419 
BOPMEC -.012 .049 -.014 -.235 .814 .942 1.062 
BOPCOH .034 .083 .029 .411 .681 .666 1.501 
BOPDMS .338 .097 .264 3.465 .001 .585 1.709 
BOPDMC .044 .054 .051 .813 .417 .867 1.154 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSTRF 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.214 
Table 8.14: Regression of Board Strategic Role on combination of Board Characteristics 
and Board Processes 
 The regression equation is: 
 BOSTRF = 0.660 + 0.256*HUCPRO + 0.338*BOPDMS 
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This regression equation shows that with the combination, the impact of board 
operations is no longer significant only board decision-making is the only process factor that 
has significant impact on board strategic role. However, board professional human capital 
was found to have significant impact on board strategic role. The relatively low figure of 
adjusted R square implies that these relationships are weak. 
 
8.5     Summary of Hypotheses Testing on Regression Results 
Hypotheses Regression Analysis Results 
Board size and speed of decision-making are positively related. Negative relationship that is not 
significant 
Board size is negatively related to board cohesiveness.  Negative relationship that is not 
significant  
Board size and efficiency of operations are positively related Positive relationship that is not 
significant 
Board CEO Duality is positively correlated to board decision-
making speed 
Positively related at 5% significant 
level   
Board CEO Duality is positively correlated to cohesiveness Negative relationship that is not 
significant 
Board CEO Duality is positively correlated to board operations 
efficiency 
Positive relationship that is not 
significant 
Board independence is negatively correlated to board decision-
making speed 
Negative relationship that is not 
significant 
Board independence is negatively correlated to cohesiveness Positive relationship that is not 
significant 
Board independence is positively correlated to board operations 
efficiency 
Negative relationship that is not 
significant 
The degree of job-related diversity on the board is negatively 
related to the speed of decision-making 
Positive relationship that is not 
significant 
The degree of job-related diversity on the board is negatively 
related to the board‘s cohesiveness 
Positively related at 5% significant 
level  
Board job-related diversity is positively correlated with board 
operations efficiency.   
Positively related at 1% significant 
level 
Level of human capital on the board is positively correlated to 
board decision-making speed. 
Positively related at 1% significant 
level 
Level of human capital on the board is negatively correlated to 
board cohesiveness. 
Positively related at 1% significant 
level 
Level of human capital on the board is positively correlated to 
board operations efficiency. 
Positively related at 1% significant 
level  
Speed of Board decision-making will be positively related to  
   Board Oversight Role 
    
   Board Service Role  
    
   Board Strategic Role 
 
 
Positively related at 1% significant 
level  
Positive relationship that is not 
significant  
Positively related at 1% significant 
level  
The effect of cohesiveness on  
   Board Oversight Role will be positive 
    
   Board Service Role will be positive 
    
 
Positive relationship that is not 
significant 
Positively related at 1% significant 
level  
187 
 
   Board Strategic Role will be positive. Positive relationship that is not 
significant 
The effect of efficient board operations on  
   Board Oversight Role  
    
   Board Service Role 
     
   Board Strategic Role 
 
will be positive.  
 
Positively related at 1% significant 
level 
Positively related at 5% significant 
level  
Positively related at 5% significant 
level  
 
    Table 8.15: Summary of Hypotheses testing on Regression Results 
The regression results show a similar pattern to the correlation results. The overall 
results show that board processes have more impact than board characteristics on board task 
outcomes of board control, service and strategic roles and these board outcomes determine 
board effectiveness. The regression results therefore reveal that in Nigeria processes factors 
are more important than structural factors in determining board effectiveness. 
 
8.6  Review of the Hypotheses 
The researcher‘s theoretical framework which links board effectiveness to board 
characteristics with board processes as mediator led to the development of hypotheses that 
were tested with the correlation and regression analyses that were performed on the data. 
Hypotheses 1a, b and c predicted that board size is related to board decision-making, 
and board operations; but negatively related to board cohesiveness. Correlation results 
support the hypotheses but they are not significant. However, regression results do not 
support the hypotheses. . 
Hypotheses 2a, b, and c predicted that board CEO duality is positively related to 
board decision-making, cohesiveness and operations. Correlation and regression results 
support only the hypothesis that ‗CEO duality is positively related to board decision making‘ 
at a significant level.  
Hypotheses 3a and b predicted that board independence is negatively related to board 
decision-making and cohesiveness and positively related to board operation efficiency. 
Correlation and regression results do not support these hypotheses.  
Hypotheses 4a predicted that job-related diversity is negatively related to board 
decision-making. Correlation results show that job-related diversity is positively related to 
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board decision making at a significant level, which is the opposite of the hypothesis, and the 
regression results also support the positive relationship at a significant level.  
Hypotheses 4b predicted that job-related diversity is negatively related to board 
cohesiveness. Correlation and regression results show that job-related diversity is positively 
related to board cohesiveness at a significant level, which is a reverse of the hypothesis.  
Hypotheses 4c predicted that job-related diversity is positively related to board 
operation. Correlation and regression results show that job-related diversity is positively 
related to board operation at a significant and as such supports the hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 5a predicted that board human capital is positively related with board 
decision-making. Correlation and regression results show that board human capital is 
positively related to board decision-making at a significant level and as such support the 
hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 5b predicted that board human capital is negatively related with board 
cohesiveness. Correlation and regression results show that board human capital is positively 
related to board cohesiveness at a significant level and as such is a reverse of the hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 5c predicted that board human capital is positively related with board 
operation. Correlation and regression results show that board human capital is positively 
related to board operation at a significant level and as such supports the hypothesis.  
 Hypothesis 6a predicted that board decision-making is positively associated with 
board effectiveness (board control, service and strategic roles). Correlation results support 
this hypothesis at significant level. While regression results support part (board control and 
strategic roles) of the hypothesis at a significant level 
 Hypothesis 6b predicted that board cohesiveness is positively associated with board 
effectiveness (board control, service and strategic roles). Correlation results support this 
hypothesis at a significant level. However, regression result only supports part (board service 
role) at a significant level.  
 Hypothesis 6c predicted that board operation is positively associated with board 
effectiveness (board control, service and strategic roles). Correlation and regression results 
support this hypothesis at a significant level.  
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In reviewing these results, the only endogeneity test that was carried out is the Durban 
– Watson test. This showed figures that are between 1.5 and 2.5, therefore suggesting that 
they are no serial correlations and as such no serious endogeneity problems. However, since 
the model used is considered exploratory and not confirmatory the researcher was not 
particularly concerned about endogeneity problem. In future work, the researcher plans to 
conduct confirmatory study where instrumental proxies could be obtained to deal with 
probable endogeneity issues. 
 
8.7   Conclusion 
The results confirm some of the hypotheses, show a reverse relationship for some, and 
did not confirm others. The confirmed hypotheses show that board processes have significant 
impact on the performance of boards.  
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CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION  
9.1   Introduction 
         This chapter provides a discussion of the results and summary of the key findings of 
this study. Limitations of the research along with contributions of this study are discussed. 
Finally, suggested directions for further research are offered. 
 
9.2   Discussions 
This thesis examined the effect of board characteristics on board processes, board 
processes on board effectiveness, and then effect of board characteristics on board 
effectiveness through intervening variables of board processes. The researcher conducted his 
analysis on firms listed in the Nigerian stock exchange. To understand the impact of each of 
the board variables, the researcher used some board related theories such as agency theory, 
stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, and stakeholder theory. He argued that some 
board characteristics such as board size, board leadership (CEO duality), board independence, 
board job-related diversity and board human capital have positive impact on board processes, 
which in turn have positive impact on board performance. Board performance in this case 
means how well the board performs its roles of control of management, service to 
management and working with management in strategy development. Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) opined that the effectiveness of the board will result in better subsequent firm 
performance. 
 The control task is about the oversight function of the board to ensure that the 
company has proper internal control processes and that management abides by them. The 
service role is more advisory, such as mentoring and supporting the management, and also 
networking on behalf of the company. The strategic role requires board directors to be 
involved in the strategy development and monitoring of the implementation. 
 The empirical analyses provide interesting results. Board decision making was found 
to be positively related to board effectiveness at significant levels, which means that the 
board‘s performance as regards its control, service and strategic roles are dependent on the 
quality of its decision making. Zona and Zattoni (2007) in their study found that the 
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effectiveness of boards of directors is strongly influenced by group-level processes such as 
open and critical debate (cognitive conflict), which affects the quality of decision making. 
Board cohesiveness was found to be related to board effectiveness at significant 
levels, this means that high degree of board cohesiveness will impact on the board‘s ability to 
performance its control, service and strategic roles effectively. A cohesive board is one that 
works as a strong team. Sharon Kemp (2010) argued that teamwork is seen as important to 
the board process and enhance board effectiveness, and it was mentioned by ninety percent 
(90%) of board members in her study. Since board members are confronted with complex 
and ambiguous strategic decisions, they too are required to work together by sharing 
information, resources, and decisions (Hambrick, 2007). Boards that are unable to work as a 
team end up less able to rein in and control powerful CEOs. Without a team approach boards 
are also likely to be less effective at providing the advice and counsel to top management. 
 Board operations was found to be have a positive influence on board effectiveness at a 
significant level, this implies that a board with good operations (support services) will 
perform its control, services and strategic roles more effectively. Good board operations will 
ensure quality and timely board papers, follow up responsibilities that are well defined, clear 
understanding of directors‘ roles and responsibilities and board meetings that are well 
conducted.  
The researcher also found that board size is not significantly associated with any of 
the mediator variables of board decision-making, cohesiveness, and operations. It was also 
found that can then be deduced by proxy that board size does not have an impact on board 
effectiveness in the Nigerian environment. If board effectiveness is used as a proxy for firm 
performance then this finding is consistent with many other studies that examined the effect 
of board size on firm performance. For example, Randoy and Jenssen (2004) and Zahra and 
Stanton (1988), found that board size was not significantly associated with financial 
performance. However, these results are inconsistent with some other studies, which found 
that board size was significantly associated with firm performance measures, for example, 
Bozec, (2005); Cole et al. (2001) and Guest (2008). 
 Board independence and CEO duality were not found to have any significant 
relationship with board processes, and hence no effect on board effectiveness in the study. 
Randoy and Jenssen (2004) found that board independence is not associated with firm 
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performance based on accounting measures. Bhagat and Black (2002) also failed to show that 
greater board independence leads to improve better firm performance. According to Adams, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2009), there is no robust empirical evidence that board 
independence improves firm performance. 
 As a result of the recent corporate governance scandals, regulators and reformers all 
over the world are increasingly demanding that the role of the CEO be separated from that of 
the chair (Wilson, 2008; Lorsch and Zelleke, 2005). It is claimed that boards undertake more 
effective monitoring when the chair is independent. CEOs become more effective leaders 
when the positions of chair and CEO are separated because it allows them to concentrate on 
the firm‘s operations while empowering the board (Wilson, 2008). However, our results did 
not show any significant relationship between CEO duality and board processes and 
indirectly no significant relationships with board control, service and strategic roles. 
 A few recent papers also challenge the notion of independence, and state that boards 
that are independent on paper can be ineffective monitors when the directors are socially or 
professionally connected to the CEO (Hwang and Kim, 2010; Dey and Liu, 2010). 
 Finally, Wintoki et al. (2009) report no relationship between board size or board 
independence and firm performance. Their findings are consistent with the evolving board 
structure determinants literature that the constitution of boards depends on their information 
and contract environment (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Linck, Netter 
and Yang, 2008; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008). 
 Board job-related diversity was found to be positively related to board decision-
making, board cohesiveness and board operations at significant levels. This suggests that a 
more diverse board will lead to better decision-making. This is in line with the findings of 
other researchers who have found that a more diverse board may be more innovative, creative 
and capable of higher quality decision making (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Bilimoria and 
Wheeler, 2000), and better at strategic decision making and planning (Coffey and Wang, 
1998).  
The findings also imply that a more diverse board will lead to stronger board 
cohesiveness. This is contrary to the general belief that a group that is highly diverse might 
find it difficult to be cohesive because of the likely divergent views. It has been argued that 
diversity might have a negative impact on the ability a team of persons has to reach a 
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strategic consensus (Knight et al., 1999). A diverse board is expected to have broader 
experience that could enhance better board operations. This positive relationship in the 
Nigerian environment could be as a result of the influence chairmen, CEOs and dominant 
shareholders have in the appointment of directors and these directors have to operate to 
satisfy their sponsors. 
Board job-related diversity was also found to be positively related to board decision-
making, cohesiveness and operations at significant levels and so indirectly related to the 
board effectiveness. This implies that the higher the diversity of the board the more effective 
is the board‘s oversight function; the better the level of service provided by the board to 
management and the better the board‘s contribution to strategy. Nielsen et al (2008) in their 
study of Italian firms have results that suggest the positive effects of board job-related 
diversity on board effectiveness, measured as the performance of board service and control 
tasks, which are mediated through board open debate. 
 Board professional human capital was found to have a positive effect on board 
cohesiveness, and decision making operations at significant levels. This implies that board 
cohesiveness level increases as board human capital level increases. Board professional 
human capital, which is also board competence, refers to the presence and use of directors‘ 
knowledge and experience (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Alessandro et al., 2009; Melkumov, 
2011). 
 Board human capital was also found to be positively related to board decision-
making, cohesiveness and operations at significant levels, and indirectly to board 
effectiveness. Support to management and participation in the strategic process requires 
specialized knowledge, and higher background diversity which will likely produce board 
members with the required competences and skills. An effective board is one that can 
successfully execute the roles required of it.  This implies that to be effective, a board should 
be composed of directors that possess relevant expertise, knowledge and skills. Stewart 
(1997) argued that the greater the human capital intensity of the board, the higher its 
contribution to the success of the firm‘s strategy. 
 The results show that in Nigeria, board diversity and human capital are the most 
important board structural factors that impact board processes and indirectly impact board 
effectiveness. They also show that board processes of operations, cohesiveness and decision 
making have significant impact on board effectiveness. Finally the results show that board 
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process factors are more important than board structural factors in determining board 
effectiveness.    
 Further analyses (see appendix 6), using the control variables of organization size, 
business type, age of organization and ownership type, show that there were no significant 
differences in the results obtained as discussed above. This means that the relationships 
observed and the confirmed hypotheses are not dependent on the size, type, age and 
ownership of the companies. The minor difference could be attributed the sample size of the 
subsets. 
9.3    Importance of Board Effectiveness 
People often question whether corporate boards matter because their day-to-day 
impact is difficult to observe. But when things go wrong, they can become the center of 
attention. 
The BP crisis in the Gulf of Mexico and the death of 29 miners on April 5, 2010, at 
Massey Energy-owned coal mine in West Virginia, New Zealand have brought up new 
criticisms of weak board oversights. Such tragic crises have raised the issue of the need for 
board effectiveness particularly in the area of board oversight of the CEO and management. It 
is also argued that this will require a board that is independent. A primary question about 
board independence is whether a board member will diligently analyze board proposals and 
corporate issues and act in the corporation‘s best interest – even if it is contrary to other board 
member or CEO positions. In emerging markets like Nigeria, where CEO tend to be 
powerful, in many cases, board members, though technically independent, just follow the 
CEO‘s lead in approving actions, instead of voting in the corporation‘s interests. In a 
difference-in-differences estimation, Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) find that increases 
in director independence improve performance in those firms in which the costs of obtaining 
information are low, while performance worsens in firms in which information costs are high. 
The recent corporate scandals have resulted in regulators and reformers increasingly 
demanding that the role of the CEO be separated from that of the Chair (Wilson 2008, Lorsch 
and Zelleke 2005). They argued, like Kajola (2008), that concentration of decision 
management and decision control in one individual hinders boards‘ effectiveness in 
monitoring top management.  Many advocates claim that having an independent Chair results 
in superior monitoring by the board. According to them, CEOs become more effective 
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leaders when the two positions are separated because it allows them to concentrate on the 
firm‘s operations while empowering the board (Wilson 2008). 
While independence of the board is considered a key criterion in the governance of 
firms, there is no robust evidence that board independence improves firm performance 
(Adams et al. 2010). An important issue that is highlighted in recent research on this latter 
topic is that increased independence also comes at a cost – the possibility of breakdowns in 
communication between the CEOs and directors (Adams and Ferreira 2009).  Some 
researchers have also argued that a board‘s monitoring role is more efficiently performed by 
more independent boards (Guest, 2008; Lehn et al., 2009). However, a few recent papers also 
challenge the notion of independence, and document that boards that are independent on 
paper can be ineffective monitors when the directors are socially or professionally connected 
to the CEO (Hwang and Kim (2010); Dey and Liu (2010).   
 As our results show, for board members to perform well, provision of necessary 
information in a timely manner is critical. Board members need to have enough time to 
prepare adequately for board meetings and the decisions that will be made. It‘s important that 
the information be relevant, clear, complete and concise to avoid information overload. 
Information quality is also important to ensure adequate preparation for board meetings. 
Having high-quality information also facilitates more active board discussion and improves 
the quality of decision making. 
 Competence of board members, referred to as board human capital, is another critical 
factor, revealed the results, for board effectiveness and so the need to improve the quality of 
people serving on boards. Boards of directors are seen as groups of competent people that 
contribute to the boardroom debate through their experiences, competences and different 
viewpoints. Lack of expertise among directors is a perennial problem in Nigeria and so there 
is the need for companies to put in place processes that enable them select directors who have 
the expertise to properly evaluate the information they get from managers and add value to 
the companies. More importantly, the directors must know what questions to ask about 
information they are not getting. 
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9.4   Focus of this Study 
 Research on board effectiveness was motivated by renewed interest on the role of 
boards arising from the recent corporate failures and scandals in different parts of the world, 
including emerging markets. Many countries have issued corporate governance frameworks 
and codes aimed at focussing attention on accountability, transparency, integrity and trust. 
Most of these corporate governance codes tend to concentrate on board structure and 
practices, based on the assumption that following these normative guidelines would result in 
good governance and better board performance leading to better firm performance. Not much 
emphasis is placed on the soft issues that lead to better board performance such as board 
cohesiveness, decision making and operational processes. 
 Corporate boards are expected to be more proactive in discharging their roles of 
oversight or control function, service to CEO and his top management team and strategic 
function for better board performance and hence firm performance. In this thesis, the 
researcher examined the impact of board characteristics viz., board size, CEO duality, board 
independence, board job diversity, board professional human capital on board processes and 
the impact of board processes on board effectiveness. The researcher also investigated the 
effect of mediating variables of board processes on board effectiveness, whiling controlling 
for firm size, age, industry, and ownership type. 
 To understand the role of boards, the researcher used different governance theories 
such as agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory and stakeholder 
theory. The researcher also used the performance of the distinct board roles of control, 
service and strategic as the basis for evaluating board effectiveness. 
 Based on the review of extant literature and different theoretical perspectives and 
frameworks on board effectiveness, the researcher developed a theoretical framework on 
board effectiveness and a set of hypotheses. 
 The data for this study were based on the questionnaires administered to chairpersons 
and directors of publicly quoted firms on the Nigerian stock exchange between May and 
August 2010. The statistical method used to test the hypotheses is correlation/regression 
analysis. The use of factor analysis helped in reducing the number of variables in the 
constructs. 
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9.5   Summary of Findings 
 The empirical examination of the hypotheses developed from the theoretical 
framework presented in this study show some interesting results. Board size, CEO duality 
and board independence were found not to have any significant impact on board processes or 
on board effectiveness. This is in contrast with many research findings which link board 
performance to structural aspects of a board. 
 Board job diversity was found to have significant impact on board processes of 
operation, cohesiveness and decision making, and also on board effectiveness. Board 
professional human capital was found to have a significant impact on board processes of 
operation, cohesiveness and decision making, and also on board effectiveness.  
 Board process variables (board operations, board cohesiveness and board decision 
making), were found to have significant impact on board control role, board service role and 
board strategic role. This implies that efficient board processes will lead to board 
effectiveness.  
 In summary, the researcher found that board characteristics, apart from job diversity 
and professional human capital, do not have significant impact on board processes and board 
effectiveness. However, board processes have significant impact on board effectiveness. The 
―unimportance‖ of board characteristics can be seen to be contrary to board reforms 
throughout the world in the last decade. The study indicates the critical importance of board 
job diversity, professional human capital, board cohesiveness, board decision making and 
board operation in ensuring board effectiveness. In effect board processes of more 
preparation for board meetings, better decision-making, less personal conflicts and more 
usage of all the available skills on the board are more important than board structure. Overall, 
the results support the idea that board design involves both structural and process variables as 
propounded by Forbes and Milliken (1999); Finkelstein and Mooney (2003); Pye and 
Pettigrew (2005); Roberts et al (2005); and boards that want to be more effective must devote 
more attention to their processes and not just focus on the structure. 
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9.6   Contributions 
 Some important contributions emerge from this research. Firstly, to be best of my 
knowledge this is the first empirical study of a framework similar to the researcher‘s 
framework. The frameworks of Nicholson and Kiel (2004) and Levrau and Van den Berghe 
(2007) have not been tested empirically. This study is there a contribution to empirical study 
of board effectiveness. 
Secondly, the study contributes to understanding of board effectiveness in an 
emerging market where board roles and processes are still developing by examining both the 
traditional variables such as board size, CEO duality, board independence and other 
organizational attributes such as board job diversity and board professional human capital 
variables. In addition this is the first study to examine board effectiveness in publicly traded 
companies in Nigeria. 
 Thirdly, the study will add to better governance practices in Nigeria. The lack of good 
governance amongst Nigerian companies has been blamed for the economic backwardness of 
the country (Dike, 2006). 
 Finally, the study will be useful to practitioners as the results show that in an 
emerging market, like Nigeria, board size, CEO duality board independence and board job 
diversity are not as critical as board cohesiveness, board decision making and board 
operations in ensuring board effectiveness. Members of the board have to work together to 
make things happen and they have to be supported with efficient administrative back up. For 
institutional investors and rating agencies, this study highlights the danger of limiting 
attention to structural board characteristics when assessing the quality of corporate 
governance and board performance at a company level. 
9.7   Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 The study faced some limitations. First, the response rate of 14.7% is relatively low 
for a population of over 1580 board members. Board members in Nigeria are a difficult group 
to engage in any form of research because of their busy schedules. A higher response rate is 
likely to provide better results. 
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 Second, the responses of directors to the questions on board processes and outcomes 
are more of their perception and might not be the reality. It could have been ideal to observe 
boards in action to get first hand information but this is not possible in an environment like 
Nigeria where fear and lack of trust are prevalent. 
Third, the model developed by the researcher is primarily for one-tier or unitary 
boards. Although the unitary board of directors is internationally the most prevalent, it should 
be noted that some European have two-tier board structure.   
Fourth, the model has used a limited number of process variables in studying board 
effectiveness. There are several other process variables that have been identified in literature 
that are not included in this model. Examples are debate and conflict norms (Levrau and Van 
den Berghe, 2007), decision comprehensiveness (Simons et al., 1999). Future research should 
address the limitations of this study. Several extensions to this study can be undertaken. The 
researcher focused only on certain set of board characteristics for their impact on board 
effectiveness. There are other board characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity and 
specialised educational qualifications that could have been considered.  
There will be a need to investigate further why the traditional board characteristics do 
not directly influence board effectiveness. Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) explored the 
concept of accountability through a qualitative survey of directors of FTSE 350 companies. 
They argued that while board demography conditions board effectiveness, it is the real 
behaviour of board members that determines board effectiveness. Further research is 
therefore needed to study behaviour of directors particularly in emerging markets. More 
research is needed on how demographic variables and process variables may interact or 
jointly influence the board task performance. 
David Wan and C.H. Ong (2005) in their study of public-listed companies in 
Singapore suggest that board structure does not matter, while board process does. Further 
work has to be done in the area of board processes and explore various aspects of board 
committees. 
Further research could be undertaken to examine the role of non-executive directors, 
their compensation, and degree of independence on board effectiveness in emerging markets.  
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Researchers are invited to draw on existing literature on group dynamics and 
effectiveness and to use qualitative methods, such as case studies, to gain a clearer 
understanding of board dynamics. 
Future research may focus on the actual behaviour of directors (inside and outside the 
boardroom) with the aim of analyzing when and how they contribute to board effectiveness. 
In addition, given regulators‘ focus on preventing future corporate governance 
scandals, it would be useful to have more research explore whether there are board attributes 
that promote more ethical corporate behaviour (e.g., Harrison and Freeman, 1999) and 
attributes that make boards more effective in managing a crisis. 
We are in search of a theory that could show researchers the way forward, in board 
research, by identifying the characteristics that a board must possess if it is to be active and 
effective 
The Nigerian code of corporate governance recommends the inclusion of independent 
directors in boards of quoted companies and so it will be good to assess the impact of 
independent directors on board effectiveness. 
Finally, the study has examined the impact of board characteristics and board 
processes on board effectiveness. It may be useful to extend this study to include the impact 
of board effectiveness on firm performance. 
9.8   Concluding Remarks  
Mainstream empirical studies have assumed the effectiveness of the board is a 
function of its structure and independence from management. Only a few studies have 
attempted to adopt a comprehensive approach by studying the effect of board functions, 
processes, and behaviour on the effectiveness of the board. This study shows that process 
variables and, to a lesser extent, demographic variables significantly influence board task 
performance. A board performs well through cooperation, discussion and quality decision 
making based on quality information.  
 In sum, in order to create well-functioning boards it is not sufficient to demand 
changes in board demography, i.e. to add more independent directors, as codes of good 
governance recommend. On the contrary, boards wanting to improve their task performance 
must devote more attention to their internal processes.  
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In conclusion, the researcher strongly believes that the theoretical framework and the 
findings of this thesis will stimulate practitioners and scholars of strategy, organizational 
behaviour and corporate governance to examine boards and their activities from many 
perspectives, particularly from the process side. The findings of this study have implications 
for all stakeholders – directors, management, regulators and shareholders. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Quantitative Phase of the Research on 
Key Determinants of Effective Board of Directors in Nigerian quoted firms 
   
This is a research project is being undertaken by Chris Ogbechie of the Lagos Business 
School in collaboration with Brunel Business School, as part of his PhD program. The main 
objective of the project is to understand better, document and operationalize board variables 
and board effectiveness especially in emerging markets like Nigeria. It is aimed at getting a 
more profound insight into the concept of board effectiveness as the effectiveness of boards 
in Nigeria will have a significant impact on the state of corporate governance and hence, the 
need to understand the key factors that make these boards effective is a pressing one. 
 
Your co-operation is critical to the success of this project.  Kindly answer all the questions as 
fully and honestly as possible. Please note that there are no ―right‖ or ―wrong‖ answers to any 
of the questions and it is your initial impression and candid response which we are looking 
for. 
 
All the information provided in this questionnaire remains absolutely confidential and 
would only be seen by the academic researchers involved in this study. Neither your 
name nor that of your organization will be mentioned in the report.  
 
Once completed please return the questionnaire in the enclosed self-addressed envelope.  
 
Chris Ogbechie 
Lagos Business School 
Km 22 Lekki-Epe Expressway 
Ajah, Lagos 
Section A (Questions 1-9). In this section we seek to understand the composition of your 
Board of Directors. 
 
1. Is the Chairperson of the Board also the company‘s Chief Executive Officer (CEO)? 
                               Yes         No 
    
2.  What is the total number of Board members?                                
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3.  Please indicate below the number of your Board members that are male and female.                             
Male Female 
   
 
4.  What is the gender of the Chairperson?     Male  Female 
5.  What is the gender of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)?   Male            Female    
6. What is the number of inside/internal Board members?       
  (inside/internal board members are also referred to as executive directors) 
7. What is the number of outside/external Board members?    
 (outside/external board members are defined as those who are not employees  
            of your company) 
8. How many of the outside/external board members can be characterized as affiliated?              
 (Affiliate board members are defined as those that meet any of the following  
            conditions: affiliation with the Organization/firm as a supplier, a banker or creditor 
            within the past two years, association with a law or audit firm engaged by your firm,  
            being an employee of your firm‘s subsidiaries or holding companies or relation by  
            blood/marriage with a member of the board.) 
 
9.        Please indicate here whether the following committees (i.e. consisting of board  
           members) exist in your board and the number of members in each committee:   
 
Types of Committee   No of Board 
members in 
the committee 
No of 
independent 
members 
 Yes No (Pls. Write in)  
Nominating Committee     
Remuneration Committee     
Audit Committee     
Succession Committee     
Risk Management Committee     
Human Resources (Personnel) Committee     
Finance and General Purpose Committee     
Credit Committee     
Governance Committee     
Others (Please write in)     
     
     
Do they exist in 
the Board? 
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Section B (Questions 1-3). In this section we seek to understand the human capital your 
Board of Directors puts to use to create wealth for the company.  
 
1. How would you rate the level of diversity of your board in terms of having a mix of 
people?  (Please rate your board members on the under listed factors on a scale of 1 to 
7, where 1 means very low diversity and 7 means very high diversity 
                                                                                                  Very low                         Very high 
                           diversity   diversity  
 
a) Educational backgrounds  
(formal educational qualifications)?            1       2        3        4       5       6       7                           
b) occupational backgrounds 
 (e.g. engineer, economist, accountant) ?     1       2       3        4       5       6       7     
c) functional positions (e.g. Marketing, 
Human Resources, Production, Finance)?   1       2       3        4       5       6       7     
d) network ties (e.g. membership of social  
clubs, professional associations?                  1       2      3        4       5       6        7   
e) religious affinity       1       2        3        4       5       6       7 
 
f) tribal affinity        1       2        3        4       5       6       7 
 
 
2. How many of your board members are:  
a) Lawyers 
 
b) Accountants 
 
c) Engineers 
 
d) Economists 
 
e) Academicians 
 
f) Medical Doctors 
 
g) Bankers 
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h) Others (please specify) 
 
--------------------------------------- 
        --------------------------------------- 
 
3. Kindly rate the external board members on their knowledge of the following on a 
scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means very low and 7 means very high.  
                 Very low                           Very high
   
a) Understanding of the business of your            1      2       3       4      5       6       7 
organization?           
b) Understanding of the industry in which            1       2       3       4      5       6       7 
your organization operates?          
c) Knowledge about financial matters           1        2       3       4     5       6       7 
 
d) Knowledge about legal matters            1         2       3       4     5       6       7 
 
e) Knowledge about risk matters             1        2       3       4      5      6       7 
 
 
Section C (Questions 1 - 10). In this section we seek to understand the Operations 
adopted in the running of your Board in managing the future of your firm. Kindly 
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with these statements on a scale of 1 
to 7, 1 means strongly disagree and 7 means strongly agree. 
 
                                                                   Strongly                   Strongly 
                                   Disagree                      Agree  
    
 
 
1. The board members have the time to do their   1      2       3     4    5   6 7 
 job well 
 
2. The board has a clear understanding of its         1 2       3      4    5          6       7 
roles and responsibilities 
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3. Board meetings run on too long                          1      2      3       4    5    6 7 
 
4. Board meetings are conducted well       1  2       3      4    5    6        7 
 
5. It is clear who has responsibility for following   1  2       3      4     5    6        7 
up actions agreed by the board 
 
6. Board  members are provided with the               1   2      3      4      5     6       7 
right quality of board papers 
 
7. The board papers are timely                                1   2       3      4      5      6   7 
8. Quality of the Board‘s         1       2       3      4      5     6 7 
Charter is high 
  
9. The Chairperson leads the board well       1       2       3      4      5    6  7 
        
 
 
10. How often does your Board meet? Please Tick (  ) appropriate box below 
        
Once a 
year 
Twice 
a year 
Every 
three 
months 
Every 
two 
months 
Every 
month 
Others 
(Please 
specify) 
       
 
Section D (Questions 1 - 7). In this section we seek to understand how cohesive the 
Board is in managing the future of your firm. Kindly indicate the extent to which you 
agree or disagree with these statements on a scale of 1 to 7, 1 means strongly disagree 
and 7 means strongly agree. 
 
 
                         Strongly                  Strongly 
                                    Disagree       Agree  
  
1. The board and management periodically            1  2       3       4    5   6       7 
review how they are working together 
 
2. Misunderstandings are rare between the             1  2       3       4    5   6       7 
board and management 
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3. The board and management are able to resolve  1  2       3       4    5   6       7 
conflict between themselves constructively 
 
4. Board members are able to resolve conflict        1  2       3       4    5   6       7 
between themselves constructively 
 
5. Members of the board respect and trust      1      2       3       4    5   6       7 
each other. 
 
6. Members of the board socialize with each other 1  2        3       4      5   6       7 
outside board meetings 
 
7. Disagreement is dealt with openly in the board   1  2        3       4      5   6        7 
 
 
 
Section E (Questions 1 - 10). In this section we seek to understand the decision-making 
process adopted by the Board in managing the future of your firm. Kindly indicate the 
extent to which you agree or disagree with these statements on a scale of 1 to 7, 1 means 
strongly disagree and 7 means strongly agree. 
                            Strongly        Strongly 
                                       Disagree         Agree  
  
1. The board has adequate notice of important     1  2        3       4     5   6      7 
issues to be discussed at board meetings 
 
2. Board meetings have clearly constructed         1         2        3       4      5   6      7 
agenda 
 
3. Important items are prioritised on board          1  2        3       4      5   6      7 
Agendas 
 
4. The board has trouble reaching conclusions    1  2        3       4      5   6     7  
 
5. The business of the board conducted with       1         2        3       4      5   6      7 
openness and transparency  
 
6. The board meetings are pervaded with integrity1  2        3       4      5   6      7 
208 
 
 
7. Discussions during board meetings are    1 2         3       4    5   6      7 
constructive  
 
8. When discussing an issue directors state    1        2        3        4      5   6      7 
clear disagreement with each other 
 
9. Directors openly challenge each others‘          1      2      3     4    5   6
   7 
opinion. 
 
10. When discussing an issue different directors       1      2      3     4    5   6
   7 
propose different approaches to the issue 
  
    
 
Section F (Questions 1-5). In this section we seek to understand the extent to which your 
board deploys network of extra-organizational/informal contacts to create wealth for 
your company. Please rate external members of your board on the under listed factors 
on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means very low and 7 means very high.  
 
                   Very low            Very high 
    
  
1. Relationship with    
           government officials at the  
 Federal Level        1       2      3     4    5    6    7 
  
 
2. Relationship with    
           government officials at the  
 State Level       1      2      3     4    5    6    7 
  
 
3. Involvement with social  
clubs such as Ikoyi  
Club, etc.        1      2      3     4    5    6    7 
  
 
4. Involvement with    
professional associations     1      2      3     4    5    6    7 
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5. Involvement with trade    
Associations and Chambers  
of Commerce       1     2      3     4    5    6    7 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section G (Questions 1 - 7). In this section we seek to understand how well the Board is 
performing its oversight (control) role.   
Please indicate to what extent your board carries out the following functions on a scale 
of 1 to 7, 1 being not at all and 7 to a large extent.  
                   
Not at all                           To a large                
                                                       extent 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
1. Oversee the financial management of the       1      2      3       4       5       6       7 
Organisation 
 
2. Ensure the organisation has adequate  
financial systems and procedures       1      2      3       4       5       6       7 
 
3. Monitor organisational performance and  
taking action where necessary       1      2      3       4       5       6       7 
 
4. Monitor the organisation‘s  
chief executive and top management                  1      2      3       4       5       6       7 
 
5. Have procedure for recruiting new directors      1      2      3       4       5       6       7 
 
6. Ensure that the organisation fulfils its legal  
Obligations                     1      2      3       4       5       6       7 
 
7. Ensure accountability to the organisation‘s  
Stakeholders                     1      2      3       4       5       6       7 
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Section H (Questions 1 - 7). In this section we seek to understand how well the Board is 
providing service to management.   
Please indicate to what extent your board carries out the following functions on a scale 
of 1 to 7, 1 being not at all and 7 to a large extent.  
                   
 Not at all                To a large  
                                                               extent 
                                                                                                                                                              
1. Support and advise management           1        2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
2. Review board performance and ensure  
it works well              1        2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
3. Represent the interest of shareholders in  
the organisation             1        2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
4. Act as a link with important groups or  
organisations your firm deals with               1        2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
5. Represent the organisation externally           1        2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
6. Help to raise funds or other resources for  
the organisation              1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
7. Help to generate businesses for the 
Organisation               1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
  
 
Section I (Questions 1 - 9). In this section we seek to understand how well the Board is 
performing its strategic role.  Please indicate to what extent your board carries out the 
following functions on a scale of 1 to 7, 1 being not at all and 7 to a large extent.  
                   
        Not at all     To a large 
                                                                                                                                         extent 
                                                                                              
 
1. Sets the organisation‘s mission and values      1       2       3       4       5       6       7
     
2. Reviews and decide the organisation‘s  
strategic direction         1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
3. Determines and reviews company                      1       2       3        4       5       6       7 
      objectives to match the mission and values,  
       and to form the basis of company strategy 
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4. Determines, supports and enforces 
company policies        1  2       3        4       5   6       7 
5. Reviews and evaluates present and 
      future opportunities, threats and risks                 1  2       3        4       5       6       7 
      in the external environment, and current 
      future strengths, weaknesses and risks 
      of your company 
 
6. Determines corporate and financial  
      strategic options, reviews and selects      1  2       3        4       5       6       7 
      those to be pursued, and decides the  
      resources, contingency plans and means 
      to support them 
 
7. Determines the business unit strategies      
      and plans designed to implement the                1 2        3        4       5   6       7 
      corporate strategy 
 
8. Ensures that your company‘s 
      organization structure and capabilities    1       2        3       4     5        6       7 
      are appropriate for implementing its 
      chosen strategies 
 
9. Adapts performance measures to monitor 
      the implementation of strategy, policies     1 2        3       4     5   6      7 
      and plans, and the legal/fiduciary  
      obligations affecting the business and the 
      board 
 
 
 
       . 
       .                                                        Not                    Very 
                                                                Effective        Effective 
 
         
 
Overall how effective would you             1          2          3          4          5          6          7 
say your board is          
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Section J (Questions 1 and  2). In this section we seek to understand the factors that 
contribute to the effectiveness of boards. 
 
1. Below are factors directors and corporate governance experts think are 
responsible for effective boards. The factors are not exhaustive, so you can add 
to them in the spaces provided.  Based on your knowledge and experience as a 
director, please indicate which of the factors you consider relevant for the 
effectiveness of boards? Please answer in the table below. 
 
2. For these factors you have indicated, kindly show their relative importance in 
the effectiveness of boards  by using numbers 1,2,3…..where 1 means the most 
important, 2 is the next most important, 3 is next, ………… 
 
 
 
Question 1: Factors responsible for Board 
effectiveness  
Please 
Tick  () 
Those 
You 
Consider 
Relevant 
Question 2: 
Relative  
Importance (Use 
Numbers: 1, 2, 3….) 
 
1. Competence (knowledge and  skills) of 
directors  
 
  
2. Integrity of directors  
 
  
3. Compliance with international best practices 
 
  
4. Having a network of extra-organizational 
contacts with people/groups that are vital to 
the business 
  
5. Good interpersonal relations among 
directors 
 
  
6. Ability to accept criticism in good faith 
 
  
7. Level of preparation for board meetings 
 
  
8. Diversity of the board 
 
  
9. Board transparency and openness 
 
  
10. Board independence 
 
  
11. Compliance with codes/laws/regulations   
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12 Commitment of individual directors 
 
  
13 Participation of board in strategy 
 
  
14 Chairman‘s leadership style 
 
  
15 Board oversight/control functions 
 
  
16 Timely and balanced reports by 
management  
 
  
 
 
Section K (Questions 1-5).  In this section please provide us with some background 
information regarding your company for classification purposes only. 
 
1.   What was your company‘ previous year‘s turnover? 
_______________________________________ 
 
2.   What was the number of full-time employees working in your company last year? 
_____________ 
     
3.   What type of company do you best resemble? Please Tick (  ) appropriate box below 
        
 
Local 
Nigerian 
Company 
Nigerian 
International 
Company 
Subsidiary 
of an 
Foreign 
Company 
Joint 
Venture 
between 
Nigerian and 
Foreigners 
     
 
4.   Please indicate the classification that best describes your company  
Aviation and 
Road 
Transportation 
Commercial 
Services 
Construction 
and Real 
Estate 
Financial 
Services 
Healthcare 
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Hotel and 
Tourism 
ICT Manufacturing Media, Printing 
and Publishing 
Petroleum 
Marketing 
     
 
5.   In what year was your company established? ____________________ 
 
Finally, if there are any other comments you would like to make that you feel may help 
us to better understand the specific aspects of board effectiveness in your company, or 
any other comments you wish to make, please use the space provided below.  (If you 
would like to continue, please do so on a separate sheet and attach it to the 
questionnaire).       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY WHICH IS 
GREATLY APPRECIATED 
 
Please return the questionnaire in the self-addressed envelope provided. 
Please attach your business card or provide us with your name and mailing address in 
order to avoid sending you reminders and to dispatch your personal copy of the final 
report. 
 
 
 
 
Business Card 
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Appendix 2: Letter of Notification 
 
 
 
 
May 7, 2010 
 
 
Dear ….,   
  
Notification: Research on Board Effectiveness in Nigerian Companies 
In about a week‘s time a research questionnaire will be sent to you to be completed on the 
above subject matter. It would be greatly appreciated if you could spare some of your 
valuable time to participate in the study. 
  
This research is being undertaken by Chris Ogbechie of the Lagos Business School in 
collaboration with Brunel Business School as part of his PhD programme. The aim of the 
project is to understand, document and operationalize board variables and board effectiveness 
in the Nigerian business environment. The study will contribute to a better understanding of 
board dynamics and give some insight on what should be taken into consideration in the 
appointment of directors in Nigeria. 
 
Your views and comments will be invaluable to the success of the study. 
 
Thank you in advance for your support.  
 
Yours truly, 
 
 
Chris Ogbechie 
Director, Etisalat CSR Center 
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Appendix 3: Letter Accompanying Questionnaire 
 
 
14th May, 2010. 
 
 
 
Dear  
 
RESEARCH ON BOARD EFFECTIVENESS IN NIGERIAN COMPANIES 
 
It would be greatly appreciated if you could spare a little of your valuable time to participate 
in the above study which is of considerable importance to companies operating in Nigeria. 
 
This is a research project is being undertaken by Chris Ogbechie of the Lagos Business 
School in conjunction with Brunel Business School as part of his PhD  programme. The main 
objective of the project is to understand better, document and operationalize board variables 
and board effectiveness especially in emerging markets like Nigeria. It is aimed at getting a 
profound insight into the concept of board effectiveness as the effective boards in Nigeria 
will have a significant impact on the state of corporate governance and hence, the need to 
understand the key factors that make these boards effective is a pressing one. The study will 
also contribute to a better understanding of board dynamics and give some insight into what 
should be considered in appointing directors in Nigerian companies. 
 
Your co-operation is critical to the success of this project. Kindly answer all the questions as 
fully and honestly as possible. Please note that there are no ―right‖ or ―wrong‖ answers to any 
of the questions and it is your initial impression and candid response which we are looking 
for. 
 
All the information provided in this questionnaire remains absolutely confidential and would 
only be seen the academic researchers involved in this study. Neither your name nor that of 
your organization will be mentioned in the report. 
 
Once completed please return the questionnaire in the self-addressed envelope. 
 
Thank you in advance for your support 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Chris Ogbechie 
Director Etisalat CSR Centre 
 
 
 
217 
 
Appendix 4: First Reminder Letter 
 
 
 
May 28, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Dear ….., 
 
 
Research on Board Effectiveness in Nigerian Companies 
 
About two weeks ago a research questionnaire was sent to you to be completed on the above 
subject matter.  
 
The research project is being undertaken by Chris Ogbechie of the Lagos Business School in 
collaboration with Brunel Business School as part of his PhD programme. The aim of the 
study is to understand, document, and operationalize board variables and board effectiveness 
in the Nigerian business environment. 
 
Our records show that we are yet to receive from you the completed questionnaire. Kindly 
take some time off your busy schedule to complete the questionnaire and return to the 
undersigned. If however, you have completed and returned the questionnaire, kindly 
disregard this letter.  
 
 
Thanks you in advance for your support 
 
Yours Truly, 
 
 
 
Chris Ogbechie 
Director, Etisalat CSR Center 
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Appendix 5: Final Reminder Letter 
 
 
 
June 11, 2010 
 
 
  
  
 
Dear …..,   
  
Research on Board Effectiveness in Nigerian Companies 
About four weeks ago a research questionnaire was sent to you to be completed on the above 
subject matter.  
 
This research study is being undertaken by Chris Ogbechie of the Lagos Business School in 
collaboration with Brunel Business School as part of his PhD programme. The purpose of the 
study is to understand, record, and operationalize board variables and board effectiveness in 
the Nigerian business environment. 
 
Our records show that we are yet to receive from you the completed questionnaire. If you are 
yet to fill the questionnaire, please do so and return to the undersigned in the enclosed self-
addressed envelope. Find enclosed another copy of the questionnaire. However, if you have 
already completed and returned the questionnaire, kindly disregard this letter.  
 
Thank you in advance for your support 
 
Yours truly, 
 
 
Chris Ogbechie 
Director Etisalat CSR Center 
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Appendix 6: Regression Analysis with Control Variables 
The four control variables are: 
Variable Components Parameter Percentage 
Share 
Size Small 
 
Big 
Up to N5 billion turnover 
 
More than N5 billion turnover 
58.9 
 
41.1 
 
Ownership Nigerian 
 
Foreign 
 83.7 
 
16.3 
 
Age Young 
 
Mature 
Up to 20 years 
 
More than 20 years 
34 
 
66 
 
Type of business Manufacturing 
 
Non- 
Manufacturing 
 18.4 
 
81.6 
 
Regression Analysis  
BIG FIRMS 
Coefficientsa 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 2.525 .560  4.505 .000   
BOPOPE .406 .071 .450 5.726 .000 .877 1.140 
BOPMEC .025 .037 .050 .676 .500 .976 1.025 
BOPCOH -.040 .056 -.055 -.708 .480 .882 1.134 
BOPDMS .179 .076 .190 2.360 .020 .832 1.202 
BOPDMC .015 .039 .029 .385 .701 .941 1.062 
a. Dependent Variable: BOVERF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.258 
Regression of Board Oversight Role on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 1.724 .895  1.928 .056   
BOPOPE .303 .113 .231 2.680 .008 .877 1.140 
BOPMEC .025 .059 .035 .425 .671 .976 1.025 
BOPCOH .226 .090 .215 2.506 .013 .882 1.134 
BOPDMS .005 .121 .004 .041 .967 .832 1.202 
BOPDMC .046 .062 .062 .741 .460 .941 1.062 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSERF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.107 
Regression of Board Service Role on Board Characteristics 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 2.249 .811  2.773 .006   
BOPOPE .301 .103 .254 2.933 .004 .877 1.140 
BOPMEC .024 .054 .036 .437 .662 .976 1.025 
BOPCOH .028 .082 .029 .341 .734 .882 1.134 
BOPDMS .160 .110 .129 1.451 .149 .832 1.202 
BOPDMC .068 .057 .100 1.195 .234 .941 1.062 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSTRF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.099 
Regression of Board Strategic Role on Board Characteristics 
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     Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 4.406 .609  7.231 .000   
CEODUL .851 .603 .117 1.411 .161 .946 1.057 
BODIND -1.150 .348 -.267 -3.307 .001 .993 1.007 
BOSIZE .020 .023 .071 .857 .393 .954 1.048 
DIVJOB .101 .087 .102 1.161 .248 .832 1.202 
DIVAFF .049 .045 .090 1.103 .272 .978 1.022 
HUCPRO .114 .072 .139 1.588 .115 .850 1.176 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPOPE 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.113 
Regression of Board Operations on Board Characteristics 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.144 1.168  2.692 .000   
CEODUL -.887 1.156 -.067 -.767 .444 .946 1.057 
BODIND .640 .666 .082 .960 .339 .993 1.007 
BOSIZE -.014 .044 -.027 -.312 .756 .954 1.048 
DIVJOB -.029 .167 -.016 -.175 .861 .832 1.202 
DIVAFF -.039 .086 -.039 -.457 .649 .978 1.022 
HUCPRO .292 .137 .197 2.128 .035 .850 1.176 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPMEC 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.003 
Regression of Board Meeting Conduct on Board Characteristics 
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    Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.660 .777  4.709 .000   
CEODUL -1.974 .769 -.216 -2.566 .011 .946 1.057 
BODIND .215 .443 .040 .484 .629 .993 1.007 
BOSIZE .010 .029 .028 .333 .740 .954 1.048 
DIVJOB .192 .111 .155 1.725 .087 .832 1.202 
DIVAFF .083 .057 .121 1.465 145 .978 1.022 
HUCPRO .144 .091 .140 1.576 .117 .850 1.176 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPCOH 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.079 
Regression of Board Cohesiveness on Board Characteristics 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 5.472 .613  8.920 .000   
CEODUL .135 .607 .019 .223 .824 .946 1.057 
BODIND -.208 .350 -.050 -.594 .554 .993 1.007 
BOSIZE -.018 .023 -.070 -.805 .422 .954 1.048 
DIVJOB .094 .088 .100 1.074 .285 .832 1.202 
DIVAFF -.051 .045 -.096 -1.127 .262 .978 1.022 
HUCPRO .113 .072 .144 1.562 .121 .850 1.176 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMS 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.017 
Regression of Board Meeting Structure on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.585 1.118  3.206 .002   
CEODUL 1.646 1.106 .129 1.488 .139 .946 1.057 
BODIND -.1.095 .638 -.146 -1.716 .088 .993 1.007 
BOSIZE .063 .042 .131 1.512 .133 .954 1.048 
DIVJOB .082 .160 .048 .516 .607 .832 1.202 
DIVAFF .099 .082 .103 1.202 .232 .978 1.022 
HUCPRO -.039 .132 -.027 -.298 .766 .850 1.176 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMC 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.022 
Regression of Board Directors’ Conduct on Board Characteristics 
 
 
SMALL FIRMS 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) .495 .499  .992 .324   
BOPOPE .434 .088 .418 4.949 .000 .686 1.457 
BOPMEC .016 .050 .024 .318 .752 .877 1.140 
BOPCOH .217 .107 .221 2.039 .044 .416 2.403 
BOPDMS .193 .110 .207 1.748 .084 .349 2.869 
BOPDMC .052 .058 .069 .893 .374 .820 1.220 
a. Dependent Variable: BOVERF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.540 
Regression of Board Oversight Role on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 1.608 .893  1.801 .075   
BOPOPE .008 .157 .006 .053 .958 .686 1.457 
BOPMEC .047 .090 .054 .515 .608 .877 1.140 
BOPCOH .377 .191 .302 1.980 .051 .416 2.403 
BOPDMS .046 .198 .039 .234 .816 .349 2.869 
BOPDMC .051 .104 .053 .486 .628 .820 1.220 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSERF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.091 
Regression of Board Service Role on Board Characteristics 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 1.603 .898  1.785 .078   
BOPOPE -.080 .158 -.058 -.507 .613 .686 1.457 
BOPMEC -.047 .091 -.052 -.518 .606 .877 1.140 
BOPCOH .027 .192 .021 .143 .887 .416 2.403 
BOPDMS .598 .199 .479 3.007 .003 .349 2.869 
BOPDMC .022 .105 .022 .210 .834 .820 1.220 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSTRF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.170 
Regression of Board Strategic Role on Board Characteristics 
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 Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.005 .731  4.111 .000   
CEODUL .126 .572 .022 .221 .826 .904 1.106 
BODIND .263 .623 .041 .421 .675 .943 1.061 
BOSIZE -.006 .041 -.014 -.143 .886 .925 1.081 
DIVJOB .274 .106 .264 2.579 .012 .860 1.163 
DIVAFF -.003 .068 -.004 -.041 .968 .932 1.073 
HUCPRO .206 .069 .297 2.966 .004 .898 1.114 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPOPE 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.153 
Regression of Board Operation on Board Characteristics 
     
 Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.693 1.207  3.060 .003   
CEODUL -.521 .945 -.059 -.551 .583 .904 1.106 
BODIND -1.558 1.029 -.159 -1.514 .134 .943 1.061 
BOSIZE -.116 .068 -.180 -1.699 .093 .925 1.081 
DIVJOB .173 .176 .109 .988 .326 .860 1.163 
DIVAFF .168 .112 .159 1.503 .136 .932 1.073 
HUCPRO .053 .115 .050 .464 .644 .898 1.114 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPMEC 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.020 
Regression of Board Meeting Conduct on Board Characteristics 
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     Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.668 .741  4.947 .000   
CEODUL .402 .581 .066 .693 .490 .904 1.106 
BODIND .173 .632 .026 .274 .785 .943 1.061 
BOSIZE -.074 .042 -.167 -1.758 .082 .925 1.081 
DIVJOB .300 .108 .273 2.778 .007 .860 1.163 
DIVAFF -.043 .069 -.059 -.621 .536 .932 1.073 
HUCPRO .250 .070 .341 3.548 .001 .898 1.114 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPCOH 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.219 
Regression of Board Cohesiveness on Board Characteristics 
 
    Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.041 .818  3.716 .000   
CEODUL .200 .641 .031 .312 .756 .904 1.106 
BODIND -.717 .698 -.101 -1.027 .307 .943 1.061 
BOSIZE -.002 .046 -.004 -.039 .969 .925 1.081 
DIVJOB .216 .119 .187 1.813 .073 .860 1.163 
DIVAFF .037 .076 .049 .491 .625 .932 1.073 
HUCPRO .265 .078 .344 3.416 .001 .898 1.114 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMS 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.143 
Regression of Board Meeting Structure on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 4.025 1.103  3.648 .000   
CEODUL 1.406 .864 .178 1.627 .107 .904 1.106 
BODIND .466 .941 .053 .496 .621 .943 1.061 
BOSIZE -.007 .062 -.012 -.111 .912 .925 1.081 
DIVJOB .153 .160 .107 .952 .344 .860 1.163 
DIVAFF -.047 .102 -.049 -.459 .647 .932 1.073 
HUCPRO .022 .105 .023 .211 .833 .898 1.114 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMC 
Adjusted R-Square is -0.015 
Regression of Board Directors’ Conduct on Board Characteristics 
 
 
 
MATURE FIRMS  
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 1.249 .524  2.383 .019   
BOPOPE .373 .081 .383 4.622 .000 .681 1.468 
BOPMEC .012 .040 .022 .307 .759 .944 1.060 
BOPCOH -.061 .071 -.069 -.860 .392 .723 1.384 
BOPDMS .453 .095 .423 4.793 .000 .599 1.668 
BOPDMC -.005 .039 -.010 -.140 .889 .954 1.048 
a. Dependent Variable: BOVERF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.438 
Regression of Board Oversight Role on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 1.755 1.022  1.717 .089   
BOPOPE .133 .157 .091 .846 .399 .681 1.468 
BOPMEC -.029 .077 -.035 -.379 .706 .944 1.060 
BOPCOH .275 .138 .208 1.993 .049 .723 1.384 
BOPDMS .081 .184 .050 .441 .660 .599 1.668 
BOPDMC .075 .075 .090 .996 .321 .954 1.048 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSERF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.057 
Regression of Board Service Role on Board Characteristics 
 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) .934 .873  1.070 .287   
BOPOPE .075 .134 .056 .555 .580 .681 1.468 
BOPMEC -.002 .066 -.003 -.030 .976 .944 1.060 
BOPCOH -.024 .118 -.020 -.202 .840 .723 1.384 
BOPDMS .619 .157 .419 3.932 .000 .599 1.668 
BOPDMC .059 .064 .077 .915 .362 .954 1.048 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSTRF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.182 
Regression of Board Strategic Role on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.292 .622  5.295 .000   
CEODUL .545 .456 .107 1.196 .234 .895 1.117 
BODIND -.144 .474 -.026 -.303 .762 .985 1.016 
BOSIZE .012 .027 .038 .433 .666 .919 1.088 
DIVJOB .267 .092 .270 2.894 .005 .828 1.208 
DIVAFF .042 .051 .072 .830 .408 .964 1.038 
HUCPRO .139 .062 .206 2.259 .026 .867 1.154 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPOPE 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.138 
Regression of Board Operation on Board Characteristics 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 2.850 1.168  2.440 .016   
CEODUL -.589 .857 -.067 -.688 .493 .895 1.117 
BODIND .470 .891 .049 .527 .599 .985 1.016 
BOSIZE -.005 .051 -.008 -.088 .930 .919 1.088 
DIVJOB .104 .173 .061 .603 .548 .828 1.208 
DIVAFF .030 .096 .029 .310 .757 .964 1.038 
HUCPRO .166 .116 .141 1.432 .155 .867 1.154 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPMEC 
Adjusted R-Square is -0.014 
Regression of Board Meeting Conduct on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 4.505 .713  6.322 .000   
CEODUL -1.050 .523 -.187 -2.009 .047 .895 1.117 
BODIND .433 .544 .071 .796 .428 .985 1.016 
BOSIZE -.024 .031 -.070 -.768 .444 .919 1.088 
DIVJOB .152 .106 .139 1.439 .153 .828 1.208 
DIVAFF .041 .058 .063 .698 .487 .964 1.038 
HUCPRO .147 .071 .197 2.086 .039 .867 1.154 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPCOH 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.072 
Regression of Board Cohesiveness on Board Characteristics 
 
    Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 4.941 .583  8.472 .000   
CEODUL .072 .428 .016 .169 .866 .895 1.117 
BODIND -.167 .445 -.033 -.376 .707 .985 1.016 
BOSIZE -.016 .025 -.057 -.626 .533 .919 1.088 
DIVJOB .082 .087 .091 .947 .346 .828 1.208 
DIVAFF -.005 .048 -.009 -.096 .924 .964 1.038 
HUCPRO .189 .058 .307 3.268 .001 .867 1.154 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMS 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.081 
Regression of Board Meeting Structure on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.022 1.150  2.628 .010   
CEODUL 1.701 .843 .190 2.018 .046 .895 1.117 
BODIND -.833 .877 -.085 -.949 .344 .985 1.016 
BOSIZE .075 .050 .139 1.500 .136 .919 1.088 
DIVJOB .044 .171 .025 .257 .798 .828 1.208 
DIVAFF .216 .094 .208 2.293 .024 .964 1.038 
HUCPRO -.050 .114 -.042 -.442 .659 .867 1.154 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMC 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.052 
Regression of Board Directors’ Conduct on Board Characteristics 
 
 
YOUNG FIRMS  
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 1.062 .510  2.085 .040   
BOPOPE .446 .077 .458 5.819 .000 .826 1.211 
BOPMEC .053 .046 .085 1.142 .256 .923 1.084 
BOPCOH .120 .071 .145 1.697 .093 .703 1.422 
BOPDMS .122 .081 .141 1.497 .137 .580 1.724 
BOPDMC .099 .058 .137 1.700 .092 .794 1.259 
a. Dependent Variable: BOVERF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.431 
Regression of Board Oversight Role on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) .918 .745  1.232 .221   
BOPOPE .270 .112 .222 2.405 .018 .826 1.211 
BOPMEC .080 .067 .104 1.186 .238 .923 1.084 
BOPCOH .296 .104 .286 2.856 .005 .703 1.422 
BOPDMS .118 .119 .109 .990 .324 .580 1.724 
BOPDMC -.037 .086 -.040 -.430 .668 .794 1.259 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSERF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.220 
Regression of Board Service Role on Board Characteristics 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 1.301 .860  1.512 .133   
BOPOPE .238 .129 .178 1.836 .069 .826 1.211 
BOPMEC -.009 .078 -.011 -.118 .906 .923 1.084 
BOPCOH .134 .120 .117 1.119 .266 .703 1.422 
BOPDMS .280 .137 .236 2.040 .044 .580 1.724 
BOPDMC .018 .099 .018 .182 .856 .794 1.259 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSTRF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.142 
Regression of Board Strategic Role on Board Characteristics 
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 Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.325 .680  4.893 .000   
CEODUL -.715 .840 -.076 -.850 .397 .963 1.038 
BODIND -.878 .436 -.181 -2.013 .047 .945 1.058 
BOSIZE .017 .032 .047 .522 .603 .967 1.034 
DIVJOB .121 .100 .114 1.206 .230 .855 1.169 
DIVAFF .031 .059 .048 .523 .602 .928 1.078 
HUCPRO .267 .074 .339 3.602 .000 .867 1.153 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPOPE 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.147 
Regression of Board Operation on Board Characteristics 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 4.524 1.168  3.874 .000   
CEODUL .402 1.445 .027 .278 .781 .963 1.038 
BODIND -.105 .750 -.014 -.140 .889 .945 1.058 
BOSIZE -.097 .055 -.171 -1.758 .082 .967 1.034 
DIVJOB .015 .172 .009 .086 .932 .855 1.169 
DIVAFF .039 .101 .039 .389 .698 .928 1.078 
HUCPRO .091 .127 .074 .718 .475 .867 1.153 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPMEC 
Adjusted R-Square is -0.016 
Regression of Board Meeting Conduct on Board Characteristics 
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     Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 2.503 .791  3.165 .002   
CEODUL .677 .978 .061 .692 .491 .963 1.038 
BODIND .115 .508 .020 .226 .821 .945 1.058 
BOSIZE -.003 .037 -.006 -.071 .943 .967 1.034 
DIVJOB .287 .116 .232 2.467 .015 .855 1.169 
DIVAFF .014 .068 .019 .209 .834 .928 1.078 
HUCPRO .281 .086 .304 3.250 .002 .867 1.153 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPCOH 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.159 
Regression of Board Cohesiveness on Board Characteristics 
 
  Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.339 .773  4.321 .000   
CEODUL -.275 .956 -.026 -.288 .774 .963 1.038 
BODIND -.191 .496 -.035 -.384 .701 .945 1.058 
BOSIZE -.008 .036 -.019 -.211 .833 .967 1.034 
DIVJOB .197 .114 .166 1.735 .086 .855 1.169 
DIVAFF -.056 .067 -.077 -.842 .402 .928 1.078 
HUCPRO .298 .084 .336 3.536 .001 .867 1.153 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMS 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.131 
Regression of Board Meeting Structure on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.702 .982  3.771 .000   
CEODUL 1.704 1.214 .135 1.403 .163 .963 1.038 
BODIND -.300 .630 -.046 -.476 .635 .945 1.058 
BOSIZE .031 .046 .066 .682 .497 .967 1.034 
DIVJOB .137 .144 .097 .950 .344 .855 1.169 
DIVAFF -.112 .085 -.130 -1.320 .190 .928 1.078 
HUCPRO .109 .107 .103 1.013 .313 .867 1.153 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMC 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.004 
Regression of Board Directors’ Conduct on Board Characteristics 
 
MULTINATIONAL FIRMS 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 2.364 .568  4.163 .000   
BOPOPE .251 .083 .269 3.011 .003 .794 1.259 
BOPMEC .060 .041 .121 1.467 .145 .928 1.078 
BOPCOH .184 .077 .225 2.402 .018 .721 1.386 
BOPDMS .089 .071 .113 1.250 .214 .777 1.288 
BOPDMC .042 .042 .082 .987 .326 .905 1.105 
a. Dependent Variable: BOVERF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.241 
Regression of Board Oversight Role on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 1.973 1.029  1.918 .058   
BOPOPE .120 .151 .079 .796 .428 .794 1.259 
BOPMEC .075 .074 .093 1.014 .313 .928 1.078 
BOPCOH .359 .139 .268 2.581 .011 .721 1.386 
BOPDMS -.037 .128 -.029 -.286 .775 .777 1.288 
BOPDMC .004 .077 .005 .057 .955 .905 1.105 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSERF 
Adjusted R - Square is 0.067 
Regression of Board Service Role on Board Characteristics 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 1.641 .905  1.813 .072   
BOPOPE .115 .133 .084 .864 .389 .794 1.259 
BOPMEC .044 .065 .060 .672 .503 .928 1.078 
BOPCOH .223 .122 .186 1.827 .070 .721 1.386 
BOPDMS .171 .113 .148 1.510 .134 .777 1.288 
BOPDMC .093 .068 .125 1.379 .170 .905 1.105 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSTRF 
Adjusted R - Square is 0.105 
Regression of Board Strategic Role on Board Characteristics 
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    Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.065 .668  4.587 .000   
CEODUL .853 .529 .150 1.612 .110 .850 1.176 
BODIND .030 .403 .007 .076 .940 .995 1.005 
BOSIZE .035 .023 .136 1.553 .123 .954 1.048 
DIVJOB .202 .083 .219 2.445 .016 .922 1.085 
DIVAFF .087 .049 .156 1.778 .078 .957 1.045 
HUCPRO .157 .079 .183 1.973 .051 .858 1.166 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPOPE 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.116 
Regression of Board Operation on Board Characteristics 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 2.326 1.310  1.776 .078   
CEODUL .420 1.037 .039 .405 .686 .850 1.176 
BODIND .418 .789 .048 .529 .598 .995 1.005 
BOSIZE -.060 .045 -.124 -1.351 .179 .954 1.048 
DIVJOB .188 .162 .108 1.162 .248 .922 1.085 
DIVAFF -.070 .096 -.066 -.723 .471 .957 1.045 
HUCPRO .351 .156 .218 2.256 .026 .858 1.166 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPMEC 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.036 
Regression of Board Meeting Conduct on Board Characteristics 
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    Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 2.478 .741  3.342 .001   
CEODUL .594 .587 .092 1.012 .314 .850 1.176 
BODIND .497 .447 .093 1.113 .268 .995 1.005 
BOSIZE .004 .025 .015 .172 .864 .954 1.048 
DIVJOB .334 .092 .317 3.643 .000 .922 1.085 
DIVAFF .001 .055 .001 .017 .987 .957 1.045 
HUCPRO .258 .088 .265 2.933 .004 .858 1.166 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPCOH 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.162 
Regression of Board Cohesiveness on Board Characteristics 
 
   Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 4.040 .828  4.881 .000   
CEODUL .580 .655 .086 .885 .378 .850 1.176 
BODIND .398 .499 .071 .798 .427 .995 1.005 
BOSIZE .004 .028 .014 .158 .874 .954 1.048 
DIVJOB .149 .102 .135 1.450 .150 .922 1.085 
DIVAFF -.058 .061 -.086 -.944 .347 .957 1.045 
HUCPRO .241 .098 .237 2.452 .016 .858 1.166 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMS 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.041 
Regression of Board Meeting Structure on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 4.157 1.299  3.200 .002   
CEODUL .959 1.028 .092 .933 .353 .850 1.176 
BODIND -1.094 .783 -.127 -1.397 .165 .995 1.005 
BOSIZE .064 .044 .134 1.440 .153 .954 1.048 
DIVJOB .186 .161 .109 1.159 .249 .922 1.085 
DIVAFF -.036 .096 -.035 -.381 .704 .957 1.045 
HUCPRO -.169 .154 -.107 -1.094 .276 .858 1.166 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMC 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.012 
Regression of Board Directors’ Conduct on Board Characteristics 
 
LOCAL FIRMS   
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) .721 .445  1.620 .108   
BOPOPE .423 .078 .425 5.437 .000 .621 1.610 
BOPMEC -.011 .043 -.016 -.258 .797 .940 1.063 
BOPCOH -.084 .068 -.098 -1.242 .217 .616 1.624 
BOPDMS .494 .102 .470 4.867 .000 .409 2.447 
BOPDMC .035 .050 .048 .710 .480 .839 1.192 
a. Dependent Variable: BOVERF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.578 
Regression of Board Oversight Role on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) .926 .746  1.242 .217   
BOPOPE .180 .130 .149 1.383 .170 .621 1.610 
BOPMEC -.019 .071 -.024 -.271 .787 .940 1.063 
BOPCOH .193 .114 .184 1.702 .092 .616 1.624 
BOPDMS .259 .170 .203 1.524 .131 .409 2.447 
BOPDMC .090 .084 .100 1.073 .286 .839 1.192 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSERF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.198 
Regression of Board Service Role on Board Characteristics 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 1.046 .799  1.309 .193   
BOPOPE .056 .140 .042 .403 .687 .621 1.610 
BOPMEC -.049 .076 -.055 -.641 .523 .940 1.063 
BOPCOH -.108 .122 -.094 -.886 .378 .616 1.624 
BOPDMS .779 .182 .555 4.278 .000 .409 2.447 
BOPDMC -.008 .090 -.008 -.090 .929 .839 1.192 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSTRF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.238 
Regression of Board Strategic Role on Board Characteristics 
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     Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 4.078 .719  5.670 .000   
CEODUL -.477 .640 -.067 -.746 .458 .919 1.088 
BODIND -1.168 .477 -.215 -2.450 .016 .972 1.029 
BOSIZE -.036 .041 -.081 -.875 .383 .872 1.147 
DIVJOB .176 .109 .160 1.612 .110 .764 1.308 
DIVAFF -.018 .059 -.027 -.301 .764 .952 1.051 
HUCPRO .216 .070 .305 3.064 .003 .758 1.319 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPOPE 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.169 
Regression of Board Operation on Board Characteristics 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 4.175 1.194  3.497 .001   
CEODUL -.564 1.062 -.054 -.531 .597 .919 1.088 
BODIND -.257 .792 -.032 -.325 .746 .972 1.029 
BOSIZE -.029 .068 -.044 -.422 .674 .872 1.147 
DIVJOB -.054 .181 -.033 -.297 .767 .764 1.308 
DIVAFF .106 .098 .107 1.077 .284 .952 1.051 
HUCPRO .039 .117 .037 .336 .738 .758 1.319 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPMEC 
Adjusted R-Square is -0.039 
Regression of Board Meeting Conduct on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 4.192 .869  4.826 .000   
CEODUL -1.513 .773 -.185 -1.958 .053 .919 1.088 
BODIND -.035 .576 -.006 -.060 .952 .972 1.029 
BOSIZE -.032 .049 -.062 -.642 .522 .872 1.147 
DIVJOB .099 .132 .078 .755 .452 .764 1.308 
DIVAFF .064 .072 .083 .891 .375 .952 1.051 
HUCPRO .227 .085 .278 2.666 .009 .758 1.319 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPCOH 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.086 
Regression of Board Cohesiveness on Board Characteristics 
 
    Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 4.160 .679  6.126 .000   
CEODUL -.407 .604 -.061 -.674 .502 .919 1.088 
BODIND -.836 .450 -.163 -1.856 .066 .972 1.029 
BOSIZE -.029 .039 -.070 -.757 .451 .872 1.147 
DIVJOB .151 .103 .145 1.465 .146 .764 1.308 
DIVAFF .016 .056 .026 .294 .769 .952 1.051 
HUCPRO .229 .066 .343 3.452 .001 .758 1.319 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMS 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.170 
Regression of Board Meeting Structure on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.158 1.047  3.015 .003   
CEODUL 1.607 .932 .169 1.725 .088 .919 1.088 
BODIND -.418 .695 -.057 -.602 .548 .972 1.029 
BOSIZE .053 .059 .089 .887 .377 .872 1.147 
DIVJOB .017 .159 .012 .108 .914 .764 1.308 
DIVAFF .143 .086 .159 1.651 .102 .952 1.051 
HUCPRO .123 .102 .129 1.199 .233 .758 1.319 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMC 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.021 
Regression of Board Directors’ Conduct on Board Characteristics 
 
 
MANUFACTURING FIRMS 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 1.249 .524  2.383 .019   
BOPOPE .373 .081 .383 4.622 .000 .681 1.468 
BOPMEC .012 .040 .022 .307 .759 .944 1.060 
BOPCOH -.061 .071 -.069 -.860 .392 .723 1.384 
BOPDMS .453 .095 .423 4.793 .000 .599 1.668 
BOPDMC -.005 .039 -.010 -.140 .889 .954 1.048 
a. Dependent Variable: BOVERF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.438 
Regression of Board Oversight Role on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 1.755 1.022  1.717 .089   
BOPOPE .133 .157 .091 .846 .399 .681 1.468 
BOPMEC -.029 .077 -.035 -.379 .706 .944 1.060 
BOPCOH .275 .138 .208 1.993 .049 .723 1.384 
BOPDMS .081 .184 .050 .441 .660 .599 1.668 
BOPDMC .075 .075 .090 .996 .321 .954 1.048 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSERF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.057 
Regression of Board Service Role on Board Characteristics 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) .934 .873  1.070 .287   
BOPOPE .075 .134 .056 .555 .580 .681 1.468 
BOPMEC -.002 .066 -.003 -.030 .976 .944 1.060 
BOPCOH -.024 .118 -.020 -.202 .840 .723 1.384 
BOPDMS .619 .157 .419 3.932 .000 .599 1.668 
BOPDMC .059 .064 .077 .915 .362 .954 1.048 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSTRF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.182 
Regression of Board Strategic Role on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.292 .622  5.295 .000   
CEODUL .545 .456 .107 1.196 .234 .895 1.117 
BODIND -.144 .474 -.026 -.303 .762 .985 1.016 
BOSIZE .012 .027 .038 .433 .666 .919 1.088 
DIVJOB .267 .092 .270 2.894 .005 .828 1.208 
DIVAFF .042 .051 .072 .830 .408 .964 1.038 
HUCPRO .139 .062 .206 2.259 .026 .867 1.154 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPOPE 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.138 
Regression of Board Operation on Board Characteristics 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 2.850 1.168  2.440 .016   
CEODUL -.589 .857 -.067 -.688 .493 .895 1.117 
BODIND .470 .891 .049 .527 .599 .985 1.016 
BOSIZE -.005 .051 -.008 -.088 .930 .919 1.088 
DIVJOB .104 .173 .061 .603 .548 .828 1.208 
DIVAFF .030 .096 .029 .310 .757 .964 1.038 
HUCPRO .166 .116 .141 1.432 .155 .867 1.154 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPMEC 
Adjusted R-Square is -0.014 
Regression of Board Meeting Conduct on Board Characteristics 
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     Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 4.505 .713  6.322 .000   
CEODUL -1.050 .523 -.187 -2.009 .047 .895 1.117 
BODIND .433 .544 .071 .796 .428 .985 1.016 
BOSIZE -.024 .031 -.070 -.768 .444 .919 1.088 
DIVJOB .152 .106 .139 1.439 .153 .828 1.208 
DIVAFF .041 .058 .063 .698 .487 .964 1.038 
HUCPRO .147 .071 .197 2.086 .039 .867 1.154 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPCOH 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.072 
Regression of Board Cohesiveness on Board Characteristics 
 
    Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 4.941 .583  8.472 .000   
CEODUL .072 .428 .016 .169 .866 .895 1.117 
BODIND -.167 .445 -.033 -.376 .707 .985 1.016 
BOSIZE -.016 .025 -.057 -.626 .533 .919 1.088 
DIVJOB .082 .087 .091 .947 .346 .828 1.208 
DIVAFF -.005 .048 -.009 -.096 .924 .964 1.038 
HUCPRO .189 .058 .307 3.268 .001 .867 1.154 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMS 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.081 
Regression of Board Meeting Structure on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.022 1.150  2.628 .010   
CEODUL 1.701 .843 .190 2.018 .046 .895 1.117 
BODIND -.833 .877 -.085 -.949 .344 .985 1.016 
BOSIZE .075 .050 .139 1.500 .136 .919 1.088 
DIVJOB .044 .171 .025 .257 .798 .828 1.208 
DIVAFF .216 .094 .208 2.293 .024 .964 1.038 
HUCPRO -.050 .114 -.042 -.442 .659 .867 1.154 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMC 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.052 
Regression of Board Directors’ Conduct on Board Characteristics 
 
SERVICE (NON-MANUFACTURING) FIRMS  
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 1.113 .368  3.023 .003   
BOPOPE .411 .057 .419 7.199 .000 .759 1.317 
BOPMEC .012 .031 .020 .379 .705 .941 1.063 
BOPCOH .045 .060 .049 .747 .456 .606 1.649 
BOPDMS .316 .066 .331 4.760 .000 .533 1.878 
BOPDMC .016 .035 .024 .449 .654 .870 1.150 
a. Dependent Variable: BOVERF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.456 
Regression of Board Oversight Role on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 1.201 .624  1.925 .056   
BOPOPE .130 .097 .097 1.345 .180 .759 1.317 
BOPMEC .017 .053 .021 .325 .745 .941 1.063 
BOPCOH .452 .102 .358 4.433 .000 .606 1.649 
BOPDMS .036 .112 .028 .324 .747 .533 1.878 
BOPDMC .004 .059 .004 .063 .950 .870 1.150 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSERF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.166 
Regression of Board Service Role on Board Characteristics 
 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) .974 .622  1.566 .119   
BOPOPE .173 .096 .128 1.796 .074 .759 1.317 
BOPMEC -.007 .053 -.009 -.134 .894 .941 1.063 
BOPCOH .149 .102 .117 1.467 .144 .606 1.649 
BOPDMS .364 .112 .277 3.244 .001 .533 1.878 
BOPDMC .035 .059 .040 .602 .548 .870 1.150 
a. Dependent Variable: BOSTRF 
Adjusted R- Square is 0.184 
Regression of Board Strategic Role on Board Characteristics 
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     Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.361 .467  7.192 .000   
CEODUL .990 .655 .098 1.512 .132 .955 1.047 
BODIND -.647 .316 -.130 -2.046 .042 .993 1.007 
BOSIZE .017 .022 .051 .797 .427 .969 1.032 
DIVJOB .181 .070 .180 2.584 .010 .830 1.205 
DIVAFF .044 .041 .070 1.081 .281 .956 1.046 
HUCPRO .194 .051 .261 3.835 .000 .864 1.158 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPOPE 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.155 
Regression of Board Operation on Board Characteristics 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.734 .832  4.487 .000   
CEODUL .941 1.166 .057 .806 .421 .955 1.047 
BODIND .051 .563 .006 .091 .928 .993 1.007 
BOSIZE -.057 .039 -.103 -1.471 .143 .969 1.032 
DIVJOB .069 .125 .042 .554 .580 .830 1.205 
DIVAFF .053 .073 .051 .724 .470 .956 1.046 
HUCPRO .110 .090 .090 1.221 .223 .864 1.158 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPMEC 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.004 
Regression of Board Meeting Conduct on Board Characteristics 
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    Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.474 .490  7.095 .000   
CEODUL .471 .686 .044 .686 .493 .955 1.047 
BODIND .219 .331 .041 .662 .508 .993 1.007 
BOSIZE -.013 .023 -.036 -.565 .573 .969 1.032 
DIVJOB .178 .074 .166 2.426 .016 .830 1.205 
DIVAFF .017 .043 .025 .394 .694 .956 1.046 
HUCPRO .275 .053 .348 5.188 .000 .864 1.158 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPCOH 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.178 
Regression of Board Cohesiveness on Board Characteristics 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 4.178 .486  8.594 .000   
CEODUL .437 .681 .042 .641 .522 .955 1.047 
BODIND -.246 .329 -.048 -.748 .455 .993 1.007 
BOSIZE -.016 .023 -.047 -.715 .475 .969 1.032 
DIVJOB .152 .073 .147 2.086 .038 .830 1.205 
DIVAFF -.034 .043 -.052 -.789 .431 .956 1.046 
HUCPRO .237 .053 .312 4.519 .000 .864 1.158 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMS 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.133 
Regression of Board Meeting Structure on Board Characteristics 
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Coefficients
a
 
 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
 
t 
 
 
 
Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
Beta 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(Constant) 3.494 .778  4.491 .000   
CEODUL 1.403 1.090 .090 1.287 .199 .955 1.047 
BODIND -.649 .526 -.085 -1.232 .219 .993 1.007 
BOSIZE .039 .036 .076 1.092 .276 .969 1.032 
DIVJOB .143 .117 .092 1.224 .222 .830 1.205 
DIVAFF .038 .068 .039 .554 .580 .956 1.046 
HUCPRO -.003 .084 -.003 -.036 .971 .864 1.158 
a. Dependent Variable: BOPDMC 
Adjusted R-Square is 0.005 
Regression of Board Directors’ Conduct on Board Characteristics 
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Hypotheses proven at 
Significant levels 
 
Overall 
 
Big 
 
Small 
 
Mature 
 
Young 
 
Multinat
ional 
 
Local 
 
Manufac
turing  
 
Service 
Board CEO Duality is positively correlated to 
board decision-making speed 
Positive 
at 5% 
  Positive at 
5% 
   Positive 
at 5% 
 
Board CEO Duality is positively correlated to 
cohesiveness 
 Negative 
at 1% 
 Negative 
at 5% 
   Negative 
at 5% 
 
Board independence is positively correlated to 
board operations efficiency 
 Negative 
at 1% 
  Negative 
at 5% 
 Negative 
at 5% 
 Negative 
at 5% 
The degree of job-related diversity on the board 
is negatively related to the speed of decision-
making 
        Positive 
at 5% 
The degree of job-related diversity on the board 
is negatively related to the board‘s cohesiveness 
Positive 
at 5% 
 Positive 
at 1% 
 Positive 
at 5% 
Positive 
at 1% 
  Positive 
at 5% 
Board job-related diversity is positively 
correlated with board operations efficiency.   
Positive 
at 1% 
 Positive 
at 1% 
Positive at 
1% 
Positive 
at 1% 
Positive 
at 5% 
Positive 
at 1% 
 Positive 
at 1% 
Level of human capital on the board is positively 
correlated to board decision-making speed. 
Positive 
at 1% 
 Positive 
at 1% 
Positive at 
1% 
Positive 
at 1% 
Positive 
at 5% 
Positive 
at 1% 
Positive 
at 1% 
Positive 
at 1% 
Level of human capital on the board is 
negatively correlated to board cohesiveness. 
Positive 
at 1% 
 Positive 
at 1% 
Positive at 
5% 
Positive 
at 1% 
Positive 
at 1% 
Positive 
at 1% 
Positive 
at 5% 
Positive 
at 1% 
Level of human capital on the board is positively 
correlated to board operations efficiency. 
Positive 
at 1% 
Positive 
at 5% 
Positive 
at 1% 
Positive at 
5% 
Positive 
at 1% 
Positive 
at 5% 
Positive 
at 1% 
Positive 
at 5% 
Positive 
at 1% 
          
Speed of Board decision-making will be 
positively related to  
   Board Oversight Role 
    
   Board Service Role  
    
   Board Strategic Role 
 
 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
 
 
Positive 
at 5% 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
 
 
Positive at 
1% 
-- 
 
Positive at 
1% 
 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 5% 
 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
The effect of cohesiveness on  
   Board Oversight Role will be positive 
    
   Board Service Role will be positive 
    
   Board Strategic Role will be positive. 
 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
--- 
 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 5% 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 5% 
-- 
Positive 
at 1% 
 
-- 
 
Positive at 
5% 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 5% 
Positive 
at 5% 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 5% 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
-- 
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The effect of efficient board operations on  
   Board Oversight Role  
    
   Board Service Role 
     
   Board Strategic Role 
 
will be positive. 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
Positive 
at 5% 
Positive 
at 5% 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
Positive 
at 1% 
Positive 
at 1% 
 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Positive at 
1% 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
Positive 
at 5% 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Positive 
at 1% 
-- 
 
-- 
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